Barron Coop. Creamery v. Wickard
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
| Writing for the Court | SPARKS, MAJOR, and MINTON, Circuit |
| Citation | Barron Coop. Creamery v. Wickard, 140 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1944) |
| Decision Date | 16 February 1944 |
| Docket Number | No. 8355.,8355. |
| Parties | BARRON COOP. CREAMERY et al. v. WICKARD, Secretary of Agriculture. |
Grover D. Rose and Louis E. Hart, all of Chicago, Ill., for appellants.
J. Stephen Doyle, Jr., and W. Carroll Hunter, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., David P. Gordon, Atty., Department of Agriculture, of Washington, D. C., Wendell Berge, Asst. Atty. Gen., and John J. Boyle, U. S. Atty., of Madison, Wis., for appellee.
Before SPARKS, MAJOR, and MINTON, Circuit Judges.
The plaintiffs-appellants have appealed from a judgment of the District Court upholding the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture which denied them relief from a ruling of the Federal Milk Market Administrator for the Chicago Area reclassifying and repricing certain milk under Federal Milk Order No. 41.
Pursuant to the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 246, 7 U.S. C.A. § 601 et seq., the Secretary established the Chicago Milk Marketing Area. After public hearings, the Secretary promulgated Order 41, effective September 1, 1939, regulating the handling of milk in the Area. Section 941.4 of the order provided for the classification of milk sold in the Area as follows:
Class I is the highest priced milk, Class II is next highest, and Class III is next. It will be seen from this classification that milk used to make ice cream is in Class II, while milk used to make butter is in Class III. The purpose of this classification according to utilization is to guide the Administrator in periodically setting the uniform minimum price to be paid producers for all milk purchased during the period. All producers receive the same price. Adjustments are then made with the first handlers through the producer-settlement fund. If a first handler has disposed of milk in a use which has been assigned a higher price than the uniform minimum price, he must pay the difference into the settlement fund. On the other hand, if a first handler has disposed of milk in a use which has been assigned a lower price than the uniform minimum price, he is paid the difference out of the settlement fund. The prices assigned to each use classification, as well as the uniform minimum price, are revised each period.
Order 41 remained in force until July 1, 1940, when there became effective an amended order specifically providing for the reclassification of milk used to produce butter where subsequently such butter was used to make ice cream or ice cream mix.1
During May and June, 1940, while the original order was still in effect, the plaintiffs, who were cooperative associations in Wisconsin, purchased milk from producers which they manufactured into unsalted butter. They sold this unsalted butter to the Bowman Dairy Company of Chicago, who in turn sold it to the Goldenrod Ice Cream Company of the same city for use in making ice cream. There is no intimation that these transactions were not bona fide or that they were part of a scheme to avoid a higher classification under Order 41. The plaintiffs reported the milk thus used to the Administrator of the Chicago Area as Class III milk, the classification for milk used to make butter. The Administrator, however, claimed that the proper classification was Class II, because the butter had ultimately been used by the Goldenrod Company to make ice cream. The difference in price between Class II and Class III for the two months amounted to a total for both plaintiffs of over $11,000.
The plaintiffs petitioned the Secretary of Agriculture for relief from this claim of the Administrator. After a hearing, the Secretary sustained the Administrator. The plaintiffs then filed a petition for review with the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. The Secretary of Agriculture filed an answer and a motion for summary judgment which incorporated the transcript of the proceedings on the plaintiffs' petition before the Secretary. The District Court sustained the Secretary's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment that the Secretary's action was in accordance with law.
There is no dispute as to the facts. The question is whether Order 41 authorized the rescaling upward of the classification of milk used to manufacture butter, where the purchaser of that butter twice removed used it to make ice cream?
Paragraph (c) of Section 941.4 of the original Order 41 provided:
...
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Belco Petroleum Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
...Btu content, taxes, and gathering.4 See note 10 Infra.5 As then Circuit Judge (later Justice) Minton wrote in Barron Coop. Creamery v. Wickard, 140 F.2d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 1944):Administrative orders, like statutes, are not to be given strained and unnatural constructions. As was said in Ly......
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Crowley's Milk Co. v. Brannan
...with law if it is based upon an unreasonable interpretation of even the Secretary's own order and regulations. Barron Cooperative Creamery v. Wickard, 7 Cir., 140 F.2d 485, 488, per Minton, J. And we believe with the court below that under all the circumstances here disclosed, the reading o......
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MGPC, INC. v. Department of Energy, 10-52.
...53 L.Ed.2d 48 (1977). Finally, administrative orders are not to be given strained and unnatural construction. Barron Coop. Creamery v. Wickard, 140 F.2d 485, 488 (7th Cir.1944) (Cited in Belco, 589 F.2d 680 at 689 n. Guided by the principles stated above we approach the facts of this case. ......
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Shepherd v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
...F.Supp. 208, 210 (D.D.C.1976).22 Belco Petroleum Corp. v. FERC, 589 F.2d 680, 686 n.5 (D.C.Cir.1978) (quoting Barron Coop. Creamery v. Wickard, 140 F.2d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 1944), quoting Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364, 370, 45 S.Ct. 274, 275, 69 L.Ed. 660 (1925)). Since neither......