Baron v. McGinty

• Decision Date: 05 February 2021
• Docket Number: No. 2020-120,2020-120
• Citation: 2021 VT 6
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: Ian Baron v. Molly McGinty

2021 VT 6

Ian Baron v. Molly McGinty

No. 2020-120

Supreme Court of Vermont

September Term, 2020

February 5, 2021

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions by email at: JUD.Reporter@vermont.gov or by mail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801, of any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

On Appeal from Superior Court, Franklin Unit, Family Division

Howard E. Van Benthuysen, J.

William Pettersen IV of Pettersen Law PLLC, Colchester, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Scott R. Bortzfield, St. Albans, for Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Robinson, Eaton, Carroll and Cohen, JJ.

¶ 1. CARROLL, J. Ian Baron appeals a magistrate decision declining to register and exercise jurisdiction over his petition to modify a Virginia child-support order. Baron argues that because the requirements of 15B V.S.A. § 1602 and § 1611 were met, the magistrate was required to register and exercise jurisdiction over his petition to modify. We agree, and remand for further proceedings on whether the Virginia child-support order should be modified.

¶ 2. The record indicates the following. Baron and Molly McGinty were married in October 1996 in Utah. The parties separated around July 2015. In October 2016, a Virginia court issued a final divorce decree, which awarded McGinty sole legal and physical custody of the parties' children and ordered Baron to pay child support in the amount of $1757 per month until the children turned eighteen or graduated from high school, whichever occurred later. At the time, Baron was incarcerated in Virginia, and McGinty was living in Texas. Baron was released from prison shortly thereafter.

¶ 3. About a year later, McGinty asked a Texas court to recognize and enforce the Virginia child-support order. Baron filed an answer of no contest. The Texas court enforced the order and entered judgment against Baron for $21,997.66 based on unpaid child support and accrued interest.

¶ 4. In August 2018, McGinty relocated with the children to Vermont. Baron subsequently petitioned to register and modify the Virginia child-support order in Vermont. He argued that the Virginia court improperly used his pre-incarceration income to calculate his child support obligations and moved to retroactively modify the order as of July 2016. Alternatively, Baron argued that he was entitled to relief from the Virginia order under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60 because the miscalculation of his income was a clerical mistake.

¶ 5. A hearing was held before a magistrate in May 2019.¹ Both parties were represented by counsel. McGinty argued that the Virginia order should be modified in Texas because she was planning to return there on June 15. When asked by the magistrate if she was definitely leaving Vermont, McGinty responded "yes" and confirmed that her date of departure was June 15. Baron responded that he would be prejudiced if the proceedings were moved to Texas because he filed a petition, had done "substantial work" on the matter, and "it would be a reset under Texas law."

¶ 6. At the end of the hearing, the magistrate concluded that Baron was not entitled to relief under Rule 60 because the Virginia child-support order was not based on a clerical mistake.With regard to Baron's petition to modify the child-support order, the magistrate concluded the following:

[T]he bottom line is the court is declining to exercise jurisdiction in this matter, is not confirming or registering the Virginia order today based upon . . . McGinty's representation that she is moving out of the state, had never intended to remain in the State of Vermont. So the court of the State of Vermont is declining to exercise jurisdiction in this matter and we are not going to rewrite the Virginia, the Texas order, or make any determination as to what the current child support obligation should be in this matter.

Baron filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.

¶ 7. Baron appealed directly to this Court. However, 4 V.S.A. § 465 provides that "[a]n appeal from a decision of a magistrate shall be on the record to the Family Division of the Superior Court." We referred the matter to the family division of the superior court pursuant to Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) ("If a notice of appeal is mistakenly filed in the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court clerk will indicate on the notice the date when it was received and forward it the superior court clerk. The notice is considered filed in the superior court on the date so noted.").

¶ 8. The family division affirmed the magistrate's decision on the ground that Baron's petition was moot. The family division explained that as of June 10, 2019, McGinty and the children had relocated to Texas, which meant that the court no longer had personal jurisdiction over McGinty. Without personal jurisdiction, the court reasoned that it could not modify the Virginia child-support order. Baron appealed.

¶ 9. On appeal, Baron argues that because the requirements of 15B V.S.A. § 1602 and § 1611 were met, the magistrate was required to register and exercise jurisdiction over his petition to modify. In addition, Baron argues that he is entitled to modification of the Virginia child-support order because the involuntary loss in his income following his incarceration constitutes a substantial change in circumstances under 15 V.S.A. § 660(a)(1). Alternatively, Baron contendsthat he is entitled to relief from the Virginia child-support order under Rule 60 because the Virginia court made a mistake in calculating his income and the child-support order is no longer equitable.

¶ 10. When the family division reviews a magistrate decision, it generally does not act as a factfinder. Rather, it acts as an appellate body determining "if the tribunal below committed an abuse of discretion." Gavala v. Claassen, 2003 VT 16, ¶ 7, 175 Vt. 487, 819 A.2d 760 (mem.) (quotation omitted) (holding that Vermont Rule for Family Proceedings 8(g)(4) "authorizes submission of additional evidence upon appeal but only when the record from the magistrate is incomplete and good cause has been shown for its incompleteness" (quotation omitted)); see also In re R.L., 163 Vt. 168, 172, 657 A.2d 180, 183 (1995) ("The family court's only appellate jurisdiction authorized by statute is over decisions from the family court magistrate."). As an appellate body, "[o]ur review . . . is similar to that of the family division; it is based on the record before the magistrate." Patnode v. Urette, 2015 VT 70, ¶ 6, 199 Vt. 306, 124 A.3d 430. "We will neither set aside the magistrate's findings unless they are clearly erroneous, nor its conclusions if reasonably supported by the findings." Golden v. Worthington, 2020 VT 71, ¶ 7, ___ Vt. ___, 239 A.3d 259 (quotation omitted). "We review the legal conclusions of the magistrate and the family division de novo." Merchant v. Merchant, 2015 VT 72, ¶ 7, 199 Vt. 406, 124 A.3d 443.

¶ 11. We conclude that the magistrate correctly determined that Baron was not entitled to relief from the Virginia child-support order under Rule 60. We further conclude that the magistrate erred in declining to register and exercise jurisdiction over Baron's petition to modify.

I. Relief from Judgment

¶ 12. Baron argues that he is entitled to relief from the Virginia child-support order under Rule 60 because the Virginia court made a clerical mistake—namely, using his pre-incarceration income to calculate his child-support obligations. Alternatively, Baron argues that he is entitled to relief because the child-support order is no longer equitable.

¶ 13. Rule 60(b) provides that upon motion, a court may relieve a party from final judgment based upon a "mistake" or because "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." V.R.C.P. 60(b). The magistrate concluded that Baron was not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) because the Virginia order was not based on a clerical mistake.² "A motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) is addressed to the discretion of the trial court and is not subject to appellate review unless it clearly and affirmatively appears from the record that such discretion was withheld or otherwise abused." In re P.K., 2017 VT 3, ¶ 12, 204 Vt. 102, 164 A.3d 665 (quotation omitted). "Whether the court has authority to exercise its discretion under Rule 60(b) is a legal issue that we review de novo." Brandt v. Menard, 2020 VT 61, ¶ 3, ___ Vt. ___, 237 A.3d 1251 (quotation and alteration omitted).

¶ 14. We affirm the magistrate's conclusion that Baron was not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b); although, we affirm based on a different rationale. Wharton v. Tri-State Drilling & Boring, 2003 VT 19, ¶ 13, 175 Vt. 494, 824 A.2d 531 (mem.) ("We will affirm a judgment even if the grounds stated in its support are erroneous as long as the result is the same under the correct law and reasoning."). The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) delineates under what circumstances the family division³ may modify a child-support order issued in another state, and it does not authorize the family division to grant relief from a child-support order issued in another state under Rule 60(b).

¶ 15. "UIFSA was designed to expedite the interstate enforcement of child support orders through uniform procedures." Office of Child Support ex rel. Lewis v. Lewis, 2004 VT 127, ¶ 11, 178 Vt. 204, 882 A.2d 1128. Its primary aim "is to ensure that states do not second-guess thesupport orders of other states, thereby opening the door to forum shopping and the proliferation of conflicting orders." OCS/Glenn Pappas v. O'Brien, 2013 VT 11, ¶ 29, 193 Vt. 340, 67 A.3d 916. In pursuit of this goal, UIFSA establishes, as a "paramount" rule, that only one support order can be in effect at...