Barrett v. United States

• Decision Date: 21 February 1898
• Docket Number: No. 53,53
• Parties: BARRETT v. UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

169 U.S. 218

18 S.Ct. 327

42 L.Ed. 723

BARRETT

v UNITED STATES.

No. 53.

February 21, 1898.

Barrett was indicted, with others, as stated in the caption of the transcript of the record, 'at a circuit court of the United States for the Fourth circuit in and for the district of South Carolina, begun and holden at Columbia, in the district aforesaid, on the fourth Monday in November, 1894, before the Honorable Wm. H. Brawley, United States judge for the district of South Carolina, holding said circuit court according to the form of the act of congress in such cases made and provided,' for conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States, under sections 5440 and 5480 of the Revised Statutes, and, having been duly tried, was found guilty, and sentenced to imprisonment and fine.

To review this judgment, this writ of error was prosecuted.

The indictment commenced as follows:

'United States of America, District of South Carolina, to wit: In the Circuit Court.

'At a stated term of the circuit court of the United States for the district of South Carolina, begun and holden at Columbia, within and for the district aforesaid, on the fourth Monday of November, in the year of our Lord 1894, the jurors of the United States of America within and for the district aforesaid upon their oaths respectively do present that Charles P. Barrett [and others, naming them], together with divers other evil-disposed persons to the jurors aforesaid unknown, late of the district aforesaid, on the 1st day of July, in the year of our Lord 1892, at Spartanburg, in the state of South Carolina aforesaid, in the district aforesaid, and within the jurisdiction of this court, being persons of evil minds and dispositions, wickedly devising and intending to commit he offense against the United States hereinafter set forth, fraudulently, maliciously, and unlawfully did combine, conspire, confederate, and agree together between and among themselves to commit against the United States this offense,' etc.

Certain exceptions were taken to the action of the court in refusing to sustain a challenge to the array of both grand and petit jurors on the ground that they were drawn from both the Eastern and Western districts of South Carolina, when the alleged offense was charged in the indictment to have been committed in the county of Spartanburg, in the Western district of said state; to the order of the court overruling defendant's demurrer to the indictment on the ground that the offense was charged to have been committed in the county of Spartanburg, in the state of South Carolina, the same being in the Western district of said state, although the indictment was found in the city of Columbia, in the county of Richland, in the Eastern district thereof; to the refusal of the court to sustain defendant's plea to the jurisdiction on the ground that, although the alleged offense was charged to have been committed in the county of Spartanburg, the same being in the Western district of South Carolina, the trial was sought to be had in the city of Columbia, in the county of Richland, in the Eastern district of said state; to the denial by the court of defendant's motion that the district attorney be required to elect on which one of several conspiracies disclosed by the evidence to have been committed, if any, he would ask for a conviction; and to the refusal of the court to arrest judgment because the grand jurors who found the indictment and the petit jurors who found the verdict were drawn from the Western and Eastern districts of South Carolina, although the offense was alleged to have been committed in the county of Spartanburg, in the Western district; because the indictment was found in the county of Richland, in the Eastern district, at a time not authorized by law for the sitting of the United States court for the Western district; and because the trial was had in the county of Richland, in the Eastern district, for an offense committed in the Western district.

Charles C. Lancaster, for plaintiff in error.

Asst. Atty. Gen. Boyd, for the United States.

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.

As to the action of the court overruling defendant's motion on the evidence to compel the district attorney to elect, the bill of exceptions does not contain the evidence, and it is impossible for this court to know the ground on which the circuit court proceeded. The exception in that regard need not, therefore, be considered.

In respect of the other exceptions, they all present the same objection in different forms, namely, that the state of South Carolina was divided into two judicial districts, and that an indictment could not be lawfully found in the circuit court of the United States held in the Eastern district, or a trial be therein had, for a criminal offense committed in the Western district.

The constitution provides that the trial of crimes shall be had in the state 'where the crime shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the congress may by law have directed' (article 3, § 2, cl. 3); and by amendment 6 that 'in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed which district shall have been previously ascertained by law.'

This indictment was found December 3d; the trial had December 6th to 11th; and the defendant sentenced December 12, 1894, in the circuit court in session at Columbia. Were there at that time two judicial districts in South Carolina, within the intent and meaning of the constitution and the acts of congress in that behalf?

The circuit court of each judicial district sits within and for that district, and its jurisdiction, as a general rule, is bounded by its local limits. Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300, 328; Ex parte Devoe Mfg. Co., 108 U. S. 401, 2 Sup. Ct. 894. At the same time courts may be required to be held at different places in a judicial district, and prosecutions for offenses committed in certain counties may be required to be tried, and writs and recognizances to be returned, at each place; but this does not affect the power of the grand jury sitting at either place to present indictments for offenses committed anywhere within the district. Logan v. U. S., 144 U. S. 263, 12 Sup. Ct. 617. As to where trials shall be had in a judicial district depends entirely on the legislation upon the subject. Rosecrans v. U. S., 165 U. S. 257, 17 Sup. Ct. 302; Post v. U. S., 161 U. S. 583, 16 Sup. Ct. 611.

By the judiciary act of September 24, 1789, the then United States were divided into thirteen districts, of which New Hampshire, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, and South Carolina each constituted one district, called by the name of the state, as, for instance, 'South Carolina District'; while a part of the state of Massachusetts was erected into a district called 'Maine District,' and a part of the state of Virginia into a district called 'Kentucky District'; the remaining part of the state of Massachusetts being made a district called 'Massachusetts District,' and the state of Virginia, except so much thereof as was thereby made the district of Kentucky, a district called 'Virginia District.' 1 Stat. 73, c. 20.

The plan was to make each of the states a judicial district, and to direct the appointment of a judge, a clerk, to be appointed by him, a district attorney, and a marshal, for each district. But that part of Massachusetts now constituting the state of Maine and that part of the state of Virginia now forming the state of Kentucky were erected into independent districts under the names of 'Maine District' and 'Kentucky District,' and the district court established in each was invested with the powers of a circuit court.

By the fourth section these districts, 'except those of Maine and Kentucky,' were divided into three circuits, called the 'Eastern,' the 'Middle,' and the 'Southern' circuits; and it was provided that circuit courts should be held 'in each district of said circuits' by two of the justices of the supreme court and 'the district judge of such districts.'

North Carolina having ratified the constitution November 21, 1789, congress, by the act of June 4, 1790 (1 Stat. 126, c. 17), gave effect to the judiciary act of 1789 in that state, erecting it into a district to be called 'North Carolina District,' establishing a district court with one judge, and annexing the district to the Southern circuit. Rhode Island having ratified the constitution May 29, 1790, a similar act to give effect to the judiciary act was passed June 23, 1790 (1 Stat. 128, c. 21), by which Rhode Island was annexed to the Eastern circuit.

From the first, then, district courts have been, in exceptional instances, vested with circuit court jurisdiction.

On February 21, 1823, an act was passed entitled 'An act to divide the state of South Carolina into two judicial districts,' as follows: 'That the state of South Carolina be, and the same is hereby divided into two districts, in manner following, that is to say: the districts of Lancaster, Chester, York, Union, Spartanburg, Greeville, Pendleton, Abbeville, Edgefield, Newberry, Laurens, and Fairfield, shall compose one district, to be called the Western district, and the residue of the state shall form one other district to be called the Eastern district. And the terms of the said district court, for the Eastern district, shall be held at Charleston, at such times as they are now directed by law to be holden. And for the trial of all such criminal and civil causes, as are by law cognizable in the district courts of the United States which may hereafter arise or be prosecuted, or sued, within the said Western district, there shall be one annual session of...