Barron v. District of Columbia
| Decision Date | 25 June 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-685.,84-685. |
| Citation | 494 A.2d 663 |
| Parties | Patsy A. BARRON, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Leonard J. Koenick was on the brief for appellant.
Inez Smith Reid, Corp. Counsel, John H. Suda, Principal Deputy Corp. Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Charlotte Brookins-Pruitt and Candida Staempfli, Asst. Corp. Counsel, were on the brief for appellee.
Before NEBEKER, NEWMAN, and FERREN, Associate Judges.
Ms. Barron contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion for a new trial on damages only. She asserts that the uncontroverted evidence showed that as a result of the negligence of the District of Columbia, she experienced considerable pain and suffering as well as permanent facial scarring. She argues that a jury verdict which exceeded the undisputed special damages by only $38.60 was so inadequate as to indicate it was the product of prejudice, partiality or passion, or that it was based on mistake, oversight or consideration of an improper element. We agree and reverse.
In its Memorandum Opinion and Order filed April 18, 1984, the trial court stated the relevant facts as follows:
Plaintiff sued the District of Columbia for injuries she received when she ran into a torn-up section of an alley and fell off the bike she was riding, one she did not own. Her cheek was pierced when she fell, resulting in a permanent scar; plaintiff sustained other injuries as well.
Witnesses at trial testified as to the extent and seriousness of plaintiff's injuries, and plaintiff herself testified as to her pain and suffering. She offered as exhibits evidence of her lost wages and medical expenses which totalled $2,561.40. Defendant did not attempt to contradict the evidence offered on damages; however, the jury awarded plaintiff only $2,600.00.
Later, in the same opinion, in analogizing to our decision in Mantis v. Ashley, 391 A.2d 267 (D.C. 1978), the trial court stated: "[t]here, as here, there was no real question as to liability." Thus, we are presented with the trial court's findings that: (1) there is permanent facial scarring as well as other injuries; (2) special damages totalled $2,561.40; (3) that the District of Columbia did not seek to contradict the damage evidence; and (4) there was no real question as to liability.1
In Romer v. District of Columbia, 449 A.2d 1097 (D.C. 1982), in affirming the trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial on the grounds of inadequacy of a jury award, we stated at 1099:
[I]n reviewing the denial of a motion for a new trial based on a claimed inadequate verdict, this court will reverse only when the amount of the award evidences prejudice, passion or partiality on the part of the jury or where the verdict appears to be an oversight, mistake, or consideration of an improper element. Hughes v. Pender, D.C.App. 391 A.2d 259, 263 (1978). An appellate court should order a new trial only when the award is contrary to all reason. Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 133 U.S. App.D.C. 110, 113, 409 F.2d 145, 148, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835, 90 S.Ct. 93, 24 L.Ed.2d 85 (1969); Hughes v. Pender, supra at 263.
Our review is to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion for a new trial. Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Brothers, Miller & Rhoades, Inc., et al., 492 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1985); Cunningham v. Conner, 309 A.2d 500 (D.C. 1973); Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 133 U.S.App.D.C. 110, 409 F.2d 145, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835, 90 S.Ct. 93, 24 L.Ed.2d 85 (1969). See generally Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354 (D.C. 1979).
Where the evidence is uncontradicted and unimpeached that the plaintiff suffered substantial injuries, including significant permanent facial scarring2, and where there is no meaningful contest on the issue of liability, absent some rational explanation for a jury's refusal to award any but nominal recovery above the undisputed special damages, its award is, at least, suspect. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has said:
In the present case the verdict reflects the exact amount of medical and hospital outlay. Thus, on its face it...
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...of personal injury and pain and suffering and found them inconsequential. Id. at 516-17, 260 A.2d 634. We are also unpersuaded by the District of Columbia case relied upon by the appellant. In Barron v. District of Columbia, 494 A.2d 663 (1985), a woman permanently injured her face when she......
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Upton v. Henderer, No. 07-CV-456.
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