Barnett v. Concentrix Sols. Corp.
| Decision Date | 07 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | CV-22-00266-PHX-DJH |
| Parties | Adam Barnett, Plaintiff, v. Concentrix Solutions Corporation, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Collective and Class Action Complaint (Doc. 12) filed by Defendants Concentrix Solutions Corporation and Concentrix CVG Customer Management Group Incorporated (collectively “Concentrix”). Plaintiff Adam Barnett (“Plaintiff') filed a Response (Doc. 23) and Concentrix filed a Reply (Doc. 34). Also pending is Plaintiff's Motion to Certify Class, to Authorize Notice and for Expedited Discovery (Doc. 19) and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Under Seal exhibits therein (Doc 20). Concentrix filed a Response (Doc. 35) and Plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. 41). For the following reasons, the Court grants Concentrix's Motion to Dismiss and, consequently denies Plaintiff's Motion to Certify Class and Motion for Leave to File Under Seal as moot.
Plaintiff seeks to lead a collective class action against Concentrix for allegedly violating Federal and Arizona State labor laws. Defendant Concentrix Solutions Corporation, a New York for-profit corporation (Doc. 1 at ¶ 14), and Defendant Concentrix CVG Customer Management Group Incorporated, an Ohio for-profit corporation (Id. at ¶ 18), jointly provide marketing services through technology solutions for customers throughout the United States. (Id. at ¶ 26). On October 1, 2021, Plaintiff submitted an electronic application to work as a Senior Advisor II for Sales at Concentrix's Tempe, Arizona facility. (Doc. 23-1 at 10-11). The position provides telephone sales and services to Arizona customers. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 28). Plaintiff was hired on October 4, 2021 (Doc. 23-1 at 10) at an hourly wage rate of $20 per hour. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 30). Concentrix employees, such as Plaintiff, are eligible for various types of incentive pay if they meet certain metrics set by Concentrix. (Id. at ¶ 32).
When submitting his employment application, Plaintiff signed an acknowledgment (Doc. 23 at 4) that set forth, among other things, the following terms and conditions of employment with Concentrix:
(Doc. 12-1 at 4-5). In accepting employment at Concentrix, Plaintiff signed a “Reaffirmation of Application Acknowledgment” (“Application Acknowledgement” or “Acknowledgement”) (Docs. 23 at 3; 23-1 at 4-7), which affirmed the above provisions.
In the Collective and Class Action Complaint (Doc. 1) (“Complaint”), Plaintiff alleges Concentrix failed to pay him all wages due- including regular time, overtime, and Paid Sick Time - with factored incentive pay. Plaintiff brings the following three causes of action: Count I for failure to pay overtime wages and preserve accurate time records under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 29 U.S.C. § 207 et seq.; Count II for failure to pay timely wages due under the Arizona Wage Statute A.R.S. § 23-350 et seq.; and Count III for failure to pay paid sick time under the Arizona Paid Sick Time Statute A.R.S. § 23371 et seq. (Doc. 1 at ¶ ¶ 80-98).
Plaintiff seeks to bring Count I as a collective action under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (Id. at ¶ 66) on behalf of himself and all similarly situated current and former employees employed by Concentrix within the last three years prior to Plaintiff's filing of his Complaint. (Id. at ¶ 2). Plaintiff further seeks to bring Counts II and III as a class action under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) (Id. at ¶ 72) on behalf of himself and all similarly situated current and former Concentrix employees employed by Concentrix in Arizona from February 18, 2019, to present. (Id. at ¶ 3).
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2003). A complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal; it simply must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Ordinarily, a court may look only at the face of the complaint to rule on a motion to dismiss. Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). If a district court considers evidence outside the pleadings when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it must normally convert the motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment and give the nonmoving party an opportunity to respond. Fed.R.Civ.P. (12)(d); United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003); San Francisco Patrol Special Police Officers v. City & Cnty. Of San Francisco, 13 Fed.Appx. 670, 675 (9th Cir. 2001).
However, there are two exceptions to the above conversion requirement. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). First, a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record under Federal Rule of Evidence 201. See San Francisco Patrol Special Police Officers, 13 Fed.Appx. at 675. Second, a court may consider “material that the plaintiff properly submitted as part of the complaint or, even if not physically attached to the complaint, material that is not contended to be inauthentic and that is necessarily relied upon by the plaintiff's complaint.” Id. The latter scenario is referred to as the “incorporation by reference” doctrine in the Ninth Circuit. See e.g., Van Buskirk, 284 F.3d at 980. The circuit court has “extended the ‘incorporation by reference' doctrine to situations in which the plaintiff's claim depends on the contents of a document, the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss, and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the document, even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the complaint.” Ward v. Pima Animal Care Ctr. Officer Hinte, No. CV-20-0076-TUC-BGM, 2021 WL 4478401, at *4 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2021) (quoting Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005)).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court accepts all factual allegations in the complaint as true and views the pleadings in light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Knievel, 393 F.3d at 1072. That rule does not apply, however, to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint that provides “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor will a complaint suffice if it presents nothing more than “naked assertions” without “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557.
Concentrix moves to dismiss Plaintiff's collective and class action claims from the Complaint (Doc. 12 at 2) pursuant to the following waiver contained in the Application Acknowledgment signed by the Plaintiff:
I further agree that I will pursue any lawsuit relating to my employment with Concentrix (or any of Its subsidiaries or related entitles) as an Individual, and will not lead, join, or serve as a member of a class or group of persons bringing such a lawsuit.
(Doc. 12-1 at 5) (the “class action waiver”). Though not explicitly stated, the Court construes Concentrix's Motion to Dismiss as a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim alleging Plaintiff voluntarily and contractually waived his right to lead or participate in a collective or class action upon signing the Application Acknowledgment. (Doc. 12 at 2). In ruling on the Motion the Court will consider the Application Acknowledgement attached to both Concentrix's Motion (Doc. 12-1 at 4-6) and Plaintiff's Response (Doc. 23-1 at 4-7) under the incorporation by reference doctrine. See supra Section II. Because the plain language of the waiver is clear and unambiguous, the central issue in deciding this Motion is whether the class action wavier in the Acknowledgement is enforceable against the Plaintiff.[1]
It appears the parties agree that Arizona contract law applies to the present dispute. (See Docs. 12 at 3; 23 at 7 10-11; 34 at 1, 3-4). See also Longnecker v. Am. Exp. Co., 23 F.Supp.3d 1099, 1106 (D. Ariz. 2014) (“A district court looks to state law in determining whether a valid, enforceable [] agreement exists.” (internal citations omitted). Concentrix maintains the Acknowledgement is a valid, binding contract under Arizona law, and such waivers have been upheld as enforceable by other courts despite the absence of an arbitration agreement. Plaintiff argues the Acknowledgment should not be enforced against him because (1) certain terms therein are substantively and procedurally unconscionable; (2) the unconscionable terms cannot be severed from the rest of the Acknowledgment; and (3) public policy supports this...
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