Barreth v. Reyes 1, Inc.

Decision Date29 July 2020
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 5:19-cv-00320-TES
PartiesSETH BARRETH, Plaintiff, v. REYES 1, INC. d/b/a LITTLE CAESARS PIZZA, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Relying on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), Plaintiff Seth Barreth claims that Defendant Reyes 1, Inc. d/b/a Little Caesars Pizza ("Little Caesars") subjected him to harassment and a hostile work environment, constructively terminated him, and retaliated against him because of his sex. [Doc. 11 at p. 1]. Now, Little Caesars, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), seeks dismissal of Barreth's claims asserted against it. After a very thorough and close review of the Amended Complaint, the parties' briefs, and the applicable law, Little Caesar's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 20] is due to be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Barreth acknowledges he was born female; however, since 2013, he1 has presented as a male. [Doc. 11 at ¶ 9]. While he has yet to change his sex2 on his government-issued identification, he has legally changed his name. [Id.].

After a telephone interview, Little Caesars decided to hire Barreth as a Crew Member. [Id. at ¶¶ 11-12]. However, his employment was short-lived—30 days, at most. While Barreth never says when his first day of training was, we know that he went to complete his onboarding paperwork and receive his uniform on April 26, 2018, and later resigned on May 26, 2018. [Id. at ¶¶ 13, 17, 39-41]. When he was picking up his uniform, Store Manager Lachelle Lester informed Barreth that Little Caesars "had to run a background check." [Id. at ¶¶ 12-13]. It wasn't until then that he mentioned either his gender identity or female-to-male transition and informed Ms. Lester that his background check would still identify him as a female. [Id. at ¶¶ 10, 13-14]. Barreth claims that he never asked Ms. Lester to "instruct anyone to refer to him as any gender" or authorized her (or anyone from Little Caesars) "to disclose or discuss his gender identity or transition with anyone." [Id. at ¶ 16]. Yet, on his first day of training, Barreth "was referred to as a 'she' by a coworker," and nine days before he stopped coming intothe store to work, he alleges that his direct supervisor, Shift Leader Indya Williams, made several inappropriate comments to him. [Id. at ¶¶ 17-19, 39, 41].

Prefacing her questions with the notion that she didn't "want [Barreth] to be offended," Ms. Williams asked him if he "[had] a dick," if he "[had] titties" or had "them removed," and if he was "on hormones." [Id. at ¶¶ 20-21]. When Barreth ignored Ms. Williams' questions, she said to him, "you probably can't have kids, can you?" [Id. at ¶¶ 22-23]. Rather than respond to her specific questions, Barreth asked "who . . . disclosed his gender identity to her" and immediately stepped outside, called Ms. Lester, and explained to her that Ms. Williams had asked him questions about his genitalia and made remarks about his "supposed inability to reproduce." [Id. at ¶¶ 24, 26-27]. During this call, Ms. Lester stated that she had "already discussed [Barreth's] situation with everyone" and "that 'everyone' knew what was going on." [Id. at ¶¶ 27-28].

Thirty minutes later, Ms. Lester arrived at the Little Caesars store and finished the shift with both Barreth and Ms. Williams. [Id. at ¶ 29]. However, according to his Amended Complaint, Ms. Lester never provided any disciplinary action for Ms. Williams' conduct, never followed up to make sure Ms. Williams' treatment had stopped, and never asked Barreth whether he was "alright." [Id. at ¶¶ 30, 38]. In fact, whenever he and Ms. Williams were assigned to the same shift, Barreth contends that she would not only scrutinize his work, assign him additional tasks, blame him forthings that were not his responsibility or fault, but would also "threaten[ ] to write him up." [Id. at ¶ 31]. Other than this, she refused to interact with him. [Id. at ¶ 32].

After the incident involving Ms. Williams, Barreth alleges that "his coworkers and supervisors began frequently calling him a 'he-she' and making similar disparaging comments to and about [him] and his gender identity." [Id. at ¶ 33]. Due to this treatment, Barreth resigned. [Id. at ¶¶ 39-41]. And after his resignation, he claims that Little Caesars "made it difficult for [him] to receive his final paycheck." [Id. at ¶ 42]. Although it came "several days late," Barreth received his final paycheck in the mail. [Id. at ¶ 43]. In addition to issues related to his final paycheck, Barreth contends that Little Caesars "has taken additional actions to harass [him]" by persistently referring to him with feminine pronouns "in a written statement dated several months after the incident." [Id. at ¶ 46].

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

When ruling on a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), it is a cardinal rule that district courts must accept the factual allegations set forth in a complaint as true. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 572 (2007). Under this Rule, a defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to dismiss. Milo v. CyberCore Techs., LLC, No. SAG-18-3145, 2020 WL 134537, at *3 (D. Md. Jan. 13, 2020). This motion is an "assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by aplaintiff are true, the complaint still fails as a matter of law to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Id. However, a complaint survives a Rule 12(b)(6)-based motion if it alleges sufficient factual matter (accepted as true) that states a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009)). In fact, a complaint "may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [its] facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (citations omitted).

Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is measured by reference to the pleading standard of Rule 8—a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Milo, 2020 WL 134537, at *4; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it does require "more than unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusations." McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333 (citation omitted) (alterations adopted). The purpose of Rule 8 is to provide a defendant "with 'fair notice' of the claims and the 'grounds' for entitlement to relief." Milo, 2020 WL 134537, at *4 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56).

To decide whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, district courts use a two-step framework. McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333 (citation omitted). The first step is to identify the allegations that are "no more than conclusions." Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). "Conclusory allegations are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. After disregarding the conclusory allegations, the second step is to "assume any remainingfactual allegations are true and determine whether those factual allegations 'plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.''' Id. "A court decides whether [Rule 8's pleading standard] is met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer that the plaintiff is entitled to the legal remedy sought." Milo, 2020 WL 134537, at *4 (quoting A Society Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011)).

When drafting his complaint, "[a] plaintiff must plead more than labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "To be sure, a plaintiff may use legal conclusions to structure his complaint, but legal conclusions 'must be supported by factual allegations.'" McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). While courts, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, must take all of the factual allegations in a complaint as true; they are not bound to accept a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Courts must "identify conclusory allegations and then discard them—not 'on the ground that they are unrealistic or nonsensical' but because their conclusory nature 'disentitles them to the presumption of truth.'" McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681).

The issue to be decided when considering a motion to dismiss is not whether the claimant will ultimately prevail, but "whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidenceto support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scheuer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). The factual allegations in a complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and cannot "merely create[] a suspicion of a legally cognizable right of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Finally, and in this case, critically, a complaint that tenders "'naked assertions' devoid of 'further factual enhancement'" will not survive against a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (cleaned up). To survive, a complaint must allege enough facts "to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" supporting a claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

B. Little Caesars' Motion to Dismiss

In its Motion to Dismiss, Little Caesars first argues that Barreth's sex-based hostile work environment claim should be dismissed as violative of Rule 8 in that he does not state a claim that is plausible on its face. [Doc. 20-1 at pp. 3-7]. Second, Little Caesars argues that Barreth's retaliation claim must be dismissed for two reasons: (1) because it is outside...

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