Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Hubbard

• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: German
• Citation: Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Hubbard, 109 S.W.2d 960, 130 Tex. 476 (Tex. 1937)
• Decision Date: 03 November 1937
• Docket Number: No. 6833.,6833.
• Parties: BARNSDALL OIL CO. et al. v. HUBBARD et al.

Page 960

109 S.W.2d 960

BARNSDALL OIL CO. et al. v. HUBBARD et al.

No. 6833.

Supreme Court of Texas.

November 3, 1937.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Sixth Supreme Judicial District.

Suit to quiet title by the Barnsdall Oil Company against G. E. Hubbard, R. E. Hubbard, W. W. Lechner, the Houston Oil Company of Texas, and others, wherein G. E. Hubbard filed a cross-action against the Barnsdall Oil Company and the Houston Oil Company of Texas; R. E. Hubbard and W. W. Lechner going along in the case with G. E. Hubbard as coplaintiffs and as codefendants, and wherein F. L. Luckel filed a plea of intervention. From the judgment of the district court, G. E. Hubbard, R. E. Hubbard, W. W. Lechner, and F. L. Luckel appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals which reversed the judgment of the district court and rendered judgment . To review the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, the Barnsdall Oil Company and the Houston Oil Company of Texas bring error. After the case was docketed in the Supreme Court, the Barnsdall Oil Company and the defendants in error settled all the matters in controversy between them and judgment was entered in that portion of the cause, leaving for consideration only the action of the Court of Civil Appeals with respect to the Houston Oil Company of Texas to be considered.

Judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed.

Wm. Hodges, of Texarkana, M. D. Kirk and Foster V. Phipps, both of Tulsa, Okl., and Bramlette & Meredith, of Longview, for Barnsdall Oil Co.

Williams, Lee, Sears & Kennerly and Fred L. Williams, all of Houston, for Houston Oil Co.

Wynne & Wynne, of Longview, Vinson, Elkins, Sweeton & Weems and David T. Searls, all of Houston, J. Hart Willis, of Dallas, and W. A. Ray, of Longview, for defendants in error.

Thompson, Knight, Baker & Harris, of Dallas, as amicus curiæ.

GERMAN, Judge.

On December 18, 1919, J. G. McGrede acquired a tract of 220 acres of land in Gregg county. At that time he was married to Quessie McGrede. Some of the parties to this litigation claimed that the 220 acres was community property, while others claimed that it was the separate property of J. G. McGrede to the extent of a five-sixth undivided interest. In the trial court it was found to be community property of J. G. McGrede and his wife, who died in June, 1922, leaving six children as her heirs. Four claims of title issued from the common source, to wit:

1. During the lifetime of Mrs. McGrede a community obligation was created in favor of G. E. McGrede, a son of J. G. and Quessie McGrede, and after the death of Mrs. McGrede on, to wit, June 27, 1925, J. G. McGrede executed conveyance to G. E. McGrede of 36 acres of the 220-acre tract in satisfaction of this community obligation. Various parties held claims to the mineral estate in this 36 acres under G. E. McGrede.

2. On May 9, 1930, J. G. McGrede, while a widower, executed to B. A. Skipper an oil and gas lease covering the entire 220 acres. This lease passed as follows:

(a) It was first transferred by Skipper to W. W. Lechner on September 11, 1930. While this assignment was in the name of Lechner, Ray E. Hubbard had some interest therein.

(b) On January 5, 1931, Lechner assigned to the Barnsdall Oil Company 84 acres of the lease, the said 84 acres being specifically described.

(c) On January 24, 1930, Lechner assigned to the Houston Oil Company of Texas 25 acres of said lease, the said 25 acres adjoining the Barnsdall Oil Company's 84 acres, and also being specifically described.

(d) On January 27, 1931, Lechner executed assignment to G. E. Hubbard of said lease as to the remaining acreage of said 220-acre tract.

3. (a) On February 14, 1931, Lobella McGrede, one of the heirs of Mrs. Quessie McGrede, executed to G. E. Hubbard an oil and gas lease on her undivided interest in said 220 acres, less the 36 acres conveyed by her father to G. E. McGrede.

(b) On February 11, 1931, all of the remaining heirs of Mrs. McGrede, other than Walter McGrede, a minor, executed an oil and gas lease to G. E. Hubbard on their undivided interests in the 220 acres, less the 36-acre tract.

4. On March 28, 1931, Walter McGrede, by guardian, executed an oil and gas lease to F. L. Luckel on his undivided interest in the said 220 acres, less the 36-acre tract.

G. E. Hubbard and F. L. Luckel, claiming from the same source, to wit, the heirs of Mrs. McGrede, asserted title to a one-half undivided interest in the mineral estate in the 84 acres and the 25 acres. Sometime prior to October 31, 1932, the Barnsdall Oil Company brought suit to quiet title to its particular 84 acres. Its second amended petition, upon which it went to trial, was filed October 31, 1932. This petition names as defendants G. E. Hubbard, R. E. Hubbard, W. W. Lechner, all of the McGredes, the Houston Oil Company of Texas, and all parties interested in the 36-acre tract. F. L. Luckel was not named as a defendant.

On August 14, 1931, G. E. Hubbard, defendant in the suit of Barnsdall Oil Company, filed cross-action against the said Barnsdall Oil Company and also against Houston Oil Company of Texas, and the parties claiming the 36-acre tract. In his petition he set up the facts with reference to the lease by J. G. McGrede, and the assignments as to the specific 84 acres and the specific 25 acres, in both of which he asserted a claim to a five-sixth of a one-half undivided interest. He also asserted the same interest in the 36-acre tract, but pleaded in the alternative that, if it be found that he was not entitled to any interest in that tract, then he be allowed an augmentation from the 84 acres and the 25 acres. He prayed that his interest be established in each of the several tracts, respectively, and also prayed for a partition. While he is named as the plaintiff in this cross-action, nevertheless it appears that R. E. Hubbard and W. W. Lechner went along in the case with him as coplaintiffs and as codefendants.

On March 1, 1932, F. L. Luckel filed his plea of intervention, in which he set up claim to an undivided one-twelfth interest in the mineral estate in the whole 220 acres. His pleading was sustantially the same as that of G. E. Hubbard. He prayed that his interest be established in the 84 acres, the 25 acres, and the 36 acres, respectively, as well as in the remainder of the acreage in the 220-acre tract.

In its amended petition of October 31, 1932, Barnsdall Oil Company answered the contentions of G. E. Hubbard and F. L. Luckel, in so far as they affected its particular 84 acres. Among other things it pleaded that the 220 acres was in whole, or at least to the extent of a five-sixth interest therein, the separate property of J. G. McGrede. It claimed the full ownership of the mineral estate in the 84 acres on the ground that it acquired the lease thereon without notice, and on the ground that under the theory of equitable partition it was entitled to that tract out of the interest of J. G. McGrede; and further that it was entitled to such interest on the ground of estoppel.

Houston Oil Company of Texas on February 8, 1932, filed answer to the cross-action of G. E. Hubbard, which consisted of a general demurrer, a general denial, and a plea of not guilty. On October 31, 1932, it filed answer to the plea of intervention by Luckel, which answer consisted of a general demurrer, a general denial, and a plea of not guilty.

There were other pleadings concerning the 36-acre tract not necessary to mention.

Before trial, all of the McGredes, went out of the case on disclaimers, and it would seem that by mutual understanding the title to the 36-acre tract was regarded as being good in G. E. McGrede and those holding under him. At least it can be said that no one on appeal complained of the disposition that was made of that tract.

Based upon findings that the 220 acres was community property, that the 36 acres was conveyed by J. G. McGrede in discharge of a community obligation, that Barnsdall Oil Company was an innocent purchaser, and that Houston Oil Company was not an innocent purchaser, the trial court entered a judgment to the following effect:

1. In favor of Barnsdall Oil Company for the mineral estate in the 84 acres. This appears to have been based on a finding that after conveyance of the 36 acres there was left of the original tract 184 acres, of which J. G. McGrede owned an undivided interest of 92 acres; that Barnsdall Oil Company, as first purchaser under the J. G. McGrede lease, was entitled to take all of that particular tract.

2. In favor of Houston Oil Company of Texas for an interest of eight-twenty-fifths in the 25-acre tract, and in favor of G. E. Hubbard and F. L. Luckel for an interest of seventeen-twenty-fifths in said 25 acres, of which interest Luckel was to have a one-sixth and Hubbard five-sixths. This appears to have been based on a finding that of the 92-acre interest belonging to J. G. McGrede, after deducting the 84 acres awarded to Barnsdall Oil Company, there remained 8 acres, which the Houston Oil Company was...