Barney v. Mt. Rose Heating & Air

• Decision Date: 18 September 2008
• Docket Number: No. 47300.,47300.
• Citation: 192 P.3d 730
• Parties: Carl B. BARNEY, An Individual, Appellant, v. MT. ROSE HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING, A Nevada Corporation, Respondent.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

192 P.3d 730

Carl B. BARNEY, An Individual, Appellant, v. MT. ROSE HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING, A Nevada Corporation, Respondent.

No. 47300.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

September 18, 2008.

Molof & Vohl and Robert C. Vohl, Reno, for Appellant.

Law Offices of Jeffery A. Briggs and Jeffery A. Briggs, Reno, for Respondent.

BEFORE CHERRY, MAUPIN and SAITTA, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

NRS 108.237(1) entitles a prevailing mechanic's lien claimant to the enforcement proceedings' costs, including reasonable attorney fees. This appeal concerns three issues with regard to that statute. First, we consider whether NRS 108.237(1) contains within its scope attorney fees that are incurred after the district court enters a judgment determining the lienable amount and foreclosing upon the lien. We conclude that NRS 108.237(1) covers all attorney fees incurred to enforce a mechanic's lien before the judgment is satisfied and the lien is discharged or released, and thus, any postjudgment attorney fees incidental to the lien's enforcement through foreclosure are available under that statute.

Accordingly, here, as the district court had authority under NRS 108.237(1) to award attorney fees incurred postjudgment, we next review the prevailing lien claimant's attorney fees award to determine whether the fees were reasonable. Since the district court failed to provide any analysis or specific findings regarding the reasonableness of the fees awarded, and as it appears that some of the fees awarded were not reasonable because they ostensibly pertained to matters unrelated to the mechanic's lien's enforcement through foreclosure or matters on which the lien claimant did not prevail, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion.

Finally, we determine whether the district court erred in denying a postjudgment motion to enter satisfaction of the judgment. Because we have determined that a lien claimant is entitled to attorney fees incurred postjudgment under NRS 108.237(1) and a motion for such fees remained pending at the time payment in satisfaction of the judgment was tendered, we conclude that the district court correctly refused to compel satisfaction of the judgment, since the payment only partially satisfied the judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant Carl B. Barney contracted with Reno Construction, Inc. (RCI), to renovate his house. In turn, RCI subcontracted with respondent Mt. Rose Heating & Air Conditioning to provide equipment and services as part of the renovations. When Barney asserted that the renovations were defective and refused to pay for the work performed, RCI and Mt. Rose Heating filed mechanic's liens against the property, which they sought to enforce in the district court. Ultimately, in November 2004, after certain deductions in RCI's lien amount were taken, RCI and Mt. Rose Heating obtained a district court judgment and decree of foreclosure in their favor. Thus, with respect to foreclosure, the district court directed that the property be sold to satisfy the judgment.

Approximately three weeks later, however, even though the property had not been sold, Mt. Rose Heating attempted to execute upon Barney's personal property and proceeded to garnish Barney's bank funds. Upon Barney's motion, the district court temporarily stayed the judgment's execution, conditioned upon Barney posting a bond. Shortly thereafter, Barney filed motions to exempt his bank account from execution and to quash and discharge the garnishment, claiming, among other things, that the mechanic's lien and writ of execution statutes did not permit execution upon his personal property until after the real property's sale resulted in a deficiency. Mt. Rose Heating sought supplemental attorney fees and costs. Following litigation on these issues, Barney posted a supersedeas bond,¹ and the district court entered an order staying the judgment's execution, releasing Barney's garnished bank funds in light of the bond, and granting Mt. Rose Heating's first motion for supplemental attorney fees and costs.²

Subsequently, Mt. Rose Heating filed a second supplemental motion, seeking postjudgment attorney fees and costs incurred from December 13, 2004, through April 28, 2005. The requested amounts related to matters involving, for instance, whether Barney's bond met statutory requirements, the judgment's execution, the exemption, garnishment, and release of Barney's bank account funds, and Mt. Rose Heating's previous application for postjudgment attorney fees and costs.

While Mt. Rose Heating's second motion for attorney fees was pending before the district court, Barney paid to Mt. Rose Heating an amount to satisfy his obligations with respect to the November 2004 judgment,³ but Mt. Rose Heating refused to recognize the judgment as fully satisfied. As a result, Barney moved the district court for an order directing the clerk to enter satisfaction of the judgment and discharging his supersedeas bond. Mt. Rose Heating opposed the motion, asserting that it was willing to provide a partial satisfaction of judgment but contending that it was entitled to additional awards of attorney fees under the mechanic's lien statutes, so the entire judgment was not satisfied by the amount paid.

On April 4, 2006, the district court denied Barney's motion to compel satisfaction of the judgment and to discharge the supersedeas bond. Then, on April 28, 2006, the court granted Mt. Rose Heating's second supplemental motion for fees and costs and awarded Mt. Rose Heating $9,114.87 in additional attorney fees.

Barney has appealed the April 4 and 28 postjudgment orders, asserting that the district court was not authorized to award attorney fees incurred after the November 2004 judgment was rendered and that, even if authorized, the fees awarded were unreasonable. Barney also argues that regardless of the April 28 fee award, he paid the full amount due under the November 2004 judgment, and thus, the district court should have directed the court clerk to enter the judgment's satisfaction.

DISCUSSION

The district court may award attorney fees only if authorized by a rule, contract, or statute.⁴ Here, although Barney asserts that no authority exists allowing the district court to award postjudgment attorney fees, Mt. Rose Heating contends that the award was mandated under NRS 108.237. Thus, while we generally review district court attorney fee awards, including their reasonableness, for an abuse of discretion,⁵ this matter primarily involves an issue of statutory interpretation concerning attorney fees in mechanic's lien actions, which we review de novo.⁶ With respect to the second issue, whether the district court erred in refusing to order satisfaction of the judgment, statutory interpretation is also at issue, and thus, the same de novo standard of review applies.

Awarding attorney fees incurred postjudgment under NRS 108.237(1)

Although the district court failed to identify the basis for its April 28 award of attorney fees, Mt. Rose Heating ostensibly asked for fees under NRS 108.237(1) and now asserts that, under that statute, the court was mandated to award to it, the "prevailing lien claimant," reasonable attorney fees incurred postjudgment as part of "the costs of the proceedings." Accordingly, it appears that the fees were awarded under NRS 108.237(1).

NRS 108.237(1) provides for attorney fees as part of the costs in mechanic's lien actions as follows, with emphasis added:

The court shall award to a prevailing lien claimant, whether on its lien or on a surety bond, the lienable amount found due to the lien claimant by the court and the cost of preparing and recording the notice of lien, including, without limitation, attorney's fees, if any, and interest. The court shall also award to the prevailing lien claimant, whether on its lien or on a surety bond, the costs of the proceedings, including, without limitation, reasonable attorney's fees, the costs for representation of the lien claimant in the proceedings, and any other amounts as the court may find to be justly due and owing to the lien claimant.

Although NRS 108.237(1) does not explicitly provide for attorney fees incurred postjudgment, Mt. Rose Heating points out that the statute does not expressly exclude postjudgment attorney fees from its purview, convincingly arguing that, for policy reasons, NRS 108.237(1) should be liberally interpreted as allowing for postjudgment attorney fees so as to further the lien statutes' purpose to ensure that contractors are paid in whole for their work.⁷

When statutory language is not ambiguous, this court will interpret it according to its ordinary meaning.⁸ But when a statute is ambiguous, meaning that it is amenable to more than one reasonable interpretation, we must select the construction that will best give effect to the legislative intent.⁹ Statutes are to be read in the context of the act and the subject matter as a whole, and policy may be looked to as an interpretive aid.¹⁰ Whenever possible, we will interpret a statute in harmony with other rules and statutes.¹¹

NRS 108.237(1) gives the district court broad discretion to award, "without limitation," reasonable attorney fees and any other amounts justly due and owing as costs of "the proceedings."¹² Thus, we must determine to what "proceedings" the statute refers.¹³ To do so, we turn to the statutory scheme and policy.¹⁴

As used in NRS 108.237(1), the term "proceedings" appears within the statutory lien statutes and clearly refers to steps taken to enforce a mechanic's lien in the courts.¹⁵ The scope of that term, therefore, must be viewed in light of other mechanic's lien statutes and, in particular, NRS 108.239, which generally governs court actions to enforce mechanic's liens.

NRS 108.239(10) and (11) contemplate that, after determining the lienable amount, the district court will decree foreclosure, and the property will be sold to satisfy the lien and costs of sale. Once the...