Barr v. CHAMPION INTERN. CORP., BLDG. PD & TD

• Decision Date: 06 September 1985
• Docket Number: No. CV 85-84-M.,CV 85-84-M.
• Citation: 617 F. Supp. 45
• Parties: Sheridan BARR, Clifford Buhler, Dennis Hammer, Nelson Stillwell, et al.; on behalf of themselves and all other employees similarly situated (except supervisory) at the Darby Sawmill of Champion International Corporation, Building Products Division, Plaintiffs, v. CHAMPION INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, BUILDING PRODUCTS DIVISION AND TIMBERLAND DIVISION, Bonner Operators, Bonner, Mont., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Montana

617 F. Supp. 45

Sheridan BARR, Clifford Buhler, Dennis Hammer, Nelson Stillwell, et al.; on behalf of themselves and all other employees similarly situated (except supervisory) at the Darby Sawmill of Champion International Corporation, Building Products Division, Plaintiffs, v. CHAMPION INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, BUILDING PRODUCTS DIVISION AND TIMBERLAND DIVISION, Bonner Operators, Bonner, Mont., Defendants.

No. CV 85-84-M.

United States District Court, D. Montana, Missoula Division.

September 6, 1985.

Howard C. Greenwood, Hamilton, Mont., for plaintiffs.

Robert Sheridan, Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, Missoula, Mont., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

LOVELL, District Judge.

The four named Plaintiffs commenced this action in state court in Ravalli County, Montana, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated employees of the Darby Sawmill of Champion International Corporation, Building Products Division. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff class consists of approximately 55 employees, each of whom is allegedly entitled to payment of wages for several holidays, accrued vacation time, severance pay, and a statutory penalty in the amount of 5% per day, up to twenty days, of the total above payments due.

Defendant removed the cause to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, alleging diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Plaintiff has moved the Court to remand to state court on the ground that the amount in controversy does not meet the $10,000 jurisdictional minimum. Defendant asserts that there is proper federal jurisdiction for the reason that the aggregate interests of the class exceed $10,000. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs & Defendant are citizens of different states.

In the absence of a specific statutory exception, a federal district court can exercise removal jurisdiction over a case only if it would have had jurisdiction over it as originally brought by the plaintiff. Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787 (9th Cir.1977); Southern Pac. Co. v. McAdoo, 82 F.2d 121 (9th Cir.1936). Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) exists when the action is between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs.

It is a long-standing tenet of federal law that

when two or more plaintiffs, having separate and distinct demands, unite for convenience and economy in a single unit, it is essential that the demand of each be of the requisite jurisdictional amount; but when several plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right, in which they have a common and undivided interest, it is enough if their interests collectively equal the jurisdictional amount.

Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead and Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40-41, 32 S.Ct. 9, 56 L.Ed. 81 (1911).

This rule has been applied to forbid aggregation of claims where none of the claimants satisfies the jurisdictional amount. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 89 S.Ct. 1053, 22 L.Ed.2d 319 (1969). More importantly, the rule against aggregation of claims "also requires dismissal of those litigants whose claims do not satisfy the jurisdictional amount, even though other litigants assert claims sufficient to invoke jurisdiction of the federal court." Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 295, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973).

In the present case, certain members of the plaintiff class have claims in excess of $10,000, while the claims of the remaining class members do not meet the "amount in controversy" requirement. The Plaintiffs' claims do not derive from rights they hold in group status; in spite of the common questions of law and fact involved, Plaintiffs' rights appear to arise only from the status of each as an individual employee of Defendant. Potrero Hill Community Action Committee v. Housing Authority, 410 F.2d 974 (9th Cir.1969). Therefore, this Court is convinced "to a legal certainty" that less than the jurisdictional amount is recoverable by at least some of the plaintiff class. City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir.1972)

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that if a plaintiff cannot aggregate claims to fulfill the jurisdictional amount requirement of § 1332, then neither can a defendant who invokes federal jurisdiction under the removal provisions of § 1441. Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 789 (9th Cir.1977). It is clear then that there is no independent basis for federal jurisdiction over the claims of those plaintiffs who cannot establish the minimum "amount in controversy" requirement. The only method by which this Court could assume jurisdiction over the entire case would be to exercise its discretionary pendent jurisdiction.

The concept of pendent jurisdiction encompasses both...