Barot v. Embassy of the Republic of the Zam., Civil Action No. 13–0451 (ABJ)
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Writing for the Court | AMY BERMAN JACKSON, United States District Judge |
Citation | 299 F.Supp.3d 160 |
Parties | Dolores BAROT, Plaintiff, v. EMBASSY OF the REPUBLIC OF the ZAMBIA, Defendant. |
Decision Date | 08 March 2018 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 13–0451 (ABJ) |
299 F.Supp.3d 160
Dolores BAROT, Plaintiff,
v.
EMBASSY OF the REPUBLIC OF the ZAMBIA, Defendant.
Civil Action No. 13–0451 (ABJ)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Signed March 8, 2018
Denise Marie Clark, Jeremy Greenberg, Clark Law Group, PLLC, Washington, DC, Leonardo Abueg Canseco, Canseco Law Group, LLC, Rockville, MD, for Plaintiff.
Laina Catherine Lopez, Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, L.L.P., Washington, DC, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AMY BERMAN JACKSON, United States District Judge
Plaintiff Dolores Barot brought this action against the Embassy of the Republic of Zambia alleging that defendant discriminated against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. when it paid her less than male employees, and that it discriminated and retaliated against her in violation of Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. ("ADEA") when it terminated her employment. Compl. [Dkt. # 1] at 4. Plaintiff later amended her complaint to include an allegation that defendant violated the District of Columbia Wage Payment and Collection Law, D.C. Code § 32–1301, et seq. ("DCWPCL"), when it failed to pay her wages she was owed after her termination. 1st Am. Compl. [Dkt. # 17–1] ¶¶ 63–65; 2d Am. Compl. [Dkt. # 60] ¶¶ 87–90. On September 8, 2017, the Court granted defendant's cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the DCWPCL count (Count IV), concluding that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
Pending before the Court is defendant's motion for summary judgment on Counts I, II, and III. Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. # 80] ("Def.'s Mot."); Mem. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. [Dkt. # 80–1] ("Def.'s Mem.")1 While it appears that plaintiff's
termination was hasty, and one could take issue with the quality of the managerial decision making involved, plaintiff has not come forward with evidence that would enable a reasonable jury to conclude that she was terminated because of her age, or in retaliation for complaining about gender discrimination. So the Court will grant defendant's motion for summary judgment on the remaining counts.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background2
Plaintiff began working for defendant as a secretary in January 1998. Def.'s SOF ¶ 1; Pl.'s SOF ¶ 1. Her base salary was $1,300.00 per month, and she was eligible for an annual salary increase of $600.00 if the Embassy was satisfied with her performance during the year. Def.'s SOF ¶ 21; Pl.'s SOF ¶ 21. As of the time of her termination, plaintiff's monthly salary was $3,150.00. Def.'s SOF ¶ 26; Pl.'s SOF ¶ 26.
During her employment, plaintiff's supervisor was either the Embassy's Second Secretary (Accounts)—originally Paul Mulenga, and then Frank Mbewe—or its First Secretary (Accounts)—Mbewe. Def.'s SOF ¶ 2; Pl.'s SOF ¶ 2. Over time, as plaintiff saw it, she took on additional duties she described as "accounting duties," Pl.'s SOF ¶ 27; Ex. 3 to Def.'s Mot. [Dkt. # 80–3] at 7, 16, and, she wrote a memorandum to the Ambassador on September 7, 2009 requesting an increase in her salary. Def.'s SOF ¶ 27; Pl.'s SOF ¶ 27; Ex. 18 to Def.'s Mot. [Dkt. # 80–5] ("Sept. 7 Barot Memo"). She also provided copies of the memorandum to Mbewe; Felix C. Mbula, the First Secretary (Political & Administrative); and the Embassy's Minister Counsellor, Alfred Chioza. See Sept. 7 Barot Memo; Ex. 2 to Def.'s Mot. [Dkt. # 80–3] at 104:9–14.3
In the memo, plaintiff advocated for a salary increase commensurate with her "extra work load," and she claimed that four other individuals had been treated in that manner. Def.'s SOF ¶ 27; Pl.'s SOF ¶ 27; see also Sept. 7 Barot Memo. Plaintiff's memo had this to say about the four others:
Back in February, 2000, when Glen Jervis, Receptionist took the position of Secretary, her Salary was commensurately increased from $1,260.00 to $1,460.00, a monthly increase of $200.00 ($2,400.00/year).
In May 2003 ... Office Orderly/Janitor, Cresencio Lawigan's monthly salary was raised from $1,000 to $1,200.00; an increase of $200.00 a month ($2,400.00/year), justifying that he has to do extra work in the Chancery and the Ambassador's Residence.
In 2007, when the Second Secretary (Accts.) and Third Secretary (PA) were promoted to First Secretary (Accts) and Second Secretary (PA), their Overseas Allowances were also commensurately raised.
Sept. 7 Barot Memo; see also Def.'s SOF ¶ 28; Pl.'s SOF ¶ 28 (clarifying that Glen Jervis is female and Crescendo Lawigan is male). Plaintiff also maintained that she deserved the increase because the fact that she had created a computer template to substitute for paper forms had saved the Embassy money:
I have been doing my job exceedingly, and the Embassy have [sic ] been saving a lot, which savings is more than the 10% of my one month's salary. These savings are from purchase of Payment Vouchers and Backing Sheets because prior to my hiring, all these forms are bought from Printing Companies which the Embassy is no longer doing from then on.
Sept. 7 Barot Memo.
On September 9, 2009, plaintiff met with Mbewe and Mbula to discuss her requested salary increase. Def.'s SOF ¶ 31; Pl.'s SOF ¶ 31. Plaintiff's request was denied, and Mbewe, Mbula, and plaintiff agreed that she would return to her ordinary secretarial duties instead. See Def.'s SOF ¶ 31; Pl.'s SOF ¶ 31; Barot Dep. at 106:12–16; id. at 107:19–108:9.
Before she left for the day, though, plaintiff prepared and delivered another
memorandum to Mbewe and Mbula. She informed them that there was a shortage of the hard copy payment voucher forms that she would now need in light of her return to "secretary only" duties. Def.'s SOF ¶¶ 32–33; Pl.'s SOF ¶¶ 32–33; see Ex. 20 to Def.'s Mot. [Dkt. # 80–5] ("Sept. 9 Barot Memo");4 Barot Dep. at 122:22–123:6 (explaining that she would go back to using the paper form because that is what she did "when [she] was first hired as being [a] secretary"). Plaintiff had created and then continuously used the computerized version of the form during the time period that led up to the meeting. But after the meeting, she gave a memorandum to her supervisors advising them that they would need to order the paper forms again, repeating her point that she had been saving the Embassy money. See, e.g. , Barot Dep. at 115:20–116:6 ("On the 9th after our meeting, it has been agreed that I will be going back to being secretary. So because when I was a secretary I just filled out those forms, the payment vouchers, the backing sheet, and the forms. So—and the payment vouchers that I had was already running out, the forms that I was using before when I was a secretary. They still had the form there, so I requested for purchase of those payment vouchers."); id. at 123:18–124:3 ("Q. Why did it have to go back to that way instead of you continuing to use the form that was on your computer that would show the numbers on it?" A. "So I just wanted them to know that the one that I did was very useful. They were saving, because I was—I have to point them to they were saving because of what I did. So I had to be compensated for what I did."); id. at 156:17–157:17 ("Because I want them to know that that they are saving a lot by using what I have done and what I had formatted in my computer. They are saving a lot."); see also Sept. 9 Barot Memo.
According to defendant, Mbewe did not have access to the computerized forms on his computer, but he could access them on plaintiff's computer. Def.'s SOF ¶ 34. He logged on to plaintiff's computer after she left work on September 9, but he was unable to find the form, and he concluded that the payment voucher template had been deleted. Id. He then informed Mbula that plaintiff had deleted the template. Id. & n.52; see Ex. 21 to Def.'s Mot. [Dkt. # 80–5] ("Brief on the Case of Dolores Barot") at 2.5 The "mission administration" made a decision that night to place plaintiff on administrative leave immediately pending the arrival of the Ambassador. See Brief on the Case of Dolores Barot at 2.
The next morning, September 10, 2009, Mbula entered plaintiff's office. Def.'s SOF ¶ 36; Pl.'s SOF ¶ 36. After he asked plaintiff whether she was a member of a labor union, to which she responded "no," he presented her with a letter dated the same day signed by Chioza, placing her on indefinite administrative leave. Def.'s SOF ¶ 36; Pl.'s SOF ¶ 36. Mbula asked her to gather her things, and he escorted her out of the office. Def.'s SOF ¶ 36; Pl.'s SOF ¶ 36.6
The September 10, 2009 letter stated:
Further to the meeting between First Secretary (Accounts), First Secretary (Political and Administration) and yourself, regarding matters pertaining to your duties, and after serious consideration of the circumstances surrounding your actions thereafter, it has been decided to place you on indefinite administrative leave with immediate effect pending review of your case....
During your administrative leave, you will receive 50% of your salary. Any further decisions regarding your employment with
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