Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc.

• Decision Date: 25 August 1988
• Docket Number: No. 70910,70910
• Citation: Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So.2d 113, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 497 (Fla. 1988)
• Parties: , 13 Fla. L. Weekly 497, 15 Media L. Rep. 1901 Dempsey J. BARRON, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA FREEDOM NEWSPAPERS, INC., Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 113

531 So.2d 113

57 USLW 2180, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 497, 15 Media L. Rep. 1901

Dempsey J. BARRON, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA FREEDOM NEWSPAPERS, INC., Respondent.

No. 70910.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Aug. 25, 1988.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 28, 1988.

Sharon Lee Stedman of Rumberger, Kirk, Caldwell, Cabaniss, Burke & Wechsler, Orlando, for petitioner.

Franklin R. Harrison and William A. Lewis of Sale, Brown & Smoak, Chartered, Panama City, for respondent.

C. Gary Williams, Michael J. Glazer and Timothy B. Elliott of Ausley, McMullen, McGehee, Carothers & Proctor, Tallahassee, amicus curiae for Tallahassee Democrat, Inc.

William G. Mateer, David L. Evans and Clay H. Coward of Mateer, Harbert & Bates, P.A., Orlando, amicus curiae for Sentinel Communications Co.

Gerald B. Cope, Jr. and Laura Besvinick of Greer, Homer, Cope & Bonner, P.A., and Richard J. Ovelmen, The Miami Herald Pub. Co., Miami, amicus curiae for The Miami Herald Pub. Co.

George K. Rahdert and Bonita M. Riggens of Rahdert, Acosta & Dickson, P.A., St. Petersburg, amicus curiae for The Times Pub. Co.

OVERTON, Justice.

This is a petition to review Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Sirmons, 508 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), which reversed a trial court order sealing a substantial portion of the court file in a dissolution proceeding between Dempsey J. Barron, a state senator, and Louverne Barron. The district court acknowledged conflict with Sentinel Communications Co. v. Smith, 493 So.2d 1048 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), review denied, 503 So.2d 328 (Fla.1987). We find the district court expressly construed article I, section 23, of the Florida Constitution, agree there is conflict, and accept jurisdiction. ^*

We hold that all trials, civil and criminal, are public events and there is a strong presumption of public access to these proceedings and their records, subject to certain narrowly defined exceptions. We have articulated principles that govern these exceptions and, after applying them to this case, we find no basis to seal the file. Although we disagree in part with the district court's reasoning, we approve the result.

On January 28, 1986, Louverne Barron filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the Bay County Circuit Court against her husband, Dempsey Barron. In early September, after an answer was filed, the wife sought to amend her petition and add Terri Jo Kennedy, the executive director of the rules committee of the Florida Senate, as a party defendant. The husband immediately filed a motion to seal the file. The trial court granted the wife's motion to add Kennedy as a party defendant and entered a summary order sealing the file.

Approximately three weeks later, the respondent, Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., filed motions to intervene in the proceeding and to set aside the closure order. The trial judge permitted intervention but denied the motion to set aside the closure order with an explanatory order expressly relying on Sentinel Communications and State ex rel. Gore Newspaper Co. v. Tyson, 313 So.2d 777 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), overruled on other grounds, English v. McCrary, 348 So.2d 293 (Fla.1977). The judge explained that the court, through its inherent power, may exclude the public and press from any judicial proceedings to protect the litigants' rights if "cogent reasons" exist. He found that a "cogent reason" for closure was presented but stated that any expression of that reason in the court's order would have "then in fact ... done away with the reason to keep the file sealed." Further, the court held that the information was "uniquely private to the individual involved" and "the public records act does not apply to this information."

Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., sought appellate review under rule 9.100(d), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, asserting that the order excluded the press and public from access to judicial records, and requested a stay of the dissolution proceeding pending resolution of the closure issue. The district court granted the stay. Subsequently, the wife sought to vacate the stay explaining that this collateral issue was causing her hardship by preventing the continuation of the dissolution proceeding. The district court vacated the stay, summarily affirmed the order sealing the records, and stated that an opinion would follow.

Within a month, the trial court held a final hearing and entered a final judgment, part of which was sealed. The unsealed portion dissolved the marriage; made equitable distribution of the property; ordered the husband to allow the wife to continue as a beneficiary under his insurance policy until May 31, 1990; ordered the husband to pay $500 a month periodic alimony; determined that Dempsey Barron's conveyance to Terri Jo Kennedy of a life estate in real property in Wyoming was fraudulent and ordered it set aside; and ordered the husband to pay one-half of the wife's attorney's fees. The public part of the judgment referred to the sealed portion and stated:

2. This court's order setting forth findings of fact shall be incorporated into and made part of this final judgment, but due to this court's order sealing the file, that order will remain a part of the sealed court file. This final judgment however shall not be part of the sealed court file if either the husband or the wife need to present certified copies of the judgment for whatever purposes they may deem appropriate.

The sealed order containing the findings of fact is ten pages in length, while the unsealed portion is three pages. Neither party appealed this final judgment.

Subsequently, on June 1, 1987, the district court rendered an opinion overruling its prior order and directed that the file be opened. In explaining its changed position, the court expressed its inability to accept the principles set forth in Sentinel Communications and rejected the trial court's finding that a cogent reason existed for closing the proceeding. The court stated:

We do not find the facts upon which the trial court based this finding to be sufficiently compelling to require the proceedings be conducted in private, thereby denying the public, including the press, the right to attend these proceedings and the right to examine the court file. In essence, one of the parties wished to conduct the proceedings in private to prevent the disclosure of certain information the party would otherwise prefer not be made public. The information is of a somewhat general nature and not specifically tied to a domestic relations case. The information is not related to the marital relationship nor its breakup, to the welfare of the children, nor to the marital property. The party affected suggests it is related to present and future financial support. This may be so, but we do not find this reason to be sufficiently compelling, rising to the level that would deny the party an opportunity to receive a fair trial, to justify closing these proceedings.

Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Sirmons, 508 So.2d at 464-65 (footnotes omitted). The court also concluded that there was "no reason why the three-pronged test set forth in Miami Herald Publishing Company v. State, 363 So.2d 603 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), [would] not work as well in civil cases." Id. at 464 (footnote omitted). Further, the court held that the privacy provision in article I, section 23, of the Florida Constitution, providing that citizens of this state shall have the "right to be let alone from government intrusion," is inapplicable to this type of proceeding. Id. at 463. In a concurring opinion, Judge Nimmons expressed the view that this constitutional provision must "be taken into consideration by trial courts in the determination of whether access to a civil court proceeding by the public and the press should be limited or denied," id. at 465 (footnote omitted), but agreed with the majority that the "grounds for closure presented by Barron and relied upon by the trial court were insufficient to overcome the heavy common law presumption in favor of access." Id. at 466.

In this review, Dempsey Barron argues that the trial court properly found a cogent reason for closure and that, upon that determination, an appellate court must limit its inquiry to whether or not the trial court abused its discretion. Further, he argues that since dissolution proceedings do not involve the state and are private in nature, the parties involved have a fundamental statutory and constitutional right of privacy to have their files sealed regardless of their public-figure status. We reject these arguments for the reasons expressed below.

Public Access to Civil Court Proceedings

At the outset, we hold that both civil and criminal court proceedings in Florida are public events and adhere to the well established common law right of access to court proceedings and records. In Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 1254, 91 L.Ed. 1546 (1947), the United States Supreme Court held: "A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is public property.... There is no special perquisite of the judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from other institutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire in proceedings before it." In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n. 17, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 2829 n. 17, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980), Chief Justice Burger stated: "Whether the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a question not raised by this case, but we note that historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open." In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart expressed that "the first and fourteenth amendments clearly give the press and public a right of access to trials themselves, civil as well as criminal." Id. at 599, 100 S.Ct. at 2839. See also Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir.1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th...