Barr v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings
| Decision Date | 30 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 19-cv-1887-MMA (MDD) |
| Parties | NANCY BARR, Plaintiff, v. LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA HOLDINGS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DOC. NO 26]
Plaintiff Nancy Barr (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings (“Defendant” or “Labcorp”) asserting California state law employment claims as well as violations of California Labor Code § 1102.5 and California Health and Safety Code § 1278.5. See Doc. No. 1. Labcorp moves for summary judgment in its entirety. See Doc. No. 26. Plaintiff filed an opposition, to which Labcorp replied. See Doc. Nos. 32 43.[1] The Court found this matter suitable for determination on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. See Doc. No. 31. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Labcorp's motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff is a licensed medical doctor. See Doc. No. 47-5 (“Pl. Decl.”) at ¶ 1. In 2014, she began providing pathology services to Labcorp at its San Diego laboratory (the “San Diego Lab”). See Doc. No. 26-1 (“Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts” or “SS”) at No. 1.[3] Labcorp operates a network of clinical laboratories that provide testing and diagnostic services. See SS at No. 2. From 2014 to 2016, Plaintiff was contracted to work for Labcorp through a third-party medical group, Affiliated Pathologists Medical Group, Inc (“APMG”). See SS at No. 3. After APMG dissolved, Plaintiff and five other pathologists formed Southern California Pathology Medical Group (“SCPMG”). See SS at No. 4. On April 1, 2016, Labcorp and SCPMG entered into a services agreement. See Id. One year later, SCPMG disbanded, and Plaintiff individually entered into a one-year Pathology Services Agreement with Labcorp (the “Agreement”). See SS at No. 5. The Agreement was for one year-set to expire on April 1, 2018-and called for 30-days' termination notice. See SS at No. 5; Doc. No. 26-3 (“Kondon Decl.”) at Ex. F. The Agreement provided an automatic one-year renewal at the end of the term unless expressly terminated. See Id. The parties dispute whether the Agreement conferred on Plaintiff employee or independent contractor status. See Doc. No. 26 at 9 n.1.
On April 30, 2018, Plaintiff notified her supervisor, Melissa Thompson (“Thompson”), of a potential “specimen mix-up.” SS at No. 16. Sometime prior, Plaintiff became aware of inconsistent diagnoses for a specific patient-JZ. See SS at No. 16. In late March 2018, Plaintiff reported that JZ's pap smear was “abnormal” and “suspicious for squamous cell carcinoma.” SS at No. 17. However, a subsequent biopsy and second procedure of JZ's tissue revealed only normal cells. See SS at No. 18; Kondon Decl. at Exs. I, J. Following this inconsistency, JZ's original pap smear was reprocessed and came back “negative” or “normal.” SS at No. 19.
Thompson subsequently investigated the discrepancy and in May 2018, concluded that it was the result of instrument processing error. See SS at Nos. 20, 22. Plaintiff disputes that Thompson conducted a thorough investigation and asserts that the specimen mix-up was not due to instrument processing error but instead “human or operator error resulting in somebody else's PAP smear being mislabeled as JZ's.”[4] PRS at No. 20. Thompson did not report the specimen mix-up to anyone above her in management, including Sonya Engle. See SS at No. 23.
In 2018, Labcorp's Vice President and General Manager for Southern California Sonya Engle (“Engle”) began investigating Labcorp's productivity and was charged with review and optimization of the contract pathologists at the Southern California facilities, which included the San Diego Lab. See Doc. No. 26-6 (“Engle Decl.”) at ¶ 4; see also SS at Nos. 9-11.
In March 2018, upon reviewing the San Diego Lab's productivity, Engle concluded that it was contracting with two more pathologists than the workload justified. See SS at No. 12. Engle's investigation also revealed an imbalance in the distribution of cases. See SS at No. 12. While pathologists are tasked with analyzing both cytology and biopsy specimens, Engle found that Plaintiff read almost exclusively cytology cases in 2017, and that she read more pap smears than the other pathologists. See SS at Nos. 6-7.
Accordingly, Engle determined that with two fewer pathologists, the lab would work most efficiently with all cases evenly distributed. See SS at No. 14. Because Plaintiff was an “outlier among the pathologists, ” Engle recommended that Plaintiff be one of the pathologists terminated. SS at No. 13.
Plaintiff disputes that the workload at the San Diego Lab justified terminations and that the lab would be more effective with an even distribution of cytology cases. See, e.g., Pl. Decl. at ¶¶ 51-55. She also disputes that it was Engle's decision to terminate her. See Doc. No. 47-3 (“Sottile Decl.”) Ex. B at 351:15-21 (“Miss Engle said the decision was entirely Melissa's decision . . . .”).
On June 29, 2018, Engle and Thompson met with Plaintiff to deliver her a notice of termination. See SS at No. 24. The parties dispute what was said during that meeting. See, e.g., Sottile Decl. at Ex. B at 351:15-21. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that during the meeting Plaintiff indicated that she had quality assurance concerns and requested a follow-up meeting. See SS at No. 24. At that time, Engle withdrew the notice of termination and scheduled a second meeting. See SS at No. 25.
At the July 2, 2018 follow-up meeting, Plaintiff notified Engle of the specimen mix-up and indicated her belief that it had not been properly investigated. See SS at No. 26. The parties dispute whether Engle had prior knowledge of the situation. See PRS at No. 23 (). During the meeting, Plaintiff also expressed other concerns, including that Thompson had falsified data and “had not recorded, or had corrected, errors made by other pathologists.” SS at No. 27. Engle had no prior knowledge of Thompson's alleged misconduct. See SS at No. 27. After the meeting, Engle investigated Plaintiff's claims by interviewing Thompson and Tiea Kesler, Labcorp's Vice President of Anatomic Pathology. See SS at No. 28. While Engle was satisfied that Thompson had properly investigated the specimen mix-up, she directed Engle to formally document her investigation. See SS at No. 29; Doc. No. 26-6 (“Thompson Decl.”) at Ex. B.
On August 16, 2018, Engle and Thompson met with Plaintiff to communicate Engle's investigation and findings.[5] See SS at No. 30. Immediately thereafter, Plaintiff called Labcorp's internal compliance hotline and the Center for Medicaid Services (“CMS”) and lodged quality assurance complaints.[6] See SS at No. 31.
On September 7, 2018, Engle and Thompson met with Plaintiff and presented her with a second notice of termination. See SS at Nos. 32-33. Upon receipt, Plaintiff informed Engle and Thompson of her internal and CMS complaints-information that neither Engle nor Thompson was previously aware of.[7] See SS at No. 34. The basis for Plaintiff's termination is at the center of this dispute. See e.g., SS at No. 14; Pl. Decl. at ¶¶ 124, 127.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the basis of its motion and of identifying the portions of the declarations, pleadings, and discovery that demonstrate absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party has “the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact, and for these purposes the material it lodged must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party.” Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). A fact is material if it could affect the “outcome of the suit” under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. See id.
If the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by its own evidence or by citing appropriate materials in the record, show by sufficient evidence that there is a genuine dispute for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . ..” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A “scintilla of evidence” in support of the nonmoving party's position is insufficient; rather, “there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Moreover, “a party cannot manufacture a genuine issue of material fact merely by making assertions in its legal memoranda.” S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. Walter Kidde & Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1982).
In support of her opposition, Plaintiff submitted a declaration. See Pl. Decl....
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