Barnett v. Penn Hills Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 18 May 2016
• Docket Number: 2:16-cv-274
• Parties: DAVAUN BARNETT, Plaintiff, v. PENN HILLS SCHOOL DISTRICT, PENN HILLS SHOOL DISTRICT SCHOOL BOARD, CARL BARBARINO, JENNIFER BURGESS-JOHNSON, DENISE GRAHAM-SHEALY, HEATHER HOOLAHAN, ROBERT HUDAK, DONALD KUHN, and JOHN ZACCHIA, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

DAVAUN BARNETT, Plaintiff, v. PENN HILLS SCHOOL DISTRICT, PENN HILLS SHOOL DISTRICT SCHOOL BOARD,CARL BARBARINO, JENNIFER BURGESS-JOHNSON, DENISE GRAHAM-SHEALY,HEATHER HOOLAHAN, ROBERT HUDAK, DONALD KUHN, and JOHN ZACCHIA, Defendants.

2:16-cv-274

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

May 18, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which the Plaintiff, Davaun Barnett, a former principal in the Penn Hills School District, challenges the circumstances surrounding his termination. Pending before the Court is the MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 14) filed by Defendants, along with a brief in support (ECF No. 15). Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition thereto (ECF No. 17), and the motion is ripe for disposition.

I. Background

Plaintiff was the building principal at Linton Middle School in the Penn Hills School District until his termination in August 2013. Compl. ¶ 15. The incident leading to his termination occurred on February 9, 2013, when the school held a "Star Wars"-themed fundraiser. Id. ¶ 16. A staff member who was collecting money at the door needed a break and was relieved by Plaintiff's wife. Id. ¶ 17. The staff member gave Plaintiff's wife $300.00 that had been collected for the fundraiser and told her to give the money to Plaintiff. The money has never been accounted for. Id.

Plaintiff learned about the missing funds for the first time on May 9, 2013, and told the School District that his wife would check if she had any receipts that could account for the money. Id. ¶ 18. "Plaintiff could only speculate as to what could have happened to the money," and so he asked the School District for a letter stating how much was "unaccounted for." Id. Four days later, the School District sent Plaintiff a "formal request to provide receipts/and [sic] or funds to address the discrepancy by May 20, 2013." Id. ¶ 19.

Before Plaintiff could respond, however, he "received notice of a Loudermill hearing" from the School District, which charged him with "[i]mproper personal or financial gain, where it is alleged that [he] may have retained school funds without permission." Id. ¶ 20 (internal quotation marks omitted). After the Loudermill hearing was held, the School District sent Plaintiff a "formal statement of charges and notice of hearing,"¹ in which Plaintiff claims that he was "charged with something new: 'failure to account for or return $300.000 (Three Hundred Dollars) placed in [his] trust through [his] wife.'" Id. ¶ 21.

A formal hearing was then conducted. Afterwards, the School Board made "no finding as to whether [Plaintiff] himself ever actually personally misappropriated the $300.00 cash given to [his wife]." Id. ¶ 22 (internal quotation marks omitted). But it went on to conclude that "Plaintiff had 'intentionally obfuscated' the District investigation into the missing funds by speculating about what could have happened to the money.'" Id. ¶ 23. Based on that finding, "the Boardrecommended terminating Plaintiff's employment." Id. ¶ 24.

Plaintiff sought review of the School Board's decision with Pennsylvania's Acting Secretary of Education, who affirmed after conducting a de novo review. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff appealed that decision to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court,² arguing, among other things, that "his due process rights were violated when he was not notified that the basis of his immorality charge included allegations of misrepresentations prior to the Board hearing on the matter."³ Commw. Ct. Opinion at 2, ECF No. 15-1. The court rejected that argument, finding that Plaintiff was given adequate notice of the charges against him and that his "defense was not prejudiced by being subjected to surprise charges." Id. at 19. The court also sided with the School District on the remaining issues and affirmed the decision of the Acting Secretary. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that while his appeal was pending, "and more specifically on or about June 2, 2015," he learned "that the 'process' through which" he was terminated "was an utter sham." Id. ¶ 27. In particular, he alleges that he "received a communication from a former Board member" saying "that the Board had decided to terminate [his] employment . . . long before it had magically molded the allegations against him to the supposed 'obfuscation' charge." Id. ¶ 28. As support for this assertion, Plaintiff points to the fact that the School Board "directed theDistrict to remove Plaintiff's salary from the District's budget" in May 2013, which "was well before Plaintiff's formal hearing in September and October 2013." Id. ¶¶ 29-30. Plaintiff also claims that since June 2015, he has received "other communications" confirming that his salary was removed from the School District's budget before his formal hearing was held. Id. ¶ 32. According to Plaintiff, "[s]everal witnesses are thus available and willing to testify to the fact that the 'process' afforded to [him] was irreparably tainted with the Board's pre-arranged agenda to terminate [his] employment." Id. ¶ 33.

Plaintiff filed this suit on March 9, 2016, alleging violations of procedural and substantive due process, along with conspiracy and various state-law claims.⁴ In addition to the School District and School Board,⁵ Plaintiff has named the members of the School Board - Carl Barbarino, Jennifer Burgess-Johnson, Denise Graham-Shealy, Heather Hoolahan, Robert Hudak, Donald Kuhn, and John Zacchia - as Defendants. The Defendants now move to dismiss all of the claims against them.

II. Legal Standard

"[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The plausibility standard "does not impose a probability requirement." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). However, a pleading must show "more than a sheer possibility that a defendantacted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

III. Discussion

A. Preclusion

Defendants first contend that Plaintiff's "claims and the essential issues he raises . . . have already been determined by the Secretary of Education and the Commonwealth Court" and thus are barred by claim and issue preclusion.⁶ Defs.' Br. at 3, ECF No. 15. As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has explained,

Issue preclusion, otherwise known as collateral estoppel, bars re-litigation of an issue identical to that in a prior action. Claim preclusion, often called res judicata, is broader in effect and prohibits reexamination not only of matters actually decided in the prior case, but also those that the parties might have, but did not, assert in that action.

Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett Sq., 4 F.3d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1993). "When a prior case has been adjudicated in a state court, federal courts are required by 28 U.S.C. § 1738 to give full faith and credit to the state judgment and, in section 1983 cases, apply the same preclusion rules as would the courts of that state." Id. (citations omitted).

1. Claim Preclusion

Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, "[a]ny final, valid judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction precludes any future suit between the parties or their privies on the same cause of action." Balent v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 669 A.2d 309, 313 (Pa. 1995). For the doctrine to apply, "(1) the thing sued upon [,] (2) the cause of action[,] (3) the persons and parties to the action[,] and (4) the capacity of the parties to sue or be sued" must be the same in both actions. R & J Holding Co. v. Redev. Auth. of Cnty. of Montgomery, 670 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bearoff v. Bearoff Bros., Inc., 327 A.2d 72, 74 (Pa. 1974)). If theserequirements are met, the doctrine will bar not just claims that were actually litigated, but also those that "could have been litigated during the first proceeding if they were part of the same cause of action." Balent, 669 A.2d at 313.

Instead of addressing these requirements in his response, Plaintiff argues that his claims are not barred because they are based on what he calls "newly discovered" evidence: i.e., that he learned that the Defendants had already decided to terminate him prior to his formal hearing while his appeal was pending, as evidenced by the Board's decision to "remove" his salary from the budget before the hearing was held. "[T]he Defendants' concealed bias," he argues, "could only have become knowable . . . by virtue of the fortuitous disclosure from several insiders who reached out to him after his termination was final." Pl.'s Br. at 5. "Consequently," he says, "the current distinct claim of a deprivation of due process could not have been presented any earlier than it has been." Id.

Plaintiff's argument seems rather specious. His allegation that an unidentified individual told him that Defendants had predetermined his fate before the formal hearing is nothing more than "a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation," which need not be accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Moreover, it strains credulity for him to suggest that he had no idea that his salary was "removed" (whatever that actually means) from the budget until June 2015. If his salary was "removed," then presumably he would have stopped receiving a paycheck from the School District. And certainly that would not have been lost on him at the time. In fact, according to the Commonwealth Court's opinion, Plaintiff's status was actually converted from "suspended with pay" to "suspended without pay" following the Loudermill hearing. Commw. Ct. Opinion at 4. So he had to have known that he was off the payroll, even if temporarily, long before he now claims. At any rate, this hardly shows that Plaintiff's fate was sealed prior to theformal hearing, and...