Barnett v. Tipton County Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 26 January 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07-2055-JPM-dkv.,07-2055-JPM-dkv.
• Citation: 601 F.Supp.2d 980
• Parties: Christopher P. BARNETT, by his next friend and father, Donald BARNETT; Kevin D. Black, by his next friend and mother, Dana Black; and Gary A. Moses, by his next friend and mother, Misty Platt, Plaintiffs, v. TIPTON COUNTY BOARD OF EDCATION; Tim Fite, individually and in his official capacity as Director of Schools for the Tipton County Board of Education; and Grant Shipley, individually and in his official capacity as principal of Brighton High School, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

601 F.Supp.2d 980

Christopher P. BARNETT, by his next friend and father, Donald BARNETT; Kevin D. Black, by his next friend and mother, Dana Black; and Gary A. Moses, by his next friend and mother, Misty Platt, Plaintiffs, v. TIPTON COUNTY BOARD OF EDCATION; Tim Fite, individually and in his official capacity as Director of Schools for the Tipton County Board of Education; and Grant Shipley, individually and in his official capacity as principal of Brighton High School, Defendants.

No. 07-2055-JPM-dkv.

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division.

January 26, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William T. Winchester, The Law Offices of William T. Winchester, Memphis, TN, for Plaintiffs.

James I. Pentecost, Brent S. Usery, Pentecost Glenn & Rudd, PLLC, Jackson, TN, Stephen L. Shields, Jackson Shields Yeiser Holt Speakman & Lucas, Memphis, TN, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JON PHIPPS McCALLA, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendants Tipton County Board of Education, Tim Fite, and Grant Shipley's ("Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 28), filed on June 10, 2008. Plaintiffs Christopher Barnett, Kevin Black, and Gary Moses ("Plaintiffs") filed a Response (Doc. 33) on September 10, 2008. A telephonic hearing was held on the motion on September 11, 2008. Present for Defendants was Brent Usery, Esq. Plaintiffs' counsel failed to appear. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from Plaintiffs' allegations that Defendants violated their First Amendment and Due Process rights and committed various torts under Tennessee state law. Plaintiffs contend Defendants violated their civil rights by taking disciplinary action against them upon learning that Plaintiffs created fake Internet profiles for a teacher and school administrator on a public website. (Compl., generally.)

At the times of the incidents in question, Plaintiffs were all students at Brighton High School ("BHS") in Brighton, Tipton County, Tennessee. (Id. at ¶¶ 1-3.) In October 2006, Plaintiff Christopher Barnett created a fake Myspace profile of Earl LeFlore, the assistant principal at BHS. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.) The profile contained LeFlore's photograph and biography from the Tipton County Board of Education's ("Board") website as well as sexually suggestive comments about female BHS students. (Fite Aff. at 2.) Plaintiff Kevin Black created a similar profile of Charles Nute, a coach at BHS. (Shipley Aff. at 3.)

BHS first received notice of the websites upon receiving phone calls from a concerned parent and a local reporter who believed LeFlore was the author of the website and had engaged in inappropriate communications with BHS students. (Fite Aff. at 1-2.) BHS officials conducted an investigation, during which Plaintiff Gary Moses admitted to contributing to the websites and identified Barnett and Black as the sites' creators. (Id. at 2.) School officials also learned through searches of the school computers that Barnett had accessed LeFlore's fake profile during one of his classes in the school's computer lab. (Erickson Aff. at 1-2.) As a result of the investigation, the school suspended Barnett for two days and gave him an eight day in-school suspension, gave Black an eleven day in-school suspension, and gave Moses a two-day in-school suspension. (Shipley Aff. at 4.)

Following his suspension, Barnett created a website containing a "Wanted" poster containing the photograph of a BHS student. (Fite Aff. at 3.) Barnett allegedly believed this student told school officials that Barnett had created LeFlore's Myspace profile. (Id.)

In November 2006, the Board conducted disciplinary hearings regarding Barnett and Black's actions. (Shipley Aff. at 5.) The committee heard testimony from school officials, Barnett, and Black, and it also considered evidence gathered during the school's investigation. (Tr. of BHS Administrative Hr'g Regarding Chris Barnett and Kevin Black 4-50.) The Board concluded that Barnett should be sent to an alternative school for the remainder of the school year, and Barnett did not appeal the Board's decision. (Id. at 79-80.) The Board also found that Black's inschool suspension was sufficient punishment and placed him on a zero-tolerance policy for the remainder of the school year. (Id.)^*

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants violated Plaintiffs' Free Speech rights and deprived Plaintiffs of their right to public education without due process of law. (Compl. ¶ 34.) Plaintiffs also bring a claim for defamation, alleging that the charges brought by Defendants were false. (Compl. ¶ 36.) In addition, Plaintiffs claim that were the charges against them true, Defendants publicly aired the allegations in a manner that portrayed Plaintiffs in a false light. (Compl. ¶ 38.) Last, Plaintiffs assert that the charges against them were false and that Defendants engaged in outrageous conduct in making the charges. (Compl. ¶ 40.) Plaintiffs seek damages and a permanent injunction, among other relief.

In the instant motion, Defendants move for summary judgment, asserting that Plaintiffs have failed to put forth sufficient evidence to support their claims.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celdtex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). So long as the movant has met its initial burden of "demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact," Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, and the nonmoving party is unable to make such a showing, summary judgment is appropriate. Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d 351, 353 (6th Cir.1989). In considering a motion for summary judgment, however, "the evidence as well as all inferences drawn therefrom must be read in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir.1986), reh'g denied; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

When confronted with a properly-supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see also Abeita v. TransAm. Mailings, Inc., 159 F.3d 246, 250 (6th Cir.1998), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied. A genuine issue of material fact exists for trial "if the evidence [presented by the nonmoving party] is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In essence, the inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. Analysis

Defendants' motion for summary judgment rests on three contentions: (A) Defendants did not violate Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights, (B) Defendants did not violate Plaintiffs' Substantive and Procedural Due Process rights, and (C) Plaintiffs' state law claims should be dismissed because federal courts do not have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims arising under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act ("TGTLA"). The Court will address each of these issues in turn.

A. First Amendment Violation

Plaintiffs argue that their web profiles are protected as "parodies." Parodies are not "reasonably believable" and are clearly exaggerated to enhance humor of the parody. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988). The First Amendment protects parodies that involve speech that cannot "reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about [the subject of the parody]." Id.

Plaintiffs have offered no evidence to support their contention that a visitor to the websites would understand them to be parodies and not describing actual facts. Furthermore, visitors to the fraudulent website believed it was authentic and that LeFlore had engaged in the inappropriate behavior. Both a news reporter and a parent of one of the school's students contacted the school believing the website to be true. Because there is no genuine issue of material fact on this issue, the Court cannot find that Plaintiffs' websites are protected as parodies under the First Amendment, and Plaintiffs' First Amendment claim is DISMISSED.

B. Violation of Plaintiff's Due Process Rights

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated both their substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants contest this allegation, asserting that the disciplinary proceedings held by the school Board satisfied due process requirements.

1. The Board's Disciplinary Hearing

Plaintiffs first assert that the hearings deprived them of procedural due process. A state cannot deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Article XI § 12 of the Tennessee Constitution gives students a property interest in free public education that is protected by the Due Process Clause. Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 574 (6th Cir.2000). A student's right to procedural due process requires formal procedures for student disciplinary hearings involving expulsion or suspensions of more than ten days. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-73, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975). School officials must tailor disciplinary hearing procedures to avoid "unfair or mistaken findings of misconduct and arbitrary exclusions from school." Id. at 581, 95 S.Ct. 729.

School board disciplinary...