Barrett v. Brooks Hospital, Inc.

• Citation: 338 Mass. 754,157 N.E.2d 638
• Parties: Gladys V. BARRETT v. BROOKS HOSPITAL, INC.
• Decision Date: 03 April 1959
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Page 638

157 N.E.2d 638

338 Mass. 754

Gladys V. BARRETT v. BROOKS HOSPITAL, INC.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

Argued Jan. 5, 1959.

Decided April 3, 1959.

Reuben H. Nitkin, Boston, for plaintiff.

Andrew B. Goodspeed, Boston, for defendant.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and RONAN, SPALDING, WHITTEMORE and CUTTER, JJ.

WILKINS, Chief Justice.

In this action of tort, the plaintiff, a patient at the defendant hospital, was hurt in a fall from an X-ray table, in circumstances which would warrant the verdict the jury returned in her favor, unless the defendant should be ruled as matter of law to have established the defence of charitable immunity. The case is reported upon the correctness of the judge's rulings in denying the defendant's motions for a directed verdict and for entry of a verdict for the defendant under leave reserved.

We are not asked to renounce the doctrine of charitable immunity set forth in McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, and reaffirmed by this court many times, on the last three occasions in rescript opinions. Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 126 N.E. 392, 14 A.L.R. 563; Kidd v. Massachusetts Homoeopathic Hospital, 237 Mass. 500, 130 N.E. 55; Foley v. Wesson Memorial Hospital, 246 Mass. 363, 141 N.E. 113; Young v. City of Worcester, 253 Mass. 481, 149 N.E. 204; Glaser v. Congregation Kehillath Israel, 263 Mass. 435, 161 N.E. 619; Bearse v. New England Deaconess Hospital, 321 Mass. 750, 72 N.E.2d 743; Mastrangelo v. Maverick Dispensary, 330 Mass. 708, 115 N.E.2d 455; Simpson v. Truesdale Hospital, Inc., 338 Mass. ----, 154 N.E.2d 357. In previous decisions we have indicated as firmly as we can that any abolition of this rule must be by the Legislature. The plaintiff contends that 'the defendant hospital is not a charitable institution,' apparently as matter of law on the evidence, and in any event that the jury's verdict was right. We recognize that the defendant has the burden of proof upon its affirmative defence of charitable immunity. See White v. Central Dispensary & Emergency Hospital, 69 App.D.C. 122, 99 F.2d 355, 358, 119 A.L.R. 1002. ¹

The evidence as to the charitable character of the defendant was contained in oral testimony offered by each party and in two certified documents, offered by the defendant, bearing the seal of the Commonwealth, and signed by the Secretary of the Commonwealth. In so far as the tetimony was oral, whether given by witnesses, other than herself, called by the plaintiff ² or by the defendant, it could have been disregarded in whole or in part by the jury. Phillips v. Eldridge, 221 Mass. 103, 104, 108 N.E. 909; Hall v. College of Physicians and Surgeons, 254 Mass. 95, 99-100, 149 N.E. 675; Cook v. Cole, 273 Mass. 557, 559, 174 N.E. 271; Canavan v. George, 292 Mass. 245, 250, 198 N.E. 270; Sluskonis v. Boston & Maine R. R., 299 Mass. 413, 415-416, 12 N.E.2d 858; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. English Const. Co., 303 Mass. 105, 110-111, 20 N.E.2d 939; Lydon v. Boston Elevated R. Co., 309 Mass. 205, 206-207, 34 N.E.2d 642. Duff v. Webster, 315 Mass. 102, 103, 51 N.E.2d 957. Consequently, much testimony relied upon by the defendant must be disregarded by us also. We refer to such matters as exemption from taxation of all kinds; the receipt of gifts, donations, bequests, and income from trusts; inability to run the hospital upon amounts charged patients for services of all kinds; and the use of all funds, from whatever source received, for the purposes for which the hospital was incorporated.

The authenticity or accuracy of the two documents has not been attacked by the plaintiff in the Superior Court or in this court, and, accordingly, they must be accepted as true. Gahn v. Leary, 318 Mass 425, 426-427, 61 N.E.2d 844, and cases cited. Grover v. Smead, 295 Mass. 11, 13, 2 N.E.2d 1012.

One document certified that on August 15, 1919, the name of the defendant was changed from 'Charles D. Sias Research Laboratory and Appendix Hospital' to 'Brooks Hospital, Inc.' The other document was the articles of incorporation and showed that on July 12, 1915, pursuant to R.L. c. 125, § 6 (see now G.L. c. 180), a charter was issued to 'Charles D. Sias Research Laboratory and Appendix Hospital' from which it appears that the corporation has no capital stock ³ nor any provision for the distribution of profits or dividends; and that the corporate purposes are: (a) Creating, establishing, and maintaining a hospital for providing medical and surgical treatment for the sick and injured and for promoting and advancing by original research and laboratory investigations or otherwise the science of medicine and surgery, and for exercising all powers usually incident to the maintenance and operation of a general hospital. (b) Acquiring by purchase, gift or otherwise any real and personal property which shall be devoted to the purposes set forth in the agreement of association and receiving and holding in trust or otherwise funds received by gift or bequest which shall be devoted by it to such purposes. (c) Doing all such things as may be incidental to the foregoing purposes.

The principal question for decision is whether, when a corporation is shown by public records to be charitable in its creation and in its pwoers as stated in its charter, there is incumbent upon that corporation the further obligation to go on and prove to the satisfaction of the tribunal of fact that it has not been operating ultra vires, or whether the powers enumerated in the charter are controlling where evidence is lacking to the contrary. We are of opinion that the charter is prima facie evidence of charitable purpose and operation, and that unless there is introduced evidence warranting a finding to the contrary, the affirmative defence is established as matter of law. This conclusion was reached by a majority of courts elsewhere which had occasion to consider the question. Southern Methodist Hospital & Sanatorium of Tucson v. Wilson, 45 Ariz. 507, 524-525, 46 P.2d 118; Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 59 Idaho 350, 364, 82 P.2d 849; Maretick v. South Chicago Community Hospital, 297 Ill.App. 488, 493-494, 17 N.E.2d 1012; Nicholas v. Evangelical Deaconess Home & Hospital, 281 Mo. 182, 191, 219 S.W. 643; D'Amato v. Orange Memorial Hospital, 101 N.J.L. 61, 63, 127 A. 340; Sessions v. Thomas Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 89 Utah 222, 233-234, 51 P.2d 229; ⁴ 119 A.L.R. 1022. If Hall v. College of Physicians & Surgeons, 254 Mass. 95, 149 N.E. 675, undertakes to state a contrary rule, it cannot be reconciled with other decisions of this court. See Zoulalian v. New England Sanatorium & Benevolent Ass'n, 230 Mass. 102, 105, 119 N.E. 686, L.R.A.1918F, 185; Kidd v. Massachusetts Homoeopathic Hospital, 237 Mass. 500, 130 N.E. 55; Glaser v. Congregation Kehillath Israel, 263 Mass. 435, 436, 161 N.E. 619.

In the present case, the terms of the charter, if viewed alone, would require a finding that the defendant is a public charity. Its purposes, 'promoting and advancing by original research and laboratory investigations or otherwise the science of medicine and surgery,' are a charitable use. These activities are not confined to the laboratory.

In Zoulalian v. New England Sanatorium & Benevolent Ass'n, 230 Mass. 102, 105, 119 N.E. 686, L.R.A.1918F, 185, it was said, 'The defendant is a corporation organized 'for the purpose of founding a hospital * * * for the care and relief of indigent or other sick or infirm persons * * * and in no manner directly or indirectly for private profit or divident paying, to any one.' It is plain that the objects of the corporation being benevolent and charitable, it must be held to be a valid public charity.'

The defendant's charter does not contain any such word as 'indigent.' That is not necessary. 'Charity in the legal sense 'is not confined to mere almsgiving or the relief of poverty and distress, but has a wider signification, which embraces the improvement and promotion of the happiness of man.' * * * New England Sanitarium v. Inhabitants of Stoneham, 205 Mass. 335, 342, 91 N.E. 385.' Little v. City of Newburyport, 210 Mass. 414, 417, 96 N.E. 1032, 1033. The purpose cannot be carried out for private profit. Assessors of Boston v. Garland School of Home Making, 296 Mass. 378, 387, 6 N.E.2d 374. A purpose qualifies as charitable if it 'is for the benefit of 'the public at large or some part thereof, or an indefinite class of persons.' Old South Society in Boston v. Crocker, 119 Mass. 1, 23. Sherman v. Shaw, 243 Mass. 257, 259, 137 N.E. 374.' Assessors of Boston v. Garland School of Home Making, supra, 296 Mass. 387, 6 N.E.2d 381; Assessors of Dover v. Dominican Fathers Province of St. Joseph, 334 Mass. 530, 539-540, 137 N.E.2d 225.

Two cases relied upon by the plaintiff do not support her contention that there is nothing in the defendant's charter to designate it as charitable or to compel it to exist for charitable purposes. In Donnelly v. Boston Catholic Cemetery Ass'n, 146 Mass. 163, 15 N.E. 505, there was a special act of incorporation of three named individuals, 'their associates and successors' 'for the purpose of establishing * * * a place of the burial of the dead.' St.1851, c. 292. The court held (146 Mass. at page 166, 15 N.E. at page 507) that 'The beneficiaries are a definite number of persons clearly pointed out by law,' so that the corporation did not fall within the description of a public charity given in Old South Society in Boston v. Crocker, 119 Mass. 1, 22-23. In Stratton v. Physio-Medical College, 149 Mass. 505, 21 N.E. 874, 5 L.R.A. 33, there was a lapse of a bequest to a definite private pecuniary enterprise.

'The requirement of the payment of reasonable fees by those who receive the benefits of an institution does not necessarily render it noncharitable. Such a requirement does not necessarily restrict the class of persons benefited so that it is not...