Barrett v. Coplan

• Decision Date: 20 November 2003
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 03-317-JD.,CIV. 03-317-JD.
• Citation: 292 F.Supp.2d 281
• Parties: Lisa BARRETT, v. Jane COPLAN, Warden, New Hampshire State Prison, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire

292 F.Supp.2d 281

Lisa BARRETT, v.Jane COPLAN, Warden, New Hampshire State Prison, et al.

No. CIV. 03-317-JD.

United States District Court, D. New Hampshire.

November 20, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Lisa Barrett, pro se.

ORDER

MUIRHEAD, United States Magistrate Judge.

Before the court is pro se plaintiffLisa Barrett, an inmate at the New Hampshire State Prison("NHSP"), who has filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a number of NHSP employees.Barrett alleges that the defendants have violated her¹ rights under the Eighth Amendment² by failing to adequately treat her for serious medical needs while she has been incarcerated at the NHSP.As Barrett is proceeding both pro se and in forma pauperis, the complaint is before me for preliminary review.SeeUnited States District Court for the District of New Hampshire Local Rules ("LR")4.3(d)(2).For the reasons stated herein, I order that the complaint be served on the defendants in their individual capacities.Seeid.;28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).In a Report and Recommendation issued simultaneously with this Order, I recommend that any claims asserted against the defendants in their official capacities be dismissed.

Standard of Review

In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court is obliged to construe the pleading liberally.SeeAyala Serrano v. Lebron Gonzalez,909 F.2d 8, 15(1st Cir.1990)(followingEstelle v. Gamble,429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251(1976) to construe pro se pleadings liberally in favor of the pro separty)."The policy behind affording pro se plaintiffs liberal interpretation is that if they present sufficient facts, the court may intuit the correct cause of action, even if it was imperfectly pled."Ahmed v. Rosenblatt,118 F.3d 886, 890(1st Cir.1997), cert. denied, Ahmed v. Greenwood,522 U.S. 1148, 118 S.Ct. 1165, 140 L.Ed.2d 176(1998).

At this preliminary stage of review, all factual assertions made by the plaintiff and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom must be accepted as true.SeeAulson v. Blanchard,83 F.3d 1, 3(1st Cir.1996)(stating the "failure to state a claim" standard of review and explaining that all "well-pleaded factual averments," not bald assertions, must be accepted as true).This review ensures that pro se pleadings are given fair and meaningful consideration.SeeEveland v. Dir. of C.I.A.,843 F.2d 46, 49(1st Cir.1988).Applying this standard, the facts as related by Barrett are recounted here.

Background³

Lisa Barrett is a NHSP inmate who suffers from gender identity disorder ("GID"), otherwise known as transsexualism.⁴Barrett was born biologically male, but is psychologically and emotionally female.Prior to her incarceration, Barrett had lived as a female since the age of seventeen, and had cross-dressed at a much earlier age pursuant to her long-held belief that she is, in fact, a female.

In the early 1990s, prior to her incarceration, Barrett received female hormones from a physician.When she was incarcerated pretrial at the Belknap County House of Correction prior to her transfer to NHSP, the medical department there continued to provide Barrett with female hormones, resulting in some physiological changes, including minor breast development.Upon her intake to NHSP, Barrett was examined by a NHSP physician who stopped her hormone treatments.Barrett advised the NHSP medical staff of her transsexuality, but was denied treatment for that condition.

During the mid-1990s, Barrett was housed at the Secure Housing Unit at the NHSP.During that time, she made numerous attempts at both suicide and self-castration, both, she alleges, resulting from her untreated GID.Since October of 1997, Barrett states that she has lived in general population at the NHSP, and has attempted, to the extent possible, to modify her appearance and behavior in order to live as a woman.

On July 22, 2002, Barrett submitted a request slip to Warden Jane Coplan explaining that her GID presented a serious medical need and requesting appropriate treatment, including hormone treatment for a later sex reassignment surgery and the ability to purchase items available to female inmates.Barrett received a reply from Coplan advising that Coplan had no legal obligation to grant any of Barrett's requests.On August 9, 2002, Barrett replied to Coplan advising her of court rulings requiring that prisons provide treatment for inmates with GID.On August 12, 2002, Coplan requested documentation of legal precedent for Barrett's assertion.On August 14, 2002, Barrett reports that she provided Coplan with documentation supporting her legal position.On September 24, 2002, Coplan advised Barrett that she would not be allowed to dress as a woman at the NHSP because it would put her in danger of assault, and that she would not be allowed to be housed at the women's prison because she is a male inmate.

On July 22, 2002, Barrett sent a request slip to the NHSP mental health department describing her emotional distress at having to live with male genitalia, and explicitly threatening to mutilate her own male genitalia.As a result of that slip, NHSP Nurse Practitioner Cathy Fontaine scheduled a mental health appointment for Barrett on August 19, 2002.Barrett submitted an additional request slip to the mental health department requesting treatment.On August 19, 2002, Barrett met with Fontaine and discussed her transsexualism and her desire to be treated for GID.

Fontaine provided the information she received from Barrett to NHSP physician David Freedman, a gynecologist.On September 20, 2002, Freedman responded, indicating that NHSP does not perform or approve sex reassignment surgery or pre-operative hormone treatment.On September 21, 2002, Barrett sent a request to Freedman addressing his desire to be evaluated for hormone therapy and to receive treatment for GID.On October 2, 2002, Freedman responded that sex reassignment is a lengthy process that involves a period of living in the community as a woman, and that such an option would not be appropriate in a prison setting and would therefore not be available to Barrett.Barrett was advised to pursue his GID treatment after he was released from prison.Barrett also met with NHSP physician Richard Fellows a couple of times and discussed with Fellows her desire to be treated for GID.Barrett was twice scheduled for personality testing, but both times, the testing appointment was cancelled by NHSP staff.

Barrett contends that she has sought treatment for her transsexuality at NHSP since 1994.Prison officials, she claims were well aware of the risk she posed to either kill herself or to attempt to mutilate herself.Despite that, she was not provided with any psychological or other treatment by any medical professional experienced with GID.Barrett alleges that the blanket policy at the NHSP of not considering hormone or surgical treatment for people with GID, without regard to the individualized medical need presented by the individual patient suffering from the condition, prevented her from being considered for appropriate treatment for her serious medical needs.

Discussion

1.Inadequate Medical Care Claim⁵

The Eighth Amendment protects prison inmates from prison officials acting with deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs.SeeFarmer v. Brennan,511 U.S. 825, 831, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811(1994).To assert a viable cause of action for inadequate medical care, an inmate must first state facts sufficient to allege that the plaintiff has a serious medical need for which adequate care has not been provided.Farmer,511 U.S. at 831, 114 S.Ct. 1970;Rhodes v. Chapman,452 U.S. 337, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59(1981);Estelle,429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. 285.The inmate must then allege that a responsible prison official was aware of the need or of the facts from which the need could be inferred, and still failed to provide treatment.Id.A serious medical need is one that involves a substantial risk of serious harm if it is not adequately treated.Kosilek v. Maloney,221 F.Supp.2d 156, 180(D.Mass.2002)(citingFarmer,511 U.S. at 835-47, 114 S.Ct. 1970).The First Circuit has defined a serious medical need as one "`that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.'"Mahan v. Plymouth County House of Corr.,64 F.3d 14, 18(1st Cir.1995)(quotingGaudreault v. Mun. of Salem,923 F.2d 203, 208(1st Cir.1990)).

The Eighth Amendment's guarantee of adequate medical care applies to both mental health and physical health needs.Torraco v. Maloney,923 F.2d 231, 234(1st Cir.1991)."Adequate medical care" requires treatment by qualified medical personnel who provide services that are of a quality acceptable when measured by prudent professional standards in the community, tailored to an inmate's particular medical needs, and that are based on medical considerations.United States v. DeCologero,821 F.2d 39, 42-43(1st Cir.1987).This does not mean that an inmate is entitled to the care of his or her choice simply that the care must meet minimal standards of adequacy.Deliberate indifference may be found where the medical care provided is "so clearly inadequate as to amount to a refusal to provide essential care."Torraco,923 F.2d at 234.Constraints effected by the prison settings may affect the choice of care provided, and may be relevant to whether or not inadequate care was provided with a deliberately indifferent mental state on the part of prison officials.Wilson v. Seiter,501 U.S. 294, 302, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271(1991).However, the Eighth Amendment does not permit necessary medical care to be denied to a prisoner because the care is expensive or because it might be controversial or unpopular.SeeKosilek,221 F.Supp.2d at 181-83(internal citations omitted)(discussing the tension between penological...