Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc.

Decision Date28 February 2020
Docket NumberNo. 18-15081,18-15081
Parties Wilhen Hill BARRIENTOS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Margarito Velazquez-Galicia, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Shoaib Ahmed, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CORECIVIC, INC., Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Meredith Blake Stewart, Bryan Lopez, Southern Poverty Law Center, New Orleans, LA, Priyanka Bhatt, Azadeh N. Shahshahani, Project South, Atlanta, GA, Warren Tavares Burns, Daniel H. Charest, Burns Charest, LLP, Dallas, TX, Rebecca Miriam Cassler, Laura G. Rivera Simonsen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Decatur, GA, Robert Andrew Free, Law Office of R. Andrew Free, Nashville, TN, Korey A. Nelson, Lydia A. Wright, Burns Charest, LLP, New Orleans, LA, Daniel Werner, Southern Poverty Law Center, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Daniel P. Struck, Nicholas D. Acedo, Struck Love Bojanowski & Acedo, PLC, Chandler, AZ, Stephen E. Curry, Curry Law Firm, Augusta, GA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Bradley Hinshelwood, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Appellate Staff, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae United States of America.

Jon M. Greenbaum, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law.

Alvin Francis Lindsay, III, Hogan Lovells US, LLP, Miami, FL, for Amici Curiae Human Trafficking Legal Center, Tahirih Justice Center, Coalition to Abolish Slavery & Trafficking, Americans for Immigrant Justice, Asista Immigration Assistance.

Before HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and ROTHSTEIN,* District Judge.

HULL, Circuit Judge:

In this case, Appellees Wilhen Hill Barrientos, Margarito Velazquez-Galicia, and Shoaib Ahmed, current and former alien detainees, brought a class action lawsuit against Appellant CoreCivic, Inc., a private contractor, which owns and operates the Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia ("Stewart"). Stewart is a federal immigration detention facility where aliens are held during the pendency of removal proceedings or for other reasons related to enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws. At Stewart, CoreCivic, as a private contractor, is required to operate what is referred to as a "voluntary work program," through which detainees may perform work for compensation.

Appellees’ complaint alleged that, far from operating a "voluntary" work program, CoreCivic coerces alien detainees to perform labor at Stewart by, inter alia, the use or threatened use of serious harm, criminal prosecution, solitary confinement, and the withholding of basic necessities. Appellees’ complaint asserted that CoreCivic’s labor scheme violated, and continues to violate, the forced-labor prohibition in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act ("TVPA"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1594 – 95, and Georgia law. The TVPA subjects to criminal and civil liability "[w]hoever" knowingly obtains the labor or services of a "person" by any one of the prohibited coercive means explicitly listed in the TVPA. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589(a), 1595.

CoreCivic moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that the TVPA does not apply to a private government contractor or cover labor performed in work programs by alien detainees in lawful custody of the U.S. government. Although it denied the motion, the district court certified for immediate appeal the narrow, purely legal question of "[w]hether the TVPA applies to work programs in federal immigration detention facilities operated by private for-profit contractors." See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). We granted CoreCivic’s petition for permission to immediately appeal the district court’s order.

After review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that: (1) under the plain language of the statute, the TVPA covers the conduct of private contractors operating federal immigration detention facilities; (2) the TVPA does not bar private contractors from operating the sort of voluntary work programs generally authorized under federal law for aliens held in immigration detention facilities; but (3) private contractors that operate such work programs are not categorically excluded from the TVPA and may be liable if they knowingly obtain or procure the labor or services of a program participant through the illegal coercive means explicitly listed in the TVPA. Because our review is limited to the legal question of the TVPA’s applicability to private contractors operating federal immigration detention facilities, we do not at this time address whether the factual allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a TVPA claim.

I. BACKGROUND

The question certified by the district court concerns the TVPA and work programs in federal immigration detention facilities. We review the TVPA, the relevant work programs, and then the district court proceedings.

A. The TVPA

The TVPA prohibits knowingly "obtain[ing] the labor or services of a person" by any one of, or combination of, the following means:

(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical restraint to that person or another person; (2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or another person;
(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process; or
(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint.

18 U.S.C. § 1589(a) (collectively, the "illegal coercive means"). Section 1589(a) applies to "[w]hoever" knowingly provides or obtains such forced labor or services from a "person." Id.

In turn, § 1595(a) provides a private cause of action for any victim of a violation of § 1589. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). Under § 1595(a), "[a]n individual who is a victim of a violation" of the TVPA "may bring a civil action against the perpetrator," as well as against anyone who "knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value," from any such violation. Id.

B. Work Programs in ICE Detention Facilities

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") detains certain aliens during the pendency of removal proceedings or for other reasons related to enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws. ICE detains some of those aliens in facilities operated by private contractors. Appellant CoreCivic is a private contractor that operates several detention centers throughout the country, including the Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia, where Appellees were or are being held.1

CoreCivic, as a private contractor operating an ICE detention facility, is subject to, and required to follow, the Performance-Based National Detention Standards ("PBNDS"), the operative version of which was promulgated in 2011 and revised in 2016. See U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Performance-Based National Detention Standards 2011 (rev. 2016), available at https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/2011/pbnds2011r2016.pdf. The PBNDS are designed to ensure a safe and secure detention environment that meets detainees’ basic needs and is consistent with applicable legal requirements.

The PBNDS state that detention centers may require all detainees to "maintain their immediate living areas in a neat and orderly manner" through certain "personal housekeeping" tasks such as "making their bunk beds daily," "stacking loose papers," and "keeping the floor free of debris." Id. § 5.8(V)(C). Beyond these basic required tasks, detainees "shall not be required to work," and all other "[w]ork assignments are voluntary." Id. §§ 5.8(II)(2), 5.8(V)(C).

As to voluntary work, the PBNDS further state that "[d]etainees shall be provided the opportunity to participate in a voluntary work program" through which they may earn monetary compensation.2 Id. §§ 5.8(I), 5.8(V)(A) (emphasis added). The purpose of such voluntary work programs is to reduce "[t]he negative impact of confinement ... through decreased idleness, improved morale and fewer disciplinary incidents." Id. § 5.8(II)(4). However, the facility administrator must operate the voluntary work program in compliance with the PBNDS, which regulate the selection of detainees, the hours of work (no more than 8 hours per day and 40 hours per week), the minimum compensation for completed work (at least $1.00 per day), the number of work assignments a detainee can perform, and the conditions under which that work occurs. Id. §§ 5.8(V)(D)(O). The PBNDS delegate the site-specific rules for each work program to the "facility administrator." Id. § 5.8(V)(D).

Detainees may be removed from the voluntary work program for causes such as "unsatisfactory performance" or "disruptive behavior," or as a "sanction imposed ... for an infraction of a facility rule, regulation or policy." Id. § 5.8(V)(L). Additionally, the PBNDS specify that participants in the voluntary work program are "expected to be ready to report for work at the required time," "may not leave an assignment without permission," and "may not evade attendance and performance standards in assigned activities nor encourage others to do so." Id. § 5.8(V)(M).

The PBNDS otherwise provide for disciplinary action against detainees outside the context of the voluntary work program. See generally id. § 3.1. The PBNDS identify four categories of offenses and prescribe appropriate sanctions for each category. Id. §§ 3.1(V)(C), 3.1 app. A. Those categories are "greatest," "high," "high moderate," and "low moderate."3 Id. According to the PBNDS, all four categories of infractions are punishable by a "[l]oss of privileges"—including "commissary, vending machines, movies, recreation, etc."—and a "[c]hange [in] housing," among other sanctions. Id. § 3.1 app. A. Additionally, all but the lowest category of infractions are punishable by the initiation of criminal proceedings and "[d]isciplinary segregation" of varying length...

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