Barnett v. Antonacci

Decision Date03 October 2013
Docket NumberNo. 4D12–2939.,4D12–2939.
Citation122 So.3d 400
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals
PartiesSteven L. BARNETT, Appellant, v. Peter ANTONACCI, State Attorney for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, Appellee.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Bruce S. Rogow and Tara A. Campion of Bruce S. Rogow, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

David Aronberg, State Attorney, and Leigh Lassiter Miller, Assistant State Attorney, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

GROSS, J.

Stephen L. Barnett appeals the dismissal of his verified petition for writ of mandamus, quo warranto, and/or all writs. The petition sought the abatement of a nolle prosse entered by the State Attorney for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Peter Antonacci. We affirm because there is no legal basis to issue the writs.

In early 2012, Bruce Colton, the State Attorney for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, charged William Chris Blane, Jr., by information with three counts of fraudulent transactions 1 and one count of second degree grand theft between $20,000 and $100,000.2 The information named Barnett as the victim of the crimes charged.

After filing the information, State Attorney Colton advised the Governor “that the victim [Barnett] and his wife are close friends of State Attorney Colton and his family[.] Consequently, the Governor reassigned the criminal prosecution to the State Attorney for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit.3

There was limited docket activity in the criminal case after it was transferred to the Fifteenth Circuit. Blane's defense counsel moved to dismiss three of the four counts for failure to comply with the statute of limitations. Thereafter, the parties stipulated to a docket call which was set for May 24, 2012.

On May 11, 2012, an assistant state attorney, acting on behalf of State Attorney Antonacci, filed a nolle prosse with the clerk of the circuit court that dismissed all four counts against Blane. The nolle prosse stated, “Although there was probable cause for arrest and charge of the Defendant(s), the State has entered a Nolle Prosse in this case.”

In his lawsuit, Barnett alleged that he “did not receive any notice from anyone of the decision to file the nolle prosse, nor was he informed of the fact that such an action was being considered.” Four days after the entry of the nolle prosse, however, assistant state attorneys from Antonacci's office met with Barnett in West Palm Beach and confirmed that the nolle prosse had been entered.

On June 7, 2012, Barnett filed a petition for writ of mandamus, quo warranto and/or all writs relief in the Florida Supreme Court. The petition sought an order “abating” the nolle prosse and, if necessary, an order compelling the Governor to appoint another state attorney to handle the prosecution. The Supreme Court transferred the case to the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit which entered the order dismissingthe petition that is the subject of this appeal.

[T]he de novo standard of review is applied when considering an order granting a motion to dismiss,” including the review of an order dismissing a petition for writ of mandamus. Walker v. Ellis, 989 So.2d 1250, 1251 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); see also Mazer v. Orange Cnty., 811 So.2d 857, 858–59 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (stating that appellate courts generally review orders dismissing petitions for writ of mandamus de novo ).

Barnett argues that Antonacci violated his constitutional right under Article I, section 16(b) of the Florida Constitution to, as he states, “notice and an opportunity for a victim to be heard vis a vis the dismissal of an information by a State Attorney.” Article I, section 16(b) provides,

Victims of crime or their lawful representatives, including the next of kin of homicide victims, are entitled to the right to be informed, to be present, and to be heard when relevant, at all crucial stages of criminal proceedings, to the extent that these rights do not interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused.

(Emphasis added).

Based on this provision, Barnett contends that “the Florida Constitution prohibits disposition of [a] criminal case without notifying the victim[.]

Harmonizing Article I, section 16(b) with the separation of powers provision of the Florida Constitution, we conclude that a prosecutor's decision to file charges or to discontinue prosecution is not a “stage” of a criminal proceeding within the meaning of Section 16(b). SeeFla. Const. art. II, § 3 (separation of powers provision).

“To be entitled to mandamus relief, ‘the petitioner must have a clear legal right to the requested relief, the respondent must have an indisputable legal duty to perform the requested action, and the petitioner must have no other adequate remedy available.’ Pleus v. Crist, 14 So.3d 941, 945 (Fla.2009) (quoting Huffman v. State, 813 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla.2000)).

When reviewing constitutional provisions, a court ‘follows principles parallel to those of statutory interpretation.’ Lewis v. Leon Cnty., 73 So.3d 151, 153 (Fla.2011) (quoting Zingale v. Powell, 885 So.2d 277, 282 (Fla.2004)). First, Florida courts “must examine the actual language used in the constitution.” Id. (citing Crist v. Fla. Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Inc., 978 So.2d 134, 140 (Fla.2008); Fla. Dep't of Rev. v. City of Gainesville, 918 So.2d 250, 256 (Fla.2005)). “If the constitutional language is clear, unambiguous, and addresses the matter at issue, it must be enforced as written, and courts do not turn to rules of constitutional construction.” Ford v. Browning, 992 So.2d 132, 136 (Fla.2008) (citing Fla. Soc'y of Ophthalmology v. Fla. Optometric Ass'n, 489 So.2d 1118, 1119 (Fla.1986)).

“If the explicit language is ambiguous or does not address the exact issue before the court, the court must endeavor to construe the constitutional provision in a manner consistent with the intent of the framers and the voters.” Id. (citing Crist, 978 So.2d at 140). “It is a fundamental rule of construction that, if possible, amendments to the Constitution should be construed so as to harmonize with other constitutional provisions....” State v. Div. of Bond Fin. of Dep't of Gen. Servs., 278 So.2d 614, 617 (Fla.1973).

A bedrock of the Florida Constitution is the separation of powers doctrine,which provides that [n]o person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided” in the Constitution. Art. II § 3, Fla. Const. “In construing our constitution, [Florida courts] have ‘traditionally applied a strict separation of powers doctrine.’ Fla. House of Reps. v. Crist, 999 So.2d 601, 611 (Fla.2008) (quoting Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So.2d 321, 329 (Fla.2004)). The separation of powers doctrine encompasses two fundamental prohibitions, the first being “that no branch may encroach upon the powers of another.” Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So.2d 260, 264 (Fla.1991). The doctrine “is directed only to those powers which belong exclusively to a single branch of government.... Thus, a branch of government is prohibited from exercising a power only when that power has been constitutionally assigned exclusively to another branch[.] State v. Palmer, 791 So.2d 1181, 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (citing Simms v. State Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 641 So.2d 957, 960 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); State v. Johnson, 345 So.2d 1069 (Fla.1977); Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Hollis, 439 So.2d 947 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)) (citation omitted).

Due to the separation of powers doctrine, courts have long recognized that a prosecutor, as a member of the executive branch, has the sole responsibility to enforce criminal laws of the state. [T]he discretion of a prosecutor in deciding whether and how to prosecute is absolute in our system of criminal justice.” State v. Cain, 381 So.2d 1361, 1367 (Fla.1980) (footnote omitted); see also United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.1965) (observing that “as an incident of the constitutional separation of powers, ... the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal prosecutions”). As the Florida Supreme Court has explained,

[T]here is considerable authority for the proposition that prosecutorial discretion is itself an incident of the constitutional separation of powers, and that as a result the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the prosecutor in his control over criminal prosecutions.

Cain, 381 So.2d at 1367 n. 8.

Under Article II, Section 3, a prosecutor has the exclusive discretion to decide whether to file charges or to continue with a prosecution. See State v. Brosky, 79 So.3d 134, 135 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“Florida case law clearly provides that, in the absence of statute or motion to dismiss, the decision whether to prosecute or to dismiss charges is a determination to be made by solely the State.” (Citations omitted)). As an extension of this provision, a state attorney has the unilateral discretion to enter a nolle prosse. See State v. R.J., 763 So.2d 370, 371 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (“It is axiomatic that the decision to file a nolle prosse is vested solely in the discretion of the state.”) (footnote omitted); Wilkins v. State, 90 So.3d 305, 306 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) ([T]he decision to nolle prose a cause is within the sole discretion of the State ....”) (citing State v. Kahmke, 468 So.2d 284, 285 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)). The discretionary power of a prosecutor “in determining whether a prosecution shall be commenced or maintained may well depend upon matters of policy wholly apart from any question of probable cause.” Cox, 342 F.2d at 171 (footnote omitted).

Harmonizing Article I, Section 16(b) with the separation of powers mandated by Article II, Section 3 leads to the conclusion that a prosecutor's decision to file charges or to discontinue prosecution with a nolle prosse is not a “stage” of a criminal proceeding...

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