Barr v. United Methodist Church

Decision Date08 March 1979
Citation90 Cal.App.3d 259,153 Cal.Rptr. 322
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesFrank T. BARR et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. The UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 18244.

Milberg, Weiss, Bershad & Specthrie, William S. Lerach, Gregg A. Johnson, Frederic J. Milberg, Wied, Granby & Alford, Colin W. Wied and David J. Yardley, San Diego, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Sullivan, Jones & Archer, John H. Le'Estrange, Jr., Daniel R. Salas, San Diego, Robert V. Vallandigham, Jr. and William F. Fahey, Los Angeles, Witwer, Moran, Burlage & Atkinson, Samuel W. Witwer, Sr. and Samuel W. Witwer, Jr., Chicago, Ill., Musick, Peeler & Garrett, William McD. Miller III and Wayne B. Littlefield, Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, William H. Levit, Jr. and John H. Blue, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent.

Breed, Abbott & Morgan and Thomas A. Shaw, Jr., New York City, as amici curiae for defendant and respondent.

O'Melveny & Myers, Bennett W. Priest and Robert J. White, Kadison, Pfaelzer, Woodard, Quinn & Rossi and Alan R. Woodard, Los Angeles, for intervenors.

WIENER, Associate Justice.

The guarantees of due process of law and religious freedom under the State and Federal Constitutions do not prohibit the United Methodist Church, a legal entity under Code of Civil Procedure section 388, subdivision (a), from being sued. 1 We reverse the order of the trial court quashing service of summons on the United Methodist Church. 2

The Procedural Background

Plaintiffs commenced their class action on behalf of approximately 1,950 present and former residents of the 14 retirement homes operated in California, Hawaii and Arizona by Pacific Homes Corporation (Pacific Homes) for equitable relief or damages. 3 The complaint alleged each member of the class had entered into a "continuing care agreement" with Pacific Homes; 4 that on or about February 18, 1977 Pacific Homes petitioned for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, and that the defendants Pacific and Southwest Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church (PSWAC), a California corporation, the General Council on Finance and Administration of the United Methodist Church (GCFA), and the United Methodist Church (UMC), were each financially responsible for the operations of Pacific Homes. Plaintiffs sought a declaration requiring each of the defendants to specifically perform the continuing care agreements between each plaintiff and Pacific Homes or for damages.

Plaintiffs' bases for jurisdiction over UMC in each cause of action are the allegations which state UMC was an unincorporated association, Pacific Homes was the agent of the defendants PSWAC, GCFA and UMC and in doing the acts alleged was acting within the scope of its authority as agent and with the permission, knowledge and consent of PSWAC, UMC and GCFA; each defendant or predecessor in interest was the agent of each other defendant and in doing the acts alleged, each was acting within the scope of his authority with the permission, knowledge and consent of each other defendant; and Pacific Homes was the alter ego of each defendant.

Persons upon whom service of process was attempted on behalf of UMC moved to quash the service under Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10 on the grounds that (1) UMC was merely a loose connectional system and not a jural entity capable of being sued under Code of Civil Procedure section 388, subdivision (a); and (2) to permit suit against UMC was unconstitutional as a violation of the due process, free exercise and establishment of religion provisions of the United States and California Constitutions. Plaintiffs appeal from the order granting the motion to quash service of summons (Code Civ.Proc., § 904.1, subd. (c)).

The United Methodist Church is a Jural Entity under Code of Civil Procedure Section 388, Subdivision (a).

The Status of UMC in the Litigation is a Question of Law and Not of Fact.

The initial argument made by UMC is that as an elementary principle of appellate procedure, we must uphold the trial court order if it is supported by any substantial evidence. (See gen. Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. McHugh (1913) 166 Cal. 140, 142, 134 P. 1157; 6 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, § 245, p. 4237.) The first difficulty we encounter with this proposition is it assumes the trial judge made a factual determination. Although there was a plethora of evidence on the issue of whether UMC was an unincorporated association, the trial court explained its holding by reference to two sets of considerations. One was peculiar to Methodism with apparent reliance on the Encyclopedia Britannica as an unbiased source; the other was of general applicability to "all churches and religious movements" with the apparent assumption that the suit against UMC involved the unconstitutional interference with the free exercise of religion. Nothing is contained in the trial court order which suggests a factual determination was made which involved the process of weighing the evidence which was presented. Secondly, the analysis of whether UMC is a jural entity involves a review of data relating to the creation, existence and operation of UMC. The facts contained in the affidavits and declarations submitted, including the information in the Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church (1976), are not in dispute. The only ostensible factual conflict which arises is related to the ultimate issue expressed in opinions of witnesses on behalf of UMC to the effect that UMC cannot be sued. "In short, this is not a true case of conflicting evidence in which a reviewing court will refuse to disturb findings based thereon." (Cosper v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co. (1959) 53 Cal.2d 77, 81, 346 P.2d 409, 412; see also Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 866, fn. 2, 44 Cal.Rptr. 767, 402 P.2d 839.) The result which must be reached in this case does not rest on ecclesiastical expertise, but rather on principles of law. The question as to the jural status of UMC is one of law and not of fact. (Ibid.; cf. Brandeburg v. New York Tel. & Tel. Co. (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 893, 896, 123 Cal.Rptr. 255; Agalite-Bronson Co. v. K. G. Limited (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 308, 310, 75 Cal.Rptr. 527.)

The Criteria to be Applied to Determine Whether an Entity is Capable of Being Sued as an Unincorporated Association

"For a long time the established rule was that in the absence of statute, an unincorporated association could not sue or be sued in its common name; all the members thereof had to appear in their own names as parties plaintiff or defendant. The basic reason was that the association was not, in the eyes of the law, a legal unit or entity, and had no legal capacity to become a party to an action. (Citations.) The difficulty was only one of procedure, and the objection was purely technical. The liabilities or rights of the members were in no way involved, and were not, in theory, impaired by the operation of the rule. They might have brought actions if they all joined as plaintiffs, and they might have been held to any liability imposed upon them by law, if sued and served individually. But where associations with large membership were involved, the operation of the rule frequently had inconvenient and unjust consequences, and various exceptions came to be recognized." (Jardine v. Superior Court (1931) 213 Cal. 301, 307-308, 2 P.2d 756, 759.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 388, enacted to eliminate procedural problems in actions against an unincorporated association, was held constitutional in Jardine v. Superior Court, supra.

In its original form, only persons transacting business under a common name could be sued in that name, but "business" was ultimately construed so broadly it constituted a slight limitation on the right to sue an unincorporated association. (See Law Revision Commission Comment (1967 Amend.) Herald v. Glendale Lodge No. 1289 (1920) 46 Cal.App. 325, 330, 189 P. 329.) The 1967 amendment to Code of Civil Procedure section 388 made clear an unincorporated association, whether organized for profit or not, could either sue or be sued in the name which it had assumed or by which it was known. The trend of case law has been the rejection of legal niceties to assure full recognition of the unincorporated association as a separate legal entity. The basis for this rejection of procedural rigidity has been specifically articulated in labor law disputes. "The social and economic realities of the present-day organization of society has thus led this court and others to recognize the suability of unions. (footnote omitted.) . . . We must recognize that the society of today rests upon the foundation of group structures of all types, such as the corporation, the cooperative society, the public utility. Such groups must, of course, operate successfully within the society; one of the prerequisites to that functioning is, generally, liability to suit and opportunity for suit. To frustrate that viability by the imposition of outmoded concepts would be to impair the institutions as well as to impede the judicial process." (Daniels v. Sanitarium Assn., Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 602, 607-608, 30 Cal.Rptr. 828, 832, 381 P.2d 652, 656; see also Marshall v. International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union (1962) 57 Cal.2d 781, 22 Cal.Rptr. 211, 371 P.2d 987.)

Statutory enactments in California involving the unincorporated association have been consistent with case law development. In 1967 the Corporations Code was amended to include the definition of unincorporated association as "any partnership or other unincorporated organization of two or more persons, whether organized for profit or not . . . ." (Corp.Code, § 24000, subd. (a).) It has been made liable to third persons to the same extent as if the association were a natural person (...

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