Barnhardt v. Cooperative

Decision Date07 February 2014
Docket NumberNo. 13–2254.,13–2254.
Citation742 F.3d 365
PartiesJacqueline BARNHARDT, Plaintiff–Appellant v. OPEN HARVEST COOPERATIVE, Defendant–Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Abby Osborn, argued, Lincoln, NE (Joy Shiffermiller, on the brief), for PlaintiffAppellant.

Mark A. Fahleson, argued, Lincoln, NE (Tara Tesmer Paulson, on the brief), for DefendantAppellee.

Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Jacqueline Barnhardt appeals the district court's 1 entry of summary judgment in favor of Open Harvest Cooperative (Open Harvest) on her claim alleging a violation of § 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1140. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

I. Background

Open Harvest is a member-owned food cooperative located in Lincoln, Nebraska. Barnhardt began working at Open Harvest in September 1994 and ultimately attained the position of outreach and membership director. Open Harvest makes short-term disability insurance coverage available to its employees under a policy with Dearborn National Life Insurance Company (“Dearborn National”). However, Open Harvest does not pay or contribute any portion of the cost of coverage. Employees who opt to obtain short-term disability coverage must pay the entire premium through payroll deductions. Barnhardt enrolled in short-term disability coverage.

In December 2006, Barnhardt was diagnosed with arteriovenous malformation (“AVM”), a vascular condition that causes cognitive difficulties and occasional seizures. In January 2011, Kelsi Swanson became Open Harvest's general manager and, consequently, Barnhardt's supervisor. The following month, Swanson met with Barnhardt for her annual performance review.While Barnhardt received largely positive feedback and a three-percent raise, Swanson expressed concern about Barnhardt's time management and her interactions with coworkers. At some point during February 2011, Barnhardt disclosed her AVM to Swanson.

In late May, Swanson raised a number of concerns with Barnhardt about her conduct and performance, including her tardiness, unreasonably long lunch breaks, inappropriate comments to other employees, excessive delegation of her responsibilities, and lagging membership in the cooperative. Barnhardt sought to explain that she had not delegated her duties in order to “shirk[ ] her responsibilities.” Instead, because she intended to take medical leave due to her AVM, she was training other employees to perform her duties during her absence.

On July 13, 2011, Swanson again met with Barnhardt. Swanson reiterated her concerns about Barnhardt's performance and instructed Barnhardt to craft a performance improvement plan. Swanson warned Barnhardt that failure to make progress under the plan might result in the termination of her employment. At the meeting, Barnhardt attempted to discuss her illness and her intent to take medical leave, but Swanson refused to address the topic. On July 20, Swanson placed Barnhardt on probation for six weeks while implementing the performance improvement plan.

As part of her duties, Barnhardt organized weekly evening events for Open Harvest employees to discuss the history and philosophy of cooperatives. On July 28, at one of these events, Barnhardt criticized Swanson's management style and commitment to Open Harvest employees. She also characterized a committee created by Open Harvest management as a “divisionary tactic ... put together as a distraction to create things that make the staff feel good, but the committee isn't really doing anything.” The next morning, an Open Harvest employee informed Swanson of Barnhardt's remarks. When Swanson confronted Barnhardt about her comments, Barnhardt did not deny making them. Later that day, Barnhardt requested a meeting with Swanson to discuss taking medical leave.

Open Harvest claims that, on July 29, Swanson decided to terminate Barnhardt's employment, but she did not do so that day because she had decided to wait until Colleen Nygren, Open Harvest's finance manager, returned to the office the following week. Barnhardt worked for several hours on July 30 and took a sick day on August 1. When Barnhardt arrived at work on August 2, she was informed that her employment had been terminated. On August 3, Nygren emailed Open Harvest's outside financial advisor to determine whether Barnhardt's benefits, including her short-term disability insurance, would continue for the remainder of August. In her email, Nygren stated that she wanted to continue Barnhardt's benefits coverage for the month of August if it was possible. Nygren erroneously stated that Barnhardt's employment had been terminated on August 1. The financial manager responded that the benefits would continue only if Barnhardt remained “on [Open Harvest's] books as an active employee.” Nygren responded that Barnhardt would no longer be actively employed at Open Harvest. Nonetheless, Open Harvest deducted the short-term disability premium from Barnhardt's last paycheck—which included two weeks' severance pay—and did not forward the payment to Dearborn National. Open Harvest did not refund the deduction to Barnhardt until December 2011.

On September 15, 2011, Barnhardt filed a claim for short-term disability benefits with Dearborn National. In its letter denying benefits, Dearborn National stated that Open Harvest had terminated Barnhardt's coverage on July 31, 2011, and that Barnhardt had not become disabled until August 2, 2011. Because she became disabled after her coverage had terminated, Barnhardt was not entitled to benefits.

Barnhardt sued Open Harvest in Nebraska state court, bringing claims under ERISA, the Family Medical Leave Act, and state and federal age and disability discrimination statutes. Her ERISA claim alleged that Open Harvest knew that she would apply for disability benefits during her impending medical leave and for that reason sought to prevent her from obtaining those benefits. Open Harvest removed the case to federal court and moved for summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted Open Harvest's motion in full. Barnhardt appeals only the district court's entry of summary judgment on her ERISA claim.

II. Discussion

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Inechien v. Nichols Aluminum, LLC, 728 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir.2013). Summary judgment is proper only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). However, in order to avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” B.M. ex rel. Miller v. S. Callaway R–II Sch. Dist., 732 F.3d 882, 886 (8th Cir.2013) (quoting Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, 709 F.3d 1201, 1207 (8th Cir.2013)).

Section 510 of ERISA prohibits, among other things, an employer from discharging or discriminating against a participant in an ERISA plan “for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1140. In order to recover under a § 510 interference claim, a plaintiff “must prove that [the defendant] possessed a ‘specific intent to interfere’ with her ERISA benefits.” Manning v. Am. Republic Ins. Co., 604 F.3d 1030, 1044 (8th Cir.2010) (quoting Pendleton v. QuikTrip Corp., 567 F.3d 988, 992 (8th Cir.2009)). This specific intent to interfere means that the plaintiff's entitlement to ERISA benefits had “a determinative influence” on the defendant's decision. Koons v. Aventis Pharms., Inc., 367 F.3d 768, 777 (8th Cir.2004) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)). A plaintiff can establish a § 510 interference claim either by direct evidence of a specific intent to interfere with ERISA benefits or through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Manning, 604 F.3d at 1042 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)).

Barnhardt has not identified any direct evidence that Open Harvest acted with the specific intent to interfere with her ERISA benefits. “Direct evidence provides a strong causal link between the alleged discriminatory bias and the adverse employment action. It most often comprises remarks by decisionmakers that reflect, without inference, a discriminatory bias.” McCullough v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Scis., 559 F.3d 855, 861 (8th Cir.2009) (internal citation omitted). Direct evidence “clearly points to the presence of an illegal motive.” Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir.2004). Barnhardt has not identified any evidence of this sort showing a specific intent to interfere with her ERISA benefits. She contends that she has produced direct evidence of interference because Open Harvest's conduct was the sole reason that Dearborn National denied her benefits. But Barnhardt misunderstands the relevant inquiry. Direct evidence sufficient to support an ERISA interference claim would clearly show a specific intent to interfere, not merely interference. Many instances of interference—such as termination of ERISA benefits incident to an otherwise-permissible termination of employment—occur without giving rise to § 510 liability. See Koons, 367 F.3d at 779. “Otherwise, every employee discharged by a company with an ERISA plan would have a claim under § 510.” Majewski v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 274 F.3d 1106, 1113 (6th Cir.2001).

Because Barnhardt has not identified direct evidence of a specific intent to interfere with her ERISA benefits, we must analyze her claim under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Under this framework, if a...

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