Barry v. Barchi, No. 77-803

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtWHITE
Citation99 S.Ct. 2642,61 L.Ed.2d 365,443 U.S. 55
Docket NumberNo. 77-803
Decision Date25 June 1979
PartiesWilliam G. BARRY, etc., et al., Appellants, v. John BARCHI

443 U.S. 55
99 S.Ct. 2642
61 L.Ed.2d 365
William G. BARRY, etc., et al., Appellants,

v.

John BARCHI.

No. 77-803.
Argued Nov. 7, 1978.
Decided June 25, 1979.
Syllabus

The New York State Racing and Wagering Board (Board), which is empowered to license horse trainers participating in harness horse-race meets in New York, has issued regulations specifying the standards of conduct that a trainer must satisfy to retain his license. The trainer's responsibility rules provide that when a postrace test of a horse reveals the presence of drugs, it is to be presumed—subject to rebuttal—that the drug was either administered by the trainer or resulted from his negligence in failing adequately to protect against such occurrence. Under a New York statute (§ 8022), a suspended licensee is entitled to a postsuspension hearing, but the statute specifies no time in which the hearing must be held, affords the Board as long as 30 days after the hearing in which to issue a final order, and ordains that "[p]ending such hearing and final determination thereon, the action of the [Board] in . . . suspending a license . . . shall remain in full force and effect." Pursuant to the trainer's responsibility rules and the evidentiary presumption created therein, the Board summarily suspended appellee's trainer's license for 15 days on the basis of a postrace test that revealed a drug in the system of a horse trained by him. Without resorting to the § 8022 procedures, appellee filed suit in Federal District Court, challenging the constitutionality of § 8022 and the evidentiary presumption under the Board's rules. The court upheld the presumption, but concluded that § 8022 was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, since it permitted the State to sanction a trainer without either a presuspension or a prompt postsuspension hearing, and that § 8022 also violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, since it prohibited a stay of a license suspension pending administrative review, whereas under the laws applicable to thoroughbred racing, suspensions could be stayed pending appeal.

Held:

1. Section 8022 does not violate the Due Process Clause by authorizing summary suspensions without a presuspension hearing. Although

Page 56

appellee has a property interest in his license under state law sufficient to invoke due process protections, and although the magnitude of a trainer's interest in avoiding suspension is substantial, the State also has an important interest in assuring the integrity of racing carried on under its auspices. In these circumstances, the State is entitled to impose an interim suspension, pending a prompt judicial or administrative hearing that will definitely determine the issues, whenever it has satisfactorily established probable cause to believe that a horse has been drugged and that a trainer has been at least negligent in connection with the drugging. Here, the State adduced the assertion of its testing official as proof that appellee's horse had been drugged, and, at the interim suspension stage, an expert's affirmance would appear sufficiently reliable to satisfy constitutional requirements. As for appellee's culpability, in light of the Board's trainer's responsibility rules, the inference, predicated on the fact of drugging, that appellee was at least negligent will be accepted as defensible, and the State will not be put to further presuspension proof that appellee had not complied with the applicable rules. Pp. 63-66.

2. However, appellee was not assured a sufficiently timely post-suspension hearing and § 8022 was unconstitutionally applied in this respect. The statutory provision for an administrative hearing, neither on its face nor as applied, assured a prompt proceeding and prompt disposition of the outstanding issues between appellee and the State, it being as likely as not that appellee and others subject to relatively brief suspensions would have no opportunity to put the State to its proof until they have suffered the full penalty imposed. Once suspension has been imposed, the trainer's interest in a speedy resolution of the controversy becomes paramount, and there is little or no state interest in an appreciable delay in going forward with a full hearing. P. 66.

3. The State's prohibition of administrative stays pending a hearing in the harness racing context without a like prohibition in thoroughbred racing does not deny harness racing trainers equal protection of the laws. The legislative history of § 8022 makes clear that it and other provisions applicable to harness racing resulted from a legislative conclusion that harness racing should be subject to strict regulation, and appellee has not demonstrated that the acute problems attending harness racing also plague thoroughbred racing and that both types of racing should be treated identically. Also, the procedural mechanism selected to mitigate the threats to the public interest arising in the harness racing context is rationally related to the achievement of that goal. Pp. 67-68.

D.C.N.Y., 436 F.Supp. 775, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Page 57

Robert S. Hammer, New York City, for appellants.

Joseph A. Faraldo, Kew Gardens, N. Y., for appellee.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The New York State Racing and Wagering Board (Board) is empowered to license horse trainers and others participating in harness horse-race meets in New York.1 The Board also issues regulations setting forth the standards of conduct that a horse trainer must satisfy to retain his license.2 Among

Page 58

other things, the rules issued by the Board forbid the drugging of horses within 48 hours of a race and make trainers responsible for the condition and soundness of their horses before, during, and after a race.3 A trainer is forbidden to permit a horse in his custody to start a race "if he knows, or if by the exercise of reasonable care he might have known or have cause to believe" that a horse trained by him has been drugged.4

Page 59

Every trainer is required to "guard or cause to be guarded each horse trained by him in such manner . . . as to prevent any person not employed by or connected with the owner or trainer from administering any drug . . .." 5 And when a post-race test, which must be administered to horses finishing first, second, or third, reveals the presence of drugs, it is to be presumed—subject to rebuttal—that the drug "was either administered by the trainer or resulted from his negligence in failing to adequately protect against such occurrence." 6

On June 22, 1976, Be Alert, a harness race horse trained by appellee, John Barchi, finished second in a race at Monticello Raceway. Two days later, Barchi was advised by the Board steward that a postrace urinalysis had revealed a drug in Be Alert's system. Barchi proclaimed his innocence, and two lie-detector tests supported his lack of knowledge of the drugging. On July 8, relying on the trainer's responsibility rules and the evidentiary presumption arising thereunder, the steward suspended Barchi for 15 days, commencing July 10.7 Under § 8022 of the New York Uncon-

Page 60

solidated Laws,8 a suspended licensee is entitled to a post-suspension hearing, but the section ordains that "[p]ending such hearing and final determination thereon, the action of

Page 61

the [Board] in . . . suspending a license . . . shall remain in full force and effect." The section specifies no time in which the hearing must be held, and it affords the Board as long as 30 days after the conclusion of the hearing in which to issue a final order adjudicating a case. Without resorting to the § 8022 procedures, Barchi filed this suit in the United States District Court.

Barchi alleged that his trainer's license was protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and that § 8022 was unconstitutional because it permitted his license to be suspended without a prior hearing to determine his culpability and because a summary suspension could not be stayed pending the administrative review provided by the statute. Barchi also challenged the rule permitting the Board to presume rebuttably from the drugging of a horse that its trainer was responsible. His claim was that "there is no rational connection between the fact proved, that the horse was illegally drugged, and the ultimate fact presumed that the trainer is guilty of the act or carelessly guarded against the act occurring," App. at 15a (complaint), it being impossible, Barchi alleged, for the trainer to guard the horse against all those who by stealth might gain

Page 62

access to it. Barchi's third claim was that, in prohibiting a stay of his suspension pending administrative review, § 8022 denied him equal protection of the laws, since in the context of thoroughbred racing, in contrast to harness racing, suspensions can be stayed pending appeal.9

The District Court upheld the evidentiary presumption on its face, concluding: "[T]he duty of a trainer to oversee his horses is sufficiently connected to the occurrence of tampering to support the presumption established by the trainer's 'insurer' rules. The state's definition of trainer responsibility is reasonably related to the interests involved and, given the rebuttable nature of the 4120.5 presumption, the high standard of accountability is not unconstitutional." Barchi v. Sarafan, 436 F.Supp. 775, 784 (SDNY 1977). The District Court went on to hold, however, that § 8022 of the New York law was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause since it permitted the State "to irreparably sanction a harness race horse trainer without a pre-suspension or a prompt post-sus-

Page 63

pension hearing in violation of plaintiff's right to due process." App. to Juris. Statement 2a (order of judgment).10 The court further concluded that the difference between...

To continue reading

Request your trial
553 practice notes
  • Sense v. Shinseki, No. 08–16728.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • May 10, 2011
    ...a constitutional violation,” though that point had not been reached in that case. Id. at 547, 105 S.Ct. 1487; see also Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 66, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979) (“[I]t was necessary that Barchi be assured a prompt post-suspension hearing, one that would proceed ......
  • Zevallos v. Obama, Civil Action No.: 13-0390 (RC)
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
    • January 17, 2014
    ...The court explained that "promptness is an important aspect of the due process right to be heard." Id. at 906 (citing Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979)). Employing the Barchi balancing test, the court went on to explain that OFAC waiting fifteen months, providing a largely uninformati......
  • Jordan by Jordan v. Jackson, No. 93-1656
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • January 31, 1994
    ...as the Fourth Amendment inquiry into the constitutionality of delay in an independent probable cause determination. See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64, 66, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 2649, 2650, 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979) (citing Gerstein as analogous authority that prompt judicial or administrative heari......
  • Brewster v. Board of Educ. of Lynwood Unified School Dist., No. 97-55203
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • July 13, 1998
    ...positions and therefore justified dispensing with predeprivation process. See id. at 241, 108 S.Ct. 1780. Similarly, in Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979), the Court concluded that a State's interest in protecting the integrity of the sport of horseracing tru......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
553 cases
  • Sense v. Shinseki, No. 08–16728.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • May 10, 2011
    ...a constitutional violation,” though that point had not been reached in that case. Id. at 547, 105 S.Ct. 1487; see also Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 66, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979) (“[I]t was necessary that Barchi be assured a prompt post-suspension hearing, one that would proceed ......
  • Zevallos v. Obama, Civil Action No.: 13-0390 (RC)
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
    • January 17, 2014
    ...The court explained that "promptness is an important aspect of the due process right to be heard." Id. at 906 (citing Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979)). Employing the Barchi balancing test, the court went on to explain that OFAC waiting fifteen months, providing a largely uninformati......
  • Jordan by Jordan v. Jackson, No. 93-1656
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • January 31, 1994
    ...as the Fourth Amendment inquiry into the constitutionality of delay in an independent probable cause determination. See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64, 66, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 2649, 2650, 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979) (citing Gerstein as analogous authority that prompt judicial or administrative heari......
  • Brewster v. Board of Educ. of Lynwood Unified School Dist., No. 97-55203
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • July 13, 1998
    ...positions and therefore justified dispensing with predeprivation process. See id. at 241, 108 S.Ct. 1780. Similarly, in Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979), the Court concluded that a State's interest in protecting the integrity of the sport of horseracing tru......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT