Barnett v. United States

• Decision Date: 23 March 1936
• Docket Number: No. 7962.,7962.
• Citation: 82 F.2d 765
• Parties: BARNETT et al. v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

82 F.2d 765 (1936)

BARNETT et al. v. UNITED STATES.

No. 7962.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

March 23, 1936.

Paul R. Hutchinson, of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.

Peirson M. Hall, U. S. Atty., and Howell Purdue, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Los Angeles, Cal.

Marion De Vries, of Washington, D. C. (Jesse P. Crawford and H. Kennedy McCook, both of Washington, D. C., of counsel), amici curiæ.

Before WILBUR, GARRECHT, and MATHEWS, Circuit Judges.

WILBUR, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a decree in equity in an action brought by the United States to recover from Anna Laura Barnett and the other defendants, who have not appealed, such portion of the sum of $550,000 as was given to her by the Secretary of the Interior from funds of an Indian derived from royalties from an oil lease on real estate allotted to the Indian in the state of Oklahoma.

The appellants filed eleven assignments of error. The first was that the court erred in denying the motion of defendant Anna Laura Barnett to dismiss the amended bill of complaint. The third was that the court erred in overruling the objection of the defendants Anna Laura Barnett and Maxine Sturges by their counsel to the introduction of any evidence in said case. The sixth, that the trial court had no jurisdiction over this action or its subject-matter and erred in assuming and maintaining the same.

The appellants have prepared an agreed statement on appeal purporting to be in accordance with Equity Rule 77 (28 U.S.C.A. following section 723), which permits a statement of the cause "showing how the questions arose and were decided in the district court and setting forth so much only of the facts alleged and proved, or sought to be proved, as is essential to a decision of such questions by the appellate court."

This agreed statement is in the form of a stipulation approved by the trial judge. Among other things it states:

"It is hereby stipulated that no statement of evidence or bill of exceptions need be filed herein, and that the appeal of said case be heard on the judgment roll and upon this Agreed Statement on Appeal.

"* * * It is hereby stipulated that all orders and rulings herein mentioned and made to motions herein mentioned and the decision of the court thereon were and are duly excepted to by appellants; * * * that the motions of the defendants and appellants Anna Laura Barnett and Maxine Sturges to dismiss and to strike from plaintiff's bill of complaint applied to the original petition, its amendment, and the amended bill of complaint."

It is also stipulated that at the beginning of the trial the defendants and appellants objected to the introduction of any evidence on the ground that the plaintiff and appellee had no legal capacity to sue and that said objection was overruled by the court.

It was further stipulated that certain questions, fifteen in number, are presented to be passed upon in this appeal.

In so far as the stipulation purported to state certain propositions of law to be decided by this court upon appeal, it departs from rule 77 and must be disregarded. The parties have no right to determine by stipulation the questions to be decided on appeal. The purpose of rule 77 is to permit a succinct statement of the record so as to show how the questions to be submitted to the appellate court arose and were decided in the District Court.

Under the head of "Specification of Errors" in appellants' brief we find the following statement:

"The assignment of errors lists 11 assigned errors. After it was filed, counsel for appellants and for respondent stipulated that the appeal be prosecuted on the judgment roll and certain questions specially presented by the stipulation. In briefing appellants' cause it has been found helpful to combine some of those points. All of them are defects appearing on the face of the record. They were first presented by defendants' motion to dismiss, at the trial by defendants' objection to the introduction of any evidence, and at the close of plaintiff's case by the motion to strike all evidence, and for judgment for defendants. Now they arise naturally in an appeal on the judgment roll, except where otherwise noted. Appellants contend that the court committed error in denying said motions and that the decree is fatally defective, in the following particulars:

"I. The United States is without guardianship power or legal right to sue as plaintiff to nullify the marriage of Jackson Barnett. * * *

"II. The attempt on the part of the United States to interfere with the marriage of the Barnetts is an unconstitutional interference with their rights as citizens. * * *

"III. Assuming that the United States had the guardianship power or legal right to maintain an action to nullify the marriage, the United States District Court had no jurisdiction over the action pertaining to the marriage or the power to decree the marriage a nullity. * * *

"IV. Assuming that the United States had the guardianship power and the legal right to maintain the action to nullify the marriage, and the District Court jurisdiction over such an action, they both fall short of the power to annul the marriage, and the marriage is therefore valid.

"V. Assuming that the United States had the guardianship power and legal right to sue to nullify the marriage and the United States District Court jurisdiction over such an action, relief should be refused because of laches, and plaintiff should be estopped to maintain the action to nullify the marriage. * * *

"VI. The amended bill of complaint contains a misjoinder and multiplicity of causes of action, and violates Equity Rule 26 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723 * *

"VIII. The amended bill of complaint is fatally defective in that there is a nonjoinder of necessary parties defendant. * * *

"X. The plaintiff did not have the right to sue to recover property previously held as restricted for the benefit of Jackson Barnett, which was released from such restriction by the Secretary of the Interior in the exercise of his discretion."

These specifications are scattered through 108 pages of appellants' brief. Each specification of error in the brief should state the particular ruling claimed to be erroneous and the assignment or assignments of error upon which the specification is based. The specifications in the appellants' brief are defective, in that they do not refer at all to the assignments of error upon which they are predicated and lump together a number of rulings which are claimed to be erroneous without designating which particular ruling is complained of.

If the only difficulty in considering the appeal arose from defective specifications of error in appellants' brief because of their failure to conform to the rules of this court, we would afford an opportunity to the appellants to file a new brief with the proper specifications. But, in view of the fact that under the statement on appeal we have nothing properly before us but the question as to whether or not the bill of complaint states a cause of action and as to whether or not the decree rendered was within the jurisdiction of the court, we will proceed to a determination of those matters without calling for a new brief on the part of the appellants. In so doing we shall assume that it was the intention of the appellants by the above specifications to specify the alleged error of the trial court in denying their motion to dismiss upon the ground that the bill did not state a cause of action on behalf of the United States and to the alleged excess of jurisdiction in the remedy granted.

Aside from the description of the real estate contained in the complaint, which had been purchased by or on behalf of the appellant Anna Laura Barnett from said fund of $550,000, the facts alleged in the bill of complaint herein can be ascertained by reference to a number of decisions heretofore rendered which recite the circumstances under which $1,100,000, including the $550,000 herein involved, was procured from the Secretary of the Interior from the funds of Jackson Barnett by fraud. This renders it unnecessary to make an elaborate statement of the same facts in this opinion. Therefore, to avoid a more detailed statement of facts involved in the case at bar, we refer to such cases. Barnett v. Equitable Trust Co. of New York (D.C.) 21 F.(2d) 325, 333; Id. (C.C.A.) 34 F.(2d) 916; United States v. Equitable Trust Co. of New York, 283 U.S. 738, 739, 51 S.Ct. 639, 75 L.Ed. 1379; United States v. Mott (D.C.) 33 F.(2d) 340; Id. (C.C.A.) 37 F. (2d) 860; Mott v. United States, 283 U.S. 747, 51 S.Ct. 642, 75 L.Ed. 1385. These cases hold that the fund of $1,100,000 belonging to Jackson Barnett was obtained from the Secretary of the Interior, its lawful custodian, while Jackson Barnett was incompetent to draw upon the fund or to contract matrimony, by means of an order obtained by the appellant Anna Laura Barnett, who had kidnapped Barnett, taken him to Kansas, and then to Missouri, in each of which states a purported marriage ceremony was staged. A portion of this $1,100,000 is wrongfully in the custody of the appellant and in the other defendants.

According to allegations and findings in the case at bar, Jackson Barnett was wholly incapable of understanding the nature of a marriage contract or of the obligations thereby assumed. He did not have sufficient mental capacity to marry. After this purported marriage, Jackson Barnett was induced to make a thumbprint upon the order for the release...