Barrett v. Peters

Citation360 Or. 445,383 P.3d 813
Decision Date20 October 2016
Docket NumberCA A156271,CA A155789,SC S063744),SC S063743 (Control), (CC 13C23141,CC 13C20437
Parties Jacob Henry Barrett, Respondent on Review, v. Colette Peters, Director, Oregon Department of Corrections, Petitioner on Review. Jacob Henry Barrett, Respondent on Review, v. Colette Peters, Director,Oregon Department of Corrections, Petitioner on Review, and Greg Jones, Karin Potts, and Jana Russell, Defendants.
CourtSupreme Court of Oregon

Jona J. Maukonen, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Paul L. Smith, Deputy Solicitor General.

Nadia H. Dahab, Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter, P.C., Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.

En Banc

WALTERS, J.

Petitioner is an inmate who committed aggravated murder in Oregon and who was convicted, sentenced, and incarcerated in Oregon; however, pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact (ICC), ORS 421.245, Oregon transferred petitioner to an institution in the state of Florida. Thereafter, petitioner filed, in Oregon, two separate petitions for writ of habeas corpus alleging, among other things, that the terms of his confinement in Florida violate his rights under the state and federal constitutions. We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that petitioner's transfer to and confinement in Florida do not prohibit him from bringing those constitutional claims. We affirm the decisions of the Court of Appeals. Barrett v. Peters , 274 Or.App. 237, 250, 360 P.3d 638 (2015) ; Barrett v. Peters , 274 Or.App. 251, 254, 360 P.3d 646 (2015). We reverse the contrary judgments of the circuit court.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner committed aggravated murder in Oregon and was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. Oregon transferred petitioner to the state of Florida pursuant to the ICC, ORS 421.245, and petitioner later filed two petitions for writ of habeas corpus in Oregon pursuant to ORS 34.310 and ORS 34.362, naming the Director of the Oregon Department of Corrections (ODOC) as defendant. In his first habeas petition, petitioner alleged that the terms and conditions of his confinement in Florida violate his rights under the Oregon Constitution, specifically, his rights under Article I, sections 2, 3, and 13, to the free exercise of religion and to be free from “unnecessary rigor.” Petitioner also alleged that he had “made defendant aware of the denial of the right of free exercise” and had filed a formal grievance with ODOC, which it had denied. In addition, petitioner alleged that the conditions of his confinement violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1

In his second habeas petition, petitioner alleged that, by transferring him to and confining him in the State of Florida, defendant had denied him “timely and meaningful rehabilitative treatment and programming” in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as his Oregon constitutional right to be free from “unnecessary rigor.” Petitioner asserted that defendant “was in a position of authority,” “opted to take no action” in response to his requests to transfer, and “knew or should have known” that petitioner was being confined in violation of his constitutional rights.

Before the trial court, defendant2 moved to “deny” petitioner's first habeas petition for failure to state a claim. ORS 34.370. The state argued that the director was not a proper defendant because she did not have physical custody of petitioner and because she did not control the conditions of confinement in Florida. The trial court agreed with the state and dismissed petitioner's first habeas petition with prejudice. Subsequently, the trial court, acting sua sponte , dismissed petitioner's second petition for the same reasons that it had dismissed petitioner's first petition.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, and that court reversed both trial court decisions. Barrett v. Peters , 274 Or.App. 237 at 250, 360 P.3d 638 ; Barrett v. Peters , 274 Or.App. 251 at 254, 360 P.3d 646. In its decision as to petitioner's first petition, the Court of Appeals held that an Oregon inmate incarcerated out of state pursuant to the ICC retains the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Oregon to remedy alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement and that petitioner had properly named the Director of ODOC as defendant. Barrett v. Peters , 274 Or.App. 237 at 247, 360 P.3d 638. In reaching that conclusion, the court relied on this court's decision in Barrett v. Belleque , 344 Or. 91, 100, 176 P.3d 1272 (2008),3 that [t]he terms of the ICC * * * supplement the ordinary habeas jurisdictional analysis.’ Barrett v. Peters , 274 Or.App. 237 at 244, 360 P.3d 638. In the case involving petitioner's second petition, the Court of Appeals relied on its decision involving petitioner's first petition and again reversed the trial court judgment. Barrett v. Peters , 274 Or.App. 251 at 254, 360 P.3d 646.

The state sought review of both cases in this court, raising three issues: (1) whether Oregon law permits an inmate confined outside of Oregon pursuant to the ICC to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Oregon; (2) whether petitioner alleged cognizable habeas corpus claims in contesting the conditions of his confinement in Florida; and (3) whether petitioner properly named the Director of ODOC as defendant in these cases. This court granted review and consolidated the two cases.

II. ANALYSIS

We begin with the first question on review, which is, as noted, whether inmates incarcerated outside of Oregon as the result of transfer under the ICC, ORS 421.245, are entitled to seek a writ of habeas corpus under ORS 34.310. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that they are.

A. Oregon law permits petitioner to bring a claim for habeas relief.

Under the habeas statutes, when an inmate alleges deprivations of state or federal constitutional rights that are of the type that “would require immediate judicial scrutiny,” and “it also appears to the court that no other timely remedy is available to the prisoner,” the inmate has the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus to remedy the alleged deprivations. Penrod/Brown v. Cupp , 283 Or. 21, 28, 581 P.2d 934 (1978) ; ORS 34.310 ; ORS 34.362. ORS 34.310 provides, in part:

“Every person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of liberty, within this state, * * * may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint, and if illegal, to be delivered therefrom.”

The state argues from the text of that statute that, to qualify for habeas relief, a person must be confined within Oregon's geographic boundaries. The state contends that the phrase “within this state” is a reference to Oregon's geographic boundaries. The “within this state” requirement for habeas relief was part of the Oregon session laws enacted in 1862, General Statutes of Oregon, chapter VII, title III, section 597, page 152 (1862), and was later included in the Deady Code, General Laws of Oregon, Civil Code, chapter VII, title III, section 597, page 300 (Deady 19451864). The state contends that, when the legislature enacted those laws, “within” was defined as [i]n the inner part, as the space within the walls of a house,” and as [i]n the limits or compass of; not beyond; used of place and time.” Noah Webster, 2 An American Dictionary of the English Language 114 (1828). Therefore, the state argues, when the legislature originally drafted the “within this state” requirement, it would have understood that phrase to mean inside the geographic boundaries of the State of Oregon.

Petitioner does not contend otherwise. Rather, petitioner contends that he is entitled to seek habeas relief for two alternative reasons: First, because the “restraint” to which ORS 34.310 refers includes constructive restraint; and second, because the ICC supplements the habeas statutes and preserves petitioner's right to participate in any proceedings in which he could have participated if he were incarcerated in Oregon, including habeas proceedings. We find petitioner's second, alternative argument persuasive for the following reasons.

The ICC permits the transfer of Oregon inmates to states and territories that are parties to that compact and specifically addresses the rights of transferred inmates. Article IV, section 5, of the ICC provides that [t]he fact of confinement in a receiving state shall not deprive any inmate so confined of any legal rights” that the inmate would have had if confined within the sending state.4 Article IV, section 8, grants a transferred inmate the right to participate in any action or proceeding in which the inmate could have participated if confined in the sending state. It provides that

[a]ny inmate confined pursuant to the terms of this compact shall have any and all rights to participate in and derive any benefits or incur or be relieved of any obligations or have such obligations modified or the status of the inmate changed on account of any action or proceeding in which the inmate could have participated if confined in any appropriate institution of the sending state located within such state.”

ORS 421.245, Art IV, § 8. In Barrett v. Belleque, this court construed those two provisions of the ICC as “supplement[ing] the ordinary habeas jurisdictional analysis.” 344 Or. at 100, 176 P.3d 1272.

The petitioner in Barrett v. Belleque was imprisoned in Oregon when he filed his claim for habeas relief. Id . at 93, 176 P.3d 1272. The trial court reached the merits of the petitioner's claim and denied it. Id . The Court of Appeals affirmed. Id . The petitioner then sought review in this court, but, before the court could act, the state transferred the petitioner to an Oklahoma prison under the ICC. Id . The state moved to...

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    ...he enjoyed in New Hampshire. St. 1962, c. 753, § 2, art. 4 (e ). This is a complicated question of law. Compare Barrett v. Peters, 360 Or. 445, 454, 383 P.3d 813 (2016) (prisoner transferred to Florida from Oregon entitled to be incarcerated under conditions complying with Oregon Constituti......
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