Barrientos v. Taylor, 5:94-CV-253-BR3.

• Decision Date: 01 February 1996
• Docket Number: No. 5:94-CV-253-BR3.,5:94-CV-253-BR3.
• Citation: 917 F. Supp. 375
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
• Parties: Jose BARRIENTOS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Jake TAYLOR, Jr., et al., Defendants.

917 F. Supp. 375

Jose BARRIENTOS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Jake TAYLOR, Jr., et al., Defendants.

No. 5:94-CV-253-BR3.

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Western Division.

February 1, 1996.

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Robert J. Willis, Raleigh, NC, for plaintiffs.

Henry C. Babb, Jr., Wilson, NC, Ivan Joe Ivey, Wilson, NC, for defendants.

ORDER

BRITT, District Judge.

Before the court are the motion for summary judgment of defendants Jake Taylor, Jr.; Mrs. Jake Taylor, Jr. (Linda); and Jake Taylor Farms, Inc.; and the motion for partial summary judgment of defendant Angel Hernandez. Plaintiffs responded, and thus this matter is now ripe for disposition.

I. FACTS

Defendants Jake Taylor, Jr. and Mrs. Jake Taylor, Jr. ("the Taylors") are the president and secretary/treasurer, respectively, of defendant Jake Taylor Farms, Inc. ("Taylor Farms") which operates a sweet potato and tobacco growing business in Halifax County, North Carolina. During the 1992 harvest season, plaintiffs, who are migrant agricultural workers, performed agricultural labor on property owned by Taylor Farms or Jake Taylor, Jr. Plaintiffs performed such labor pursuant to a contract between Taylor Farms and defendant Hernandez, a farm labor contractor.

Plaintiff Jose Barrientos was injured on 28 July 1992 while riding in a tobacco wagon allegedly driven by Ramon Sanchez. According to plaintiff, a piece of unsecured heavy metal equipment fell on plaintiff's foot and ankle when the wagon rapidly accelerated. Defendants admit that the wagon did not have secure or safe seats; however, they contend that plaintiff was not authorized to ride as a passenger in the wagon.

The complaint alleges violations of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act ("AWPA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872, the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219,¹ and North Carolina's common law of negligence.² Plaintiffs seek declaratory, monetary, and injunctive relief.

The Taylors and Taylor Farms have moved for summary judgment as to all the claims, and Hernandez has moved for summary judgment only as to the issue of punitive damages.

II. DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate if the court is satisfied that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Fourth Circuit has articulated the summary judgment standard as follows:

A genuine issue exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. The plaintiff is entitled to have the credibility of all his or her evidence presumed.

Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109, 111 S.Ct. 1018, 112 L.Ed.2d 1100 (1991). The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden to show the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The opposing party must demonstrate that a triable issue of fact exists; he or she may not rest on mere allegations or denials, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the case is insufficient. Id.

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 39 F.3d 515, 518 (4th Cir.1994) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir.1994)).

A. AWPA and FLSA "Employer-Related" Claims

Plaintiffs seek damages against the Taylors and Taylor Farms for alleged violations of the AWPA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1821(a), 1821(d)(1)-(2), 1822(a),³ and 1841(b)(1) and the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 211(c).⁴ The language of each of these statutory sections requires that defendants have an employment relationship with plaintiffs. See Ricketts v. Vann, 32 F.3d 71, 75 (4th Cir.1994) (holding employment relationship is necessary for claims under §§ 1821(a), 1821(d)(1)(2), and 1841(b)(1)(A)); 29 U.S.C. § 1822(a) (applies to "each ... agricultural employer ... which employs any migrant agricultural worker" (emphases added)); 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (applies to "every employer subject to any provision of this chapter" (emphasis added)).

The terms "employ", "employee", and "employer" as they are used in the AWPA are given the same meaning as those terms are defined in the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 802(5); 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h). As defined by the FLSA, "`employ' includes to suffer or permit to work." 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). "Employer" is "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee." Id. § 203(d). An "employee" is one who is employed by an employer. Id. § 203(e)(1). "Courts have adopted an expansive interpretation of the aforementioned definitions under the FLSA, in order to effectuate the broad remedial purposes of the Act." Haywood v. Barnes, 109 F.R.D. 568, 586 (E.D.N.C.1986).

As explained by the court in Haywood:

It is well-established that the issue of whether an employer/employee relationship exists under the FLSA, and hence the AWPA, must be judged by the "economic realities" of each individual case. A person is responsible as an "employer" of another where the work "follows the usual path of the employee," and where, as a matter of economic reality, the employee is dependent upon that person for their livelihood. The touchstone of economic reality in analyzing the possible employment relationship is clearly economic "dependency."

Id. (citations omitted).

Plaintiffs may establish that an employer/employee relationship existed by showing that the Taylors and/or Taylor Farms were "agricultural employers" under the AWPA or joint employers with Hernandez. See Ricketts, 32 F.3d at 75. As plaintiffs argue principally for a finding of joint employment, the court will address this issue first.

The term "employ" encompasses situations of joint employment. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(4). "Joint employment" is defined as

a condition in which a single individual stands in the relation of an employee to two or more persons at the same time. A determination of whether the employment is to be considered joint employment depends upon all the facts in the particular case. If the facts establish that two or more persons are completely disassociated with respect to the employment of a particular employee, a joint employment situation does not exist.

Id. § 500.20(h)(4)(i).

Factors which courts may use as guidance in determining whether a joint employment situation exists include the following:

(1) the nature and degree of control of the workers;

(2) the degree of supervision, direct or indirect, of the work;

(3) the power to determine the pay rates or the methods of payment of the workers;

(4) the right, directly or indirectly, to hire, fire, or modify the employment conditions of the workers; and,

(5) preparation of payroll and the payment of wages.

Id. § 500.20(h)(4)(ii). The Haywood court considered, in addition to the aforementioned factors, other factors as relevant in the analysis of joint employment: (1) ownership of the property and facilities where the work occurred; (2) degree of skill required to perform the job; (3) investment in equipment and facilities; and (4) permanency and exclusivity of employment. See 109 F.R.D. at 587. No one factor is dispositive; rather, the court must look to "the circumstances of the whole activity." Id.; Howard v. Malcolm, 852 F.2d 101, 105 (4th Cir.1988). The Fourth Circuit has expressly adopted the Haywood analysis. See Ricketts, 32 F.3d at 76. The court will now consider the nine Haywood factors in turn.

1. Nature and Degree of Control

With respect to this factor, the Haywood court noted that it is "the right to control, not necessarily the actual exercise of that control" which is important. 109 F.R.D. at 589. In its examination, the court cited numerous facts which demonstrated the defendants' right to control the migrant workers and the actual exercise of such control. See id. at 589-90 (e.g., the defendants determined the fields in which the plaintiffs worked, when the plaintiffs were to start and stop working, and when a field was ready for harvest; the defendants supervised the plaintiffs throughout the workday). The court summarized its analysis by stating:

Most decisions involving judgment, initiative, or basic control were made by the defendants. All meaningful aspects of the business relationship were dominated by defendants: price, crop cultivation, fertilization and harvesting, method and amount of payment, and work assignments.

Id. at 590.

Here, defendant Jake Taylor, Jr. controlled almost all aspects of the farming operation with little or no input from Hernandez. Taylor made the major decisions with respect to the planting, fertilization, and cultivation of crops. (See, e.g., J. Taylor Dep. at 134-35; L. Taylor Dep. at 139; Brinson Dep. of 3/24/95 at 47-48, 55-56, 62, 81, 84-85.) For example, Taylor determined when the tobacco and sweet potatoes were ready for harvest, (J. Taylor Dep. at 133-34, 146), decided where the crews would work, (id. at 137, 142; Sanchez Dep. at 43-44; A. Barrientos Dep. at 29), and dictated the time at which plaintiffs were to start and stop working, (Hernandez Dep. at 85-86). Taylor also showed Hernandez which leaves to break off the tobacco plants so that Hernandez would convey the same to his crew. (See id. at 75-77.) In addition, Taylor inspected the sweet potatoes and reprimanded Hernandez when the sweet potatoes were not harvested properly, with the expectation that Hernandez would then tell the workers to correct the problem(s). (See id. at 201-05; L. Taylor Dep. 116-17; Sanchez Dep. at 44, 50-51, 56; Hernandez...