Barrington School Committee v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd., 90-478-M

• Decision Date: 08 May 1992
• Docket Number: No. 90-478-M,90-478-M
• Citation: 608 A.2d 1126
• Parties: 75 Ed. Law Rep. 1130 BARRINGTON SCHOOL COMMITTEE v. RHODE ISLAND STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al. P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 1126

608 A.2d 1126

75 Ed. Law Rep. 1130

BARRINGTON SCHOOL COMMITTEE v. RHODE ISLAND STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al.

No. 90-478-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 8, 1992.

Douglas Giron, Hinckley, Allen, Snyder & Comen, Providence, for plaintiff.

Thomas S. Hogan, Hogan & Hogan, East Providence, Thomas Ligouri, Jr., Westerly, Anthony Cofone, Cranston, for defendant.

OPINION

WEISBERGER, Justice.

This case comes to us on a petition for certiorari to review a judgment of the Superior Court reversing a decision of the Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board. We affirm. The facts and travel of the case are as follows.

In early 1988, the Barrington Clerks/Aides/Bus Drivers NEARI/NEA (hereafter union or petitioner), a labor organization, filed a petition with the Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board (hereafter labor board, board, or petitioner) asking that a representation election be held to determine the propriety of certifying the union as the exclusive collective bargaining agent for the clerks, aides, bus drivers, and secretaries employed by the Barrington School Committee (hereafter school committee or respondent). At that time the school committee objected to the inclusion of the positions of secretary to the superintendent of schools and secretary to the business manager of the school committee within the proposed bargaining unit. The school committee contended that the duties of the individuals holding these positions are of a confidential nature and that their participation in collective bargaining would compromise the ability of respondent to develop and to effectuate management policies.

After a formal hearing in April of 1988 to ascertain whether a representation controversy in fact existed, the board decided to conduct an election for the benefit of those employees considered to be within the appropriate bargaining unit. At that hearing the school committee persisted in its objection to the inclusion of the two secretarial positions within the bargaining unit. In support of its position, the school committee cited the prior acceptance by the board of the "labor-nexus" test developed by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to resolve the question of whether a particular employee has enough access to sensitive labor relations information to preclude that employee from engaging in collective bargaining. The board did not pass upon the eligibility of the two secretaries for membership in the bargaining unit before the representation election held on June 3, 1988. At the conclusion of the voting the union was selected as the bargaining agent for the clerks, aides, bus drivers, and secretaries comprising the Barrington bargaining unit. The board thereafter issued a certificate of representation to the union.

Subsequent to the election the board conducted hearings on September 22 and November 2, 1988, concerning whether the two secretaries might properly belong to the bargaining unit in light of their job responsibilities. On December 28, 1988, the board found the position of secretary to the superintendent of schools to be a confidential one and therefore would be excluded from the bargaining unit in accordance with the labor-nexus test. The board held, however, that the secretary to the business manager of the school committee is not a confidential employee and should be included in the unit. A certification order with these conclusions was issued accordingly. Soon afterward on January 2, 1989, the union and the school committee finalized the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.

On January 24, 1989, the school committee filed a timely appeal in the Superior Court under the provisions of the Rhode Island State Administrative Procedures Act (APA), G.L.1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 42-35-15, seeking to overturn the board's finding in regard to the business manager's secretary. After examining the record below, the Superior Court reversed the board and held that the position of secretary to the business manager should be excluded from the bargaining unit. Judgment in favor of the school committee was entered on September 19, 1990. On October 5, 1990, the union and the board petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari to consider whether the Superior Court is properly afforded jurisdiction under the APA to review a certification order of the labor board directly. In the event that the Superior Court did have such jurisdiction, petitioners then asked this court in the alternative to ascertain if the Superior Court substituted its judgment for that of the labor board outside the scope of its power of review. A writ of certiorari was issued on January 10, 1991. We shall consider the issues raised by the petition for certiorari in the order in which they appear in petitioners' brief. Additional facts will be provided in the opinion as needed.

I THE APPROPRIATENESS OF DIRECT REVIEW OF CERTIFICATION ORDERS

The petitioners argue that the Superior Court in the instant case lacked jurisdiction to review and to overturn the labor board's order allowing the secretary to the business manager to participate in collective bargaining. They contend that decisions emanating from the board as part of the process of resolving a representation controversy may not be appealed directly to the Superior Court pursuant to the APA's provisions for judicial review. We disagree and conclude that orders and other rulings related to employee-representation matters (certification orders) are capable of being perfected for direct and immediate review in the Superior Court under the terms of the APA.

There is no question that prior to the passage of the APA, certification orders could not be reviewed directly by the Superior Court under the appeal provisions contained in the Rhode Island State Labor Relations Act (Labor Relations Act). Only decisions finding or dismissing an unfair labor practice were considered to be final and subject to judicial review under the terms of the legislation. See Local 494 Mutuel Race Track Employees v. Kelley, 89 R.I. 128, 151 A.2d 374 (1959); McGee v. Local No. 682, Brotherhood of Painters, 70 R.I. 200, 38 A.2d 303 (1944). Consequently, in order to challenge a certification order, an aggrieved party had first to refuse to bargain and then to include its opposition to the order as part of a subsequent unfair labor practice appeal. ¹ The petitioners maintain that this framework for securing judicial review of a certification order was not supplanted by the enactment of the APA and is still in force. We are persuaded, however, that the adoption of the APA by the General Assembly altered significantly the route by which an appeal of a certification order may be properly taken.

The General Assembly enacted the APA in 1962 to establish a single and exclusive method of obtaining judicial review of agency action, excluding only the decisions of specifically exempt agencies. Colonial Hilton Inns of New England, Inc. v. Rego, 109 R.I. 259, 284 A.2d 69 (1971); Yellow Cab Co. v. Public Utility Hearing Board, 101 R.I. 296, 222 A.2d 361 (1966). The purpose of the APA is "to provide a uniform and consistent approach to the problems created by the increasing number and expanding jurisdiction of state administrative agencies." New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Fascio, 105 R.I. 711, 715, 254 A.2d 758, 761 (1969). In furtherance of this end the General Assembly repealed all parts of acts inconsistent with the procedural scheme set out in the APA. See G.L.1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 42-35-18. It is well settled that the provisions of the Labor Relations Act have not been excluded from the scope of the APA's coverage. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd. v. Valley Falls Fire District, 505 A.2d 1170, 1172 (R.I.1986). Accordingly we must determine presently the extent to which the APA's approach to judicial review conflicts with and therefore supersedes the procedures for review contained in the Labor Relations Act. ²

Under the APA, direct and immediate judicial review in the Superior Court is available to any party "who has exhausted all administrative remedies available to him within the agency, and who is aggrieved by a final order in a contested case * * *. Any preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency act or ruling is immediately reviewable in any case in which review of the final agency order would not provide an adequate remedy." Section 42-35-15(a). We examine these elements of an appealable order under the APA in relation to the case at bar.

An agency ruling is only appealable under the APA if it was made as part of a "contested case." The term "contested case" is defined pursuant to § 42-35-1(c) as "a proceeding, including but not restricted to ratemaking, price fixing, and licensing, in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a specific party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing." There is little doubt that controversies concerning the representation of employees must be considered "contested cases" in light of the labor board's procedures for handling these matters.

Whenever a question related to employee representation arises, the board is directed by the terms of the Labor Relations Act to provide for a hearing as part of its investigation of whether a bona fide representation controversy exists. If such a controversy is manifest the board is authorized to hold a representation election either before or after the aforesaid hearing. Additional proceedings may also be conducted by the board as part of its resolution of the controversy. The legal interests or duties of at least one party are plainly fixed by the order entered by the board at the conclusion of its representation-related proceedings. See G.L.1956 (1986 Reenactment) § 28-7-16 and § 42-35-9. Unfair labor practice charges are also resolved by the board after an appropriate hearing is held. See § 28-7-21, § 28-7-22 and § 42-35-9. We conclude...