Barraza v. Berryhill, CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:16-CV-1072

• Decision Date: 18 September 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:16-CV-1072
• Parties: HERMAN BARRAZA Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

HERMAN BARRAZA Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL,ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:16-CV-1072

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

September 18, 2017

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On July 14, 2016, the parties consented to proceed before a United States magistrate judge for all purposes, including the entry of a final judgment, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Docket Entry #9). The case was then transferred to this court. (Docket Entry #10). Cross-motions for summary judgment have been filed by Plaintiff Hermann Barraza ("Plaintiff," "Barraza") and Nancy Berryhill ("Defendant," "Commissioner"), in her capacity as Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("SSA"). (Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment ["Plaintiff's Motion"], Docket Entry #13; Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment ["Defendant's Motion"], Docket Entry #12). Defendant has also filed a reply. (Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment ["Defendant's Response"], Docket Entry #14). After considering the pleadings, the evidence submitted, and the applicable law, the court ORDERS that Defendant's Motion be GRANTED, and that Plaintiff's Motion be DENIED.

Background

On March 19, 2012, Plaintiff Herman Barraza filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("the Act"), and under Part A of Title XVIII of Act. (Transcript ["Tr."] at 144). In his application for benefits, Barraza claimed that he has been unable to work since February 16, 2007, because he has arthritis, nerve damage in his arms, legs, back and neck, high blood pressure, depression, anxiety, and joint pain. (See Tr. at 144, 175). On June 14, 2012, the SSA found that Barraza was not disabled under the Act, and so his application was denied. (Tr. at 57-58). Plaintiff petitioned for a reconsideration of that decision, but his claim was again denied on September 4, 2012. (Tr. at 85). He then successfully requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). (Tr. at 99-100). That hearing took place on September 5, 2013, before ALJ William B. Howard. (Tr. at 27-35). Plaintiff testified at the hearing and was assisted by his attorney, Donald Dewberry. (Tr. at 52-83). Dr. Robert H. Smiley, a medical expert witness, testified at the hearing, as did Kay Squires Gilreath, a vocational rehabilitation consultant. (Tr. at 71-83).

On October 25, 2013, the ALJ engaged in the following five-step, sequential analysis to determine whether Plaintiff was capable of performing substantial gainful activity or was, in fact, disabled:

1. An individual who is working or engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found disabled regardless of the medical findings. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b) and 416.920(b).

2. An individual who does not have a "severe impairment" will not be found to be disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c).

3. An individual who "meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1" of the regulations will be considered disabled without consideration of vocational factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d) and 416.920(d).

4. If an individual is capable of performing the work he has done in the past, a finding of "not disabled" must be made. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f).

5. If an individual's impairment precludes performance of his past work, then other factors, including age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity must be considered to determine if any work can be performed. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g).

Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 453 (5^th Cir. 2000); Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173-74 (5^th Cir. 1995). It is well-settled that, under this analysis, Barraza has the burden to prove any disability that is relevant to the first four steps. Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 125 (5^th Cir. 1991). If he is successful, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner, at step five, to show that he is able to perform other work that exists in the national economy. Myers v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 617, 619 (5^th Cir. 2001); Wren, 925 F.2d at 125. "A finding that a claimant is disabled or is not disabled at any point in the five-step review is conclusive and terminates the analysis." Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 58 (5^th Cir. 1987).

It must be emphasized that the mere presence of an impairment does not necessarily establish a disability. Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 293 (5^th Cir. 1992) (quoting Milam v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 1284, 1286 (5^th Cir. 1986)). Under the Act, a claimant is deemed disabled only if he demonstrates an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 618 (5^th Cir. 1990) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). Substantial gainful activity is defined as "work activity involving significant physical or mental abilities for pay or profit." Newton, 209 F.3d at 452. A physical or mental impairment is "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostictechniques." Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 165 (5^th Cir. 1983) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3)). Further, the impairment must be so severe as to limit the claimant so that "[he] is not only unable to do [his] previous work but cannot, considering [his] age, education, and work experience, engage in any kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5^th Cir. 1994) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)).

Based on these principles, as well as his review of the evidence presented at the hearing, the ALJ found that Barraza has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 16, 2007, when he last worked. (Tr. at 29). The ALJ further concluded that Plaintiff suffers from degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, hypertension, and obesity, and that these impairments are severe. (Id.). The ALJ also considered Plaintiff's testimony that he continues to have pain in both hands following surgery for carpal tunnel syndrome. (Id.). The ALJ determined this condition to be a non-severe impairment, because there was no objective medical evidence that Plaintiff's hands were limited in any way. (Id.). The ALJ further found that Barraza's impairments did not meet, or equal in severity, the medical criteria for any disabling impairment in the applicable SSA regulations.¹ (Id.). He then assessed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), and concluded that he is capable of performing light work,² although he can stand and/or walk for only about four hours in an eight hour workday, and he can sit for only six hours. (Tr. at 32). The ALJ also determined that Barraza should not work at unprotected heights or around dangerous machinery, and he can only occasionally climbone flight of stairs. (Tr. at 32). With these limitations, the ALJ decided that Barraza is capable of performing his past relevant work as a security guard. (Tr. at 34). For that reason, he concluded that Barraza is "not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act," and he denied the application for benefits on October 25, 2013. (Tr. at 35).

On November 21, 2013, Plaintiff requested an Appeals Council review of the ALJ's decision. (Tr. at 23). SSA regulations provide that the Appeals Council will grant a request for a review if any of the following circumstances is present: "(1) there is an apparent abuse of discretion by the ALJ; (2) an error of law has been made; (3) the ALJ's actions, findings, or conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence; or (4) there is a broad policy issue which may affect the public interest." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970 and 416.1470. On October 7, 2014, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request, finding that no applicable reason for review existed. (Tr. at 1-3). With this ruling, the ALJ's decision became final. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.984(b)(2) and 416.1484(b)(2).

On April 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, pursuant to section 205(g) of the Act (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)), to challenge that decision. (Plaintiff's Original Complaint, Docket Entry #1). The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. (Docket Entries 12, 13). Having considered the pleadings, the evidence submitted, and the applicable law, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

Standard of Review

Federal courts review the Commissioner's denial of disability benefits only to ascertain whether the final decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the proper legal standards were applied. Newton, 209 F.3d at 452 (citing Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5^th Cir. 1999)). "If the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, they must be affirmed." Id. (citing Martinez, 64 F.3d at 173). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere scintilla and less than a preponderance." Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5^th Cir. 1995); see Martinez, 64 F.3d at 173 (quoting Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021-22 (5^th Cir. 1990)). On review, the court does not "reweigh the evidence, but . . . only scrutinize[s] the record to determine whether it contains substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision." Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5^th Cir. 1995); see Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1302 (5^th Cir. 1987). If no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings exist that support the Commissioner's decision, then a finding of no substantial evidence is proper....