Barreto Peat, Inc. v. LUIS A. AYALA COLON SUCRS.

• Decision Date: 30 March 1989
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 88-1264 (GG).
• Citation: 709 F. Supp. 321
• Parties: BARRETO PEAT, INC., Plaintiff, v. LUIS A. AYALA COLON SUCRS., INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

709 F. Supp. 321

BARRETO PEAT, INC., Plaintiff, v. LUIS A. AYALA COLON SUCRS., INC., Defendant.

Civ. No. 88-1264 (GG).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

March 30, 1989.

Cobian & Ramos, and Juan A. Ramos Díaz, San Juan, P.R., for plaintiff.

José A. Sarraga, Hato Rey, P.R., for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

GIERBOLINI, District Judge.

Plaintiff, a New York corporation engaged in the sale of paper goods brought the present action for damages suffered as a result of the acts and/or omissions of defendant, a Puerto Rico corporation. Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Pending is a motion filed by defendant alleging that the instant action is barred by the one-year limitations period provided for tort actions in Puerto Rico. Plaintiff has filed an opposition arguing that the applicable statute of limitations is the fifteen-year period for ex contractu actions under the Civil Code of Puerto Rico. In the alternative, plaintiff contends that even if the action complained of were a negligent act, instead of a breach of contract, plaintiff had one year from April 22, 1988 to file suit because it was then that plaintiff knew of the damage and who had caused it. Thus, plaintiff argues that since the complaint was filed on July 22, 1988, it was filed well within the one-year limitations period.¹

A brief summary of the facts is essential. On October 12, 1986 plaintiff Barreto Peat, Inc. sold 728 reels of unbleached braskraft 100% long-fiber of virgin pine paper to Papelera Puertorriqueña, Inc. for $105,599.56 under "CIF, San Juan" terms, which paper is used as raw material in the manufacture of paper products. On even date, ocean carrier Saguenay Shipping Limited and the vessel M/V TRANSHOPE issued at the port of Salvador, Brazil to Industria de Papeis Santo Amaro, S.A., as shipper, a bill of lading covering the aforementioned cargo for carriage to the port of San Juan, Puerto Rico. On or about October 23, 1986, defendant Luis A. Ayala Colón Sucrs., Inc. (Ayala), an agent of Saguenay Shipping Limited, received the cargo which arrived on the M/V TRANSHOPE. On or around that same date, Ayala delivered the goods subject of the present controversy — which were covered by a bill of lading — to Papelera Puertorriqueña, Inc. without requesting the surrender of the bill of lading.

On July 22, 1988 plaintiff filed the present complaint alleging that the delivery of the goods to a third party without requiring the surrender of the original bill of lading amounts in effect to a conversion; that plaintiff has not been able to collect the sum owed to it for those goods or to retain the goods for itself, and that defendant is liable to plaintiff due to its acts and omissions.

Under Puerto Rico law, a person who causes damage to another through fault or negligence shall be liable in damages. Tit. 31 P.R.Laws Annot. § 5141. Conversion in Puerto Rico is an intentional tort. It is merely a form of the fault (culpa) described in Section 1802 of our Civil Code (1930 ed.). Federal Ins. Co. v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 750 F.2d 1095, 1100 (1st Cir.1983). The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has defined conversion as: "not the simple acquisition of another's property, but the malicious and wrongful privation of the ownership rights, the illegal exercise, or the assumption of authority over another's property, thereby depriving the lawful owner or possessor, permanently or for an indefinite period, of its use and enjoyment." Hull Dobbs Co. v. Superior Court, 81 P.R.R. 214, 222 (1959); Heirs of Sorbá v. Viñas, 49 P.R.R. 31 (1935). The facts as alleged in the complaint are to the effect that defendant illegally exercised or assumed authority over plaintiff's property, thereby depriving plaintiff of its use. Thus, the alleged acts and/or omissions of the defendant could give rise to a finding of conversion which is regulated by 31 L.P.R.A. § 5141.

The applicable statute of limitations governing the prescription of tort actions, 31 L.P.R.A. § 5298, provides that tort actions shall prescribe one year from the last tortious act. It appears from the record, that the alleged tortious act was on or about October 23, 1986 — when Ayala delivered the goods to Papelera Puertorriqueña, Inc. without requiring the surrender of the original bill of lading — and the complaint was not filed until July 22, 1988. Clearly, the action was brought after the one-year limitations period had run.

Plaintiff claims that if we considered the present action as one sounding in tort, it had one year from the date of April 22, 1988, to commence an action because it was then that it knew of the damage and who had caused it. Plaintiff contends that at a meeting on April 22, 1988 it discovered the name of the defendant employee who allowed delivery of the goods to Papelera Puertorriqueña, Inc.

The one-year statute of limitations for torts starts to run on the date plaintiff became aware of the damage and who caused the damage. However, if the lack of awareness was due to negligence or carelessness of the plaintiff, then he shall be responsible for the consequences of such carelessness. Under these circumstances, the accrual of plaintiff's cause of action shall not be delayed. Colón Prieto v. Géigel, 115 Dec.P.R. 232 (1984).

Although the Civil Code does not specifically address the issue of when the injured party should have known of the injury, a well-known Spanish law commentator, L. Díez Picazo in his treatise La Prescripción en el Código Civil, Ed. Bosch, Barcelona, 1964, p. 240 states that generally the victim is presumed to have knowledge of injury at the time of the tortious act and in any case, the victim has the burden of proving that he obtained knowledge at a later date. See also Rivera Encarnación v. E. L. A., 113 Dec.P.R. 383 (1982). On this same subject R. de Angel Yaguez, another Spanish law commentator in his treatise Lecciones sobre Responsabilidad Civil, Univ. de Deusto, Bilbao, 1978, p. 138, has expressed the following:

The eventual allegation of lack of knowledge of the injury should be judged ... in light of the excusability or inexcusability of the victim's ignorance ... (Our translation).

Nevertheless, the victim should prove that a prudent...