Barrett v. Prison Health Services, Inc.
| Decision Date | 17 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:08-CV-203.,1:08-CV-203. |
| Citation | 647 F.Supp.2d 314 |
| Parties | Christopher BARRETT, Plaintiff v. PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC. and Paul G. Cotton, M.D., P.C., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Vermont |
David J. Williams, Sleigh & Williams, St. Johnsbury, VT, for Plaintiff.
Samuel Hoar, Jr., Esq., Dinse, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C., John T. Sartore, Paul Frank & Collins PC, James W. Spink, Spink & Miller, PLC, Burlington, VT, for Defendants.
The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation was filed May 22, 2009. (Doc. 48.) After de novo review and absent objection, the Report and Recommendation is AFFIRMED, APPROVED and ADOPTED. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Defendant Cotton's motion to dismiss (Paper 42) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims against defendant Paul G. Cotton, M.D., P.C. are DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
(Doc. 42)
Plaintiff Christopher Barrett ("Barrett") brings this tort action against Prison Health Services, Inc. ("PHS") and Paul G. Cotton, M.D., P.C. ("Cotton"). Barrett claims that the defendants are jointly and severally liable for injuries he sustained from an assault in October, 2005. (Doc. 31). Presently before the Court is Cotton's Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 42). For the reasons stated below, I recommend that Cotton's motion be GRANTED.
For purposes of this motion to dismiss the following facts, as stated in the Amended Complaint (Doc. 31), are assumed to be true. In October 2005 Barrett was employed as a correctional officer by the Vermont Department of Corrections, and worked at the Northern Correctional Facility in Newport, VT. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. While working on October 2, 2005, Barrett was assaulted by inmate Daniel Heart and sustained the injuries for which he now seeks legal redress. Id. ¶ 9. During the relevant time period Inmate Heart suffered from a variety of psychiatric disorders, for which he required medication and other treatment. Both PHS and Cotton were contracted by the state of Vermont to administer such treatment to Heart and other inmates for whom it was necessary. Id. ¶¶ 16-20.
Barrett alleges that the defendants' conduct in administering mental health care to Heart fell below the relevant standard of care, and that this conduct was a proximate cause of Heart's assault on Barrett. Id. ¶ 45. Barrett also alleges that the defendants' violated their duty of care by not warning him that Heart was a potentially violent individual that would pose a "clear and present danger" if placed in the prison's general population. Id. ¶¶ 46-47.
When this litigation began with the filing of Barrett's original complaint on September 24, 2008, PHS was the only named defendant. (Doc. 1). However, following a period of discovery Barrett decided to join Cotton as a defendant as well, and he filed a Motion to Amend his complaint on February 20, 2009. (Doc. 28). This Court granted the motion as unopposed on February 24, 2009 (Doc. 30), and Barrett filed the Amended Complaint naming both PHS and Cotton on February 25, 2009. (Doc. 31).
Barrett is domiciled in, and is therefore a citizen of, Vermont.1 Id. ¶ 1; see Steigleder v. McQuesten, 198 U.S. 141, 25 S.Ct. 616, 49 L.Ed. 986 (1905). PHS is a corporation doing business in Vermont with its principal place of business in Tennessee. Cotton is a professional corporation organized under Vermont law. (Doc. 31 ¶¶ 2-3).
Before the Court is Cotton's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 42).
Barrett invokes this Court's "diversity jurisdiction" under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), which gives the federal district courts original jurisdiction of (Doc. 31 ¶ 5). This statute has been consistently held to Owen Equip, and Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978).
In its Motion, Cotton argues that since both Barrett and Cotton are Vermont citizens, complete diversity is lacking and this Court is deprived of jurisdiction at least over the claims against Cotton, if not the entire matter. (Doc. 42 ¶ 9).
In response, Barrett does not dispute that § 1332 is the only basis for original federal jurisdiction,2 nor does he contend that either he or Cotton are in fact citizens of different States,3 thus rendering diversity complete. (Doc. 43). Instead, Barrett argues that diversity should only be evaluated at the time the initial complaint is filed, and that subsequent events, including the addition of non-diverse parties, should not work to destroy complete diversity once established. (Doc. 43 at 1). Since the original complaint did not name a Vermont citizen defendant, Barrett argues, diversity is complete and this Court retains jurisdiction even over subsequently added claims against a non-diverse defendant. Id. at 3-4.
As described below, both the Supreme Court and Congress have explicitly rejected Barrett's approach in this context, and, consequently, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the cause of action against Cotton.
Barrett's claim against Cotton is a state law tort claim against a non-diverse defendant and, as such, it does not itself invoke an independent basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, if this Court may adjudicate this claim it must be pursuant to its "supplemental" jurisdiction.4 13D CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3567 at 319-320 (2008); see also Estate of Reed v. United States, et al., 2006 WL 2043100, *2 (W.D.Mo. July 20, 2006) (Not Reported) ( that federal supplemental jurisdiction is invoked when joint tortfeasors over whom there is no independent federal claim are added via amended complaint).
The supplemental jurisdiction of federal courts is regulated by statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) provides that in any civil action in which original federal jurisdiction is established, "the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy . . . [s]uch supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties."5 Cotton apparently does not dispute that subsection (a) of § 1367 is fully satisfied here. (Doc. 44); see also Timbrook v. Metzeler Auto. Profile Sys. Iowa, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 154, 156 (S.D.Iowa 2002) ().
But while subsection (a) grants supplemental jurisdiction, subsection (b) proscribes the exercise of that jurisdiction over certain categories of claims brought in diversity actions. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) states that:
In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). In this case, § 1367(b) is implicated because this Court's original jurisdiction over Barrett's claim against PHS, a citizen of Tennessee,6 is based solely on § 1332. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Serv., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 560, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005) ().
Further, since the original complaint was amended to join a permissive-that is, not indispensable — defendant, the joinder was necessarily made pursuant to Rule 20, a proposition Barrett does not dispute. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2); R & M Jewelry, LLC v. Michael Anthony Jewelers, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 398, 399 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (). It is of no matter that Barrett mentions only Rule 15(a)(2) as grounds for his Motion to Amend. (Doc. 28); Rosado v. Johnson, 589 F.Supp.2d 398, 400 (S.D.N.Y.2008) () (internal citations omitted). Rule 15(a)(2) governs only the procedure by which Barrett could amend his Complaint,7 and, when seeking to join a permissive defendant via amendment, Rule 20 governs whether or not joinder is appropriate.8
Finally, it is clear that since Cotton is a citizen of the same state as Barrett, its inclusion as a defendant is contrary to the complete diversity rule, and is therefore "inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332." See Herrick Co., Inc. v. SCS Commc'n, Inc., 251 F.3d 315, 325 nn. 7-8 (2d Cir.2001); Ascension Enter., Inc. v. Allied Signal, Inc., 969 F.Supp. 359, 361 (M.D.La.1997); 13E CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3608 at 368-369 (2009) ().
Accordingly, § 1367(b) forbids the extension of this Court's supplemental jurisdiction over Barrett's claim against Cotton, a non-diverse Rule 20 defendant. By its plain terms, "there is nothing about 1367(b) that is discretionary; if the conditions of 1367(b) are met, the court `shall not have' supplemental...
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