Barnhart v. Walton, No. 00-1937.

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Citation535 U.S. 212
Decision Date27 March 2002
PartiesBARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY <I>v.</I> WALTON.
Docket NumberNo. 00-1937.

Page 212

535 U.S. 212
BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
v.
WALTON.
No. 00-1937.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Argued January 16, 2002.
Decided March 27, 2002.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

The Social Security Act authorizes payment of Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income to individuals who have an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable ... impairment ... which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U. S. C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added); accord, § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Social Security Administration (Agency) denied benefits to respondent Walton, finding that his "inability" to engage in substantial gainful activity lasted only 11 months. The District Court affirmed, but the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the 12-month duration requirement modifies "impairment" not "inability," that the statute leaves no doubt that no similar duration requirement relates to an "inability," and that therefore Walton was entitled to benefits despite Agency regulations restricting them to those unable to work for 12 months. The court decided further that Walton qualified for benefits because, prior to his return to work, his "inability" would have been "expected" to last 12 months. It conceded that the Agency had made Walton's actual return to work within 12 months of his onset date and before the Agency's decision date determinative on this point, 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(b), 1592(d)(2), but found that the regulations conflicted with the statute. It noted that Walton's work simply counted as part of a 9-month trial work period during which persons "entitled" to Title II benefits may work without loss of benefits, 42 U. S. C. § 422(c).

Held: The Agency's interpretations of the statute fall within its lawful interpretative authority. Pp. 217-225.

(a) The Agency's reading of the term "inability" is reasonable. The statute requires both an "inability" to engage in any substantial gainful activity and an "impairment" providing "reason" for the "inability," adding that the "impairment" must last or be expected to last not less than 12 months. The Agency has determined in both its formal regulations and its interpretation of those regulations that the "inability" must last the same amount of time. Courts grant considerable leeway to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations, and the Agency has properly interpreted its regulation here. Thus, this Court must decide

Page 213

(1) whether the statute unambiguously forbids that interpretation, and if not, (2) whether the interpretation exceeds permissible bounds. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843. First, the Act does not unambiguously forbid the regulation. That the statute's 12-month phrase modifies only "impairment" shows only that the provision says nothing explicitly about the "inability's" duration. Such silence normally creates, but does not resolve, ambiguity. Second, the Agency's construction is permissible. It supplies a duration requirement, which the statute demands, in a way that consistently reconciles the statutory "impairment" and "inability" language. The Agency's regulations also reflect the Agency's own longstanding interpretation, which should be accorded particular deference, North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U. S. 512, 522, n. 12. Finally, Congress has frequently amended or reenacted the relevant provisions without change. Walton's claim that Title II's 5-month waiting period for entitlement protects against a claimant with a chronic, but only briefly disabling, disease shows, at most, that the Agency could have chosen other reasonable time periods. Moreover, Title XVI has no such period, yet Walton offers no explanation why its identical definitional language should be interpreted differently in a closely related context. Walton's argument that the Agency's interpretation should be disregarded because its formal regulations were only recently enacted is also rejected. E. g., Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 741. And the Agency's longstanding interpretation is not automatically deprived of the judicial deference otherwise its due because it was previously reached through means less formal than notice-and-comment rulemaking. Chevron, supra, at 843. Pp. 217-222.

(b) Also consistent with the statute is the Agency's regulation providing that "[y]ou are not entitled to a trial work period" if "you perform work ... within 12 months of the onset of the impairment ... and before the date of any ... decision finding ... you ... disabled," 20 CFR § 404.1592(d)(2) (emphasis added). The statute is ambiguous, and the regulation treats a pre-Agency-decision actual return to work as if it were determinative of the "can be expected to last" question. The statute's complexity, the vast number of claims it engenders, and the consequent need for agency expertise and administrative experience lead the Court to read the statute as delegating to the Agency considerable authority to fill in matters of detail related to its administration. See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S. 34, 43-44. The interpretation at issue is such a matter. Pp. 222-225.

235 F. 3d 184, reversed.

Page 214

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Parts I and III of which were unanimous, and Part II of which was joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., and STEVENS, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and GINSBURG, JJ. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 226.

Jeffrey A. Lamken argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, John C. Hoyle, and Mark S. Davies.

Kathryn L. Pryor argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief was James W. Speer.*

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.


The Social Security Act authorizes payment of disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income to individuals with disabilities. See 49 Stat. 622, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 401 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V) (Title II disability insurance benefits); § 1381 et seq. (Title XVI supplemental security income). For both types of benefits the Act defines the key term "disability" as an

"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." § 423(d)(1)(A) (1994 ed.) (Title II) (emphasis added); accord, § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V) (Title XVI).

This case presents two questions about the Social Security Administration's interpretation of this definition.

First, the Social Security Administration (which we shall call the Agency) reads the term "inability" as including a "12 month" requirement. In its view, the "inability" (to engage in any substantial gainful activity) must last, or must be expected

Page 215

to last, for at least 12 months. Second, the Agency reads the term "expected to last" as applicable only when the "inability" has not yet lasted 12 months. In the case of a later Agency determination — where the "inability" did not last 12 months — the Agency will automatically assume that the claimant failed to meet the duration requirement. It will not look back to decide hypothetically whether, despite the claimant's actual return to work before 12 months expired, the "inability" nonetheless might have been expected to last that long.

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held both these interpretations of the statute unlawful. We hold, to the contrary, that both fall within the Agency's lawful interpretive authority. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). Consequently, we reverse.

I

In 1996 Cleveland Walton, the respondent, applied for both Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income. The Agency found that (1) by October 31, 1994, Walton had developed a serious mental illness involving both schizophrenia and associated depression; (2) the illness caused him then to lose his job as a full-time teacher; (3) by mid-1995 he began to work again part time as a cashier; and (4) by December 1995 he was working as a cashier full time.

The Agency concluded that Walton's mental illness had prevented him from engaging in any significant work, i. e., from "engag[ing] in any substantial gainful activity," for 11 months — from October 31, 1994 (when he lost his teaching job) until the end of September 1995 (when he earned income sufficient to rise to the level of "substantial gainful activity"). See 20 CFR §§ 404.1574, 416.974 (2001). And because the statute demanded an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity" lasting 12, not 11, months, Walton was not entitled to benefits.

Page 216

Walton sought court review. The District Court affirmed the Agency's decision, but the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. Walton v. Apfel, 235 F. 3d 184, 186-187 (2000). The court said that the statute's 12-month duration requirement modifies the word "impairment," not the word "inability." Id., at 189. It added that the statute's "language ... leaves no doubt" that there is no similar "duration requirement" related to an "inability" (to engage in substantial gainful activity). Ibid. It concluded that, because the statute's language "speaks clearly" and is "unambiguous," Walton was entitled to receive benefits despite agency regulations restricting benefits to those unable to work for a 12-month period. Ibid.

The court went on to decide that, in any event, Walton qualified because, prior to Walton's return to work, one would...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1855 practice notes
  • Part II
    • United States
    • Federal Register June 25, 2007
    • June 25, 2007
    ...with our role ``to fill in, through interpretation, matters of detail related to [the statute's] administration,'' Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 225 (2002), we applied our scientific expertise, policy judgment, and experience to promulgate dietary supplement CGMP requirements that will ......
  • Reports and guidance documents; availability, etc.: Systemic compensation discrimination; nondiscrimination requirements; interpretive standards,
    • United States
    • Federal Register June 16, 2006
    • June 16, 2006
    ...with the weight of authority under Title VII, in addition to deference under traditional deference doctrines. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217 (2002) (``Courts grant an agency's interpretation of its own regulations considerable legal leeway''); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (......
  • Part VI
    • United States
    • Federal Register June 16, 2006
    • June 16, 2006
    ...with the weight of authority under Title VII, in addition to deference under traditional deference doctrines. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217 (2002) (``Courts grant an agency's interpretation of its own regulations considerable legal leeway''); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (......
  • Food for human consumption: Current good manufacturing practice— Dietary supplements; manufacturing, packaging, labeling, or holding operations,
    • United States
    • Federal Register June 25, 2007
    • June 25, 2007
    ...with our role ``to fill in, through interpretation, matters of detail related to [the statute's] administration,'' Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 225 (2002), we applied our scientific expertise, policy judgment, and experience to promulgate dietary supplement CGMP requirements that will ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1812 cases
  • Payne v. Kijakazi, Civil Action 4:20-CV-00125-HBB
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court of Western District of Kentucky
    • December 16, 2021
    ...of not less than twelve (12) months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 214 (2002); Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990). The Commissioner has promulgated regulations setting forth a five-step s......
  • Holly Sugar Corp. v. Veneman, No. CIV.A. 03-1739(RBW).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
    • September 15, 2004
    ...`to the precise question at issue,'[the Court] `must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.'" Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217-18, 122 S.Ct. 1265, 152 L.Ed.2d 330 (2002) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778). Second, where the statute is "silent ......
  • Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, No. 06–1322.
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • February 27, 2008
    ...functions of enforcing antidiscrimination laws and disseminating information about those laws to the public. Cf. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 225, 122 S.Ct. 1265, 152 L.Ed.2d 330 (2002) (noting that deference is appropriate in “matters of detail related to [an agency's] administration”......
  • Hux v. Astrue, Civil Action No. 11 - 1306
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. Western District of Pennsylvania
    • August 27, 2012
    ...and his or her inability to work have lasted (or are expected to last) for the statutory twelve-month period. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 214-222, 122 S.Ct. 1265, 152 L.Ed.2d 330 (2002). Consequently, the short-term exacerbations of Hux's symptoms referenced in his treatment notes wer......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 firm's commentaries
  • The Sixth Circuit's Ultra Vires Opinion In Whirlpool'What Now?
    • United States
    • Mondaq United States
    • April 18, 2022
    ...embodied in §654 was to be implemented 'under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense,' 10 USC §654(b)"); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 US 212, 222, 122 SCt 1265 (2002) ("Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through which to view the legality of the Agency interpretation here at......
2 books & journal articles
  • Administering the National Environmental Policy Act
    • United States
    • Environmental Law Reporter Nbr. 45-4, April 2015
    • April 1, 2015
    ...that authority, the Court held that Chevron deference was appropriate. 34. Mead , 533 U.S. 218. 35. See e.g. , Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002); Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106 (2002); Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conserv. v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. ......
  • The Future of Administrative Law
    • United States
    • Environmental Law Reporter Nbr. 47-3, March 2017
    • March 1, 2017
    ...A year after Mead , the Supreme Court addressed deference to a decision made by the Social Security Administration in Barnhart v. Walton , 535 U.S. 212 (2002). he Court considered a Social Security Administration policy that was initially adopted through less formal means, but was eventuall......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT