Barr v. City of Albuquerque
| Decision Date | 08 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 12-CV-01109-GBW/RHS,12-CV-01109-GBW/RHS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
| Parties | CHANDLER TODD BARR, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, RAY SCHULTZ, in his official capacity, LEAH KELLY, in her individual capacity, JENNIFER JARA, in her individual capacity, and ANDREA ORTIZ, in her individual capacity, Defendants. |
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' motions for summary judgment (docs. 59, 64, 86) and their motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint on the basis of Plaintiff's alleged discovery violations (doc. 89). Having reviewed the accompanying briefing and considered the parties' oral argument (doc. 117), and being fully advised, the Court will GRANT Defendant Ortiz's Motion for Summary Judgment, GRANT in part and DENY in part Defendants Kelly and Jara's Motion for Summary Judgment, GRANT in part and DENY in party Defendants City of Albuquerque (City) and Schultz's Motion for Summary Judgment, and DENY Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff Chandler Barr is a 23-year-old man with a long history of serious mental illness. Doc. 52 ¶¶ 12, 15-16. On September 11, 2010, Plaintiff was traveling by Greyhound bus from Oklahoma to Oregon when, while passing through Albuquerque, he began to feel ill. Id. ¶ 17-18. He exited the bus and contacted the Albuquerque Police Department (APD), informing them that he was having suicidal thoughts. Id. ¶ 19. APD officers and emergency medical personnel responded to the scene, at which point Plaintiff informed them that he was hearing voices in his head. Id. ¶¶ 20-21. Plaintiff was taken to the University of New Mexico Medical Center (UNMMC) where he received treatment for a broken finger; he was then transferred to the University of New Mexico Psychiatric Center (UNMPC) where he was treated for three days and released on September 13, 2010. Id. ¶¶ 22-25.
On September 14, 2010 at approximately 7:50 a.m., Plaintiff returned to the Greyhound bus station and approached Ryan Trujillo, a Greyhound employee, about changing his bus ticket because of his hospitalization. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. After Mr. Trujillo informed him about how he could change his ticket, Plaintiff left the bus station, but returned ten minutes later carrying a butter knife. Id. ¶¶ 30-33. Staff at the station noticed that Plaintiff had blood on his left arm and approached Plaintiff, who rebuffed them and again left the bus station. Id. ¶¶ 34-35, 37. After Plaintiff left the station for the second time, Mr. Trujillo called the police and then he and Jaime Mason, a busstation security guard, followed Plaintiff as he walked north down 1st Street towards Central Avenue. Id. ¶ 38-40.
At approximately 8:17 a.m., Defendants Jara and Kelly arrived at the scene, where they found Plaintiff walking down 2nd Street, bleeding from self-inflicted wounds on his forearm, with the knife visible in his hand. Id. ¶¶ 45-49, 63. Defendants Jara and Kelly had been notified by dispatch that Plaintiff was behaving in a way that indicated psychological issues. Id. ¶ 44. Defendants Jara and Kelly parked their vehicles near the intersection of Central Avenue and 2nd Street, at which point Defendant Kelly exited her vehicle and positioned herself behind the driver's side door of her vehicle with her sidearm drawn. Id. ¶¶ 52, 53, 57. Defendant Kelly directed Plaintiff to stop moving and put down the knife, at which point Plaintiff began to move towards Defendants Kelly. Id. ¶¶ 57, 59-61. As Plaintiff began to move towards Defendant Kelly, Defendant Jara arrived on the scene. Doc. 64, Ex. N at 114:9-12. As Defendant Jara was exiting her car, Defendant Kelly shot Plaintiff twice, at which point Plaintiff collapsed. Doc. 52. ¶¶ 65, 68-69, doc. 64, Ex. N at 114:13-14. Defendants Kelly and Jara then approached Plaintiff and ordered him to turn on his stomach. Doc. 52 ¶¶ 72-73. Defendant Jara used her boot to assist Plaintiff in turning onto his stomach, and then handcuffed him. Id. ¶ 75. Plaintiff was hospitalized for 31 days at the University of New Mexico Hospital before being transferred to the Bernalillo Metropolitan CountyDetention Center and finally back to the Northwest Center for Behavioral Health in Oklahoma. Id. ¶¶ 86-87
Defendant Ortiz was called to the scene to investigate the shooting. Id. ¶ 78. Based on her investigation, she produced a supplementary police report indicating that Plaintiff had assaulted Defendants Kelly and Jara in violation of state law. Id. ¶¶ 79-80. Defendant Ortiz also completed a criminal complaint and arrest warrant for Plaintiff regarding the assault. Id. On November 5, 2010, after hearing testimony from Defendant Ortiz, the sole witness, a grand jury indicted Plaintiff for aggravated assault on a police officer with a deadly weapon in violation of N.M.S.A. 1978 § 30-22-22(A), a third degree felony. Id. ¶¶ 91-92.
On February 13, 2012, Plaintiff moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis that the grand jury had not been instructed that Plaintiff had to have been aware that the intended assault victim was a police officer. Id. ¶ 95. The court dismissed the indictment without prejudice on March 20, 2012. Id. ¶ 97.
Plaintiff's operative Complaint (doc. 52) raises eight claims: battery, false arrest, and malicious prosecution in violation of New Mexico law, as well as excessive force, wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution, supervisory and municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires that a party seeking summary judgment demonstrate that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "In our circuit, the moving party carries the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that it is entitled to summary judgment." Trainor v. Apollo Metal Specialties, Inc., 318 F.3d 976, 979 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Hicks v. City of Watonga, 942 F.2d 737, 743 (10th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotations omitted).
Summary judgment is proper only if a reasonable trier of fact could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant bears the initial burden of "show[ing] that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Once the movant meets this burden, Rule 56(e) requires the non-moving party to designate specific facts showing that "there are . . . genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Thom v. Bristol Myers Squibb Co., 353F.3d 848, 851 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). All material facts set forth in the motion and response which are not specifically controverted are deemed undisputed. D.N.M.LR-Civ. 56.1(b).
The court must adhere to three principles when evaluating a motion for summary judgment. First, the court's role is not to weigh the evidence, but to assess the threshold issue whether a genuine issue exists as to material facts requiring a trial. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249. Second, the court must resolve all reasonable inferences and doubts in favor of the non-moving party, and construe all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551-54 (1999). Third, the court cannot decide any issues of credibility. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255. However, if the non-moving party's story "is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for the purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). In the end, "to survive the . . . motion, [the nonmovant] need only present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor." Id. at 257.
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