BARRY v. LITTLE

• Decision Date: 18 December 1995
• Docket Number: No. 92-CV-1157,No. 92-CV-1448,92-CV-1157,92-CV-1448
• Citation: 669 A.2d 115
• Parties: Marion BARRY, Jr., et al., Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. Bivens LITTLE, et al., Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

669 A.2d 115

Marion BARRY, Jr., et al., Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. Bivens LITTLE,et al., Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

Nos. 92-CV-1157, 92-CV-1448.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued December 8, 1994.

Decided December 18, 1995.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHERYL M. LONG, J.

Karen L. McDonald, Assistant Corporation Counsel with whom Vanessa Ruiz, Corporation Counsel at the time the brief was filed, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, were on the brief, for appellants/cross-appellees.

John G. Roberts, Jr., with whom Walter A. Smith, Jr., John C. Keeney, Jr., L. Anthony Sutin, Adam H. Charnes, Lynn E. Cunningham, Robert Berlow, Patricia Mullahy Fugere, Frank R. Trinity, Joan D. Christopher, Faith Mullen and Arthur B. Spitzer, were on the brief, for appellees/cross-appellants.

Before WAGNER, Chief Judge, and STEADMAN, Associate Judge and BOWERS, Associate Judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. ^*.

Sitting by designation pursuant to D.C. Code § 11-707(a) (1995).

BOWERS, Associate Judge:

Plaintiffs,¹ a class of District of Columbia residents receiving General Public Assistance (GPA) benefits on June 30, 1991 under the Public Assistance Act of 1982, D.C. Code §§ 3-201.1 to 3-221.1 (1988 Repl.),² suffered the termination of those benefits when they were later found not to be "disabled" under D.C.Law 9-27,³ originally enacted as emergencylegislation, effective July 1, 1991, amending the 1982 statute. These terminations were to become effective at the end of the recipients' current "certification period."⁴ The non-disability findings were made without any pre-termination hearings and were followed by termination notices from the Department of Human Services (hereinafter, "DHS") which failed to disclose the basis of such findings. After first seeking administrative "fair hearings," the aggrieved recipients thereafter filed in Superior Court this class action lawsuit, claiming that the notices were violative of D.C. Code § 3-205.55 (1994 Supp.), and that the notices, as well as the final sentence of D.C. Code § 3-205.53(c) (1994 Supp.), precluding the payment of benefits pending appeals from non-disability findings, were violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Superior Court agreed with these contentions, declared D.C. Code § 3-205.53(c) (1994 Supp.) unconstitutional on its face, granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment⁵ and issued a permanent injunction⁶ (a) enjoining the District of Columbia ⁷from terminating GPA benefits of any class member without providing such person with adequate notice and the opportunity for a pre-termination hearing and (b) ordering reinstatement of benefits and retroactive payments from date of termination to date of reinstatement. The District appeals from these rulings. The lower court, however, refused to reinstate the benefits of a subgroup of plaintiff class who re-applied for benefits but failed to appeal the denials of their re-applications. Their appeal of that refusal constitutes the cross-appeal.

Because we conclude that plaintiffs possessed no "property interest" in the continued receipt of GPA benefits extending beyond the expiration of their current certification period following enactment of D.C.Law 9-27, we reverse the trial court's judgment declaring unconstitutional D.C. Code § 3-205.53(c) (1994 Supp.). For the same reason, we find no constitutional deficiency in the termination notices. The District concedes, however, that said notices were violative of D.C. Code § 3-205.55 (1994 Supp.) and hence, for that reason, does not challenge the order of the trial court requiring reinstatement of benefits. The order awarding a lump-sum retroactive payment, however, is challenged on appeal as an unwarranted exercise of the trial court's equitable powers in fashioninga remedy. We agree and reverse that order.

Because we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision not to grant any relief to those members of plaintiff class who failed to appeal the denials of their reapplications for GPA benefits, we affirm its ruling challenged on cross-appeal.

I. D.C.Law 9-27 and its Legislative History

In the spring of 1991, at the urging of the Mayor due to severe budgetary constraints, the D.C. Council passed emergency legislation (made permanent by D.C.Law 9-27), effective July 1, 1991, which substantially altered the GPA program in several respects. First, it eliminated "incapacity" as a ground for the receipt of GPA benefits. Second, it changed the substantive definition of "disability." Under the new standard, an individual "shall be deemed to be disabled if the individual is determined by the Mayor to be disabled based upon the criteria for the supplemental security income program established pursuant to the Social Security Amendments Act of 1972 (42 U.S.C. § 1381 et. seq.)." D.C. Code § 3-205.42 (1994 Supp.).⁸ Third, unlike the welfare legislation in effect prior to July 1, 1991, it provided that GPA benefits would not be continued during the appeal of a termination of benefits based on a finding that the recipient is not disabled. Lastly, of pivotal significance to the outcome of the instant appeal, it added to the pre-existing statute an entirely new section, now codified at D.C. Code § 3-205.42a (1994 Supp.), captioned "Eligibility for General Public Assistance." This new section reads as follows:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, beginning July 1, 1991, an individual shall be eligible for GPA benefits only if the individual has a disability as defined in Sec. 3-205.42(2).

(b) An individual who is receiving GPA benefits on June 30, 1991, may continue to receive GPA benefits until the expiration of the individual's certification period. Benefits beyond the expiration of the certification period shall not be paid to an individual unless the GPA recipient reapplies for benefits and is determined to have a disability as defined in Sec. 3-205.42(2) . . .⁹

On March 18, 1991, Bill 9-159, the Public Assistance Act of 1982 Budget Conformity Amendment Act of 1991 (which ultimately was enacted as D.C.Law 9-27) was introduced in the District of Columbia Council at the request of the Mayor and referred to the Committee on Human Services. On April 25, 1991 this Committee issued a Report, signed by its Chairman, H.R. Crawford (hereinafter, The "Crawford Committee Report"), recommending the Bill's approval by the full Council. In the section of the Report captioned "Background and Need," the Report refers to the Mayor's revised Fiscal Year 1991 and Fiscal Year 1992 budget proposals submitted to the Council to deal with severe budget and financial constraints facing the city brought on by the then-current economic recession. One of the proposals called for "a reduction in spending in various District-funded programs, including a reduction in the General Public Assistance Program (GPA). . . ." Crawford Committee Report at 2. This reduction in GPA spending was needed to offset increased spending requiredto adequately fund a growing Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) caseload. Id. at 3. Bill 9-159 sought to accomplish this reduction in GPA spending primarily by repeal of the "incapacity" eligibility criteria. In this same "Background and Need" Section, the Crawford Committee Report made the following observation:

An individual on GPA receives a payment of $270 per month. During the first 6 months of FY 1991, an average of 4685 persons per month received GPA. Of that number approximately 3,200 had an incapacity (and) 881 were permanently disabled and were applying for SSI. . . . Current estimates are that about 1,500 persons would lose GPA eligibility with the repeal of the incapacity eligibility criteria.

Id. at 5.

Finally, at a Committee meeting held on April 25, 1991 to consider and mark up Bill 9-159, Council Chairman John Wilson, clearly recognizing the detrimental impact that passage of the Bill would have upon many GPA recipients, stated that:

the present financial situation calls for some hard, unpopular decisions, and . . . this one (the vote on Bill 9-159) is one of the first that the City Council will have to make.

Crawford Committee Report at 19.

II. Trial Court Statement of Issues and Findings

In a Memorandum Opinion dated September 8, 1992 and issued contemporaneous with the issuance of a Permanent Injunction in favor of plaintiffs, the trial court described the issues before it in these words:

Lest there be any doubt, this case does not involve a challenge to the legislature's right and power to make changes in eligibility criteria. Rather, the real issue in this case is the lack of a pretermination hearing (denied by statute) and adequate notice of termination to the affected recipients.

The focus of the case is the asserted constitutional deficiency of the manner in which the District of Columbia has implemented 1991 legislation that changes the criteria for these [GPA] benefits. The term "implemented" refers to executive branch action as well as a specific statutory mandate.

Memorandum Opinion at 2.

The statutory mandate referred to above, which the trial court declared unconstitutional on its face, is the final sentence of D.C. Code § 3-205.53(c) (1994 Supp.), which states that "[b]enefits shall not be continued beyond the effective date of termination if the sole basis for the individual's appeal of the termination is the failure to meet the disability standard defined in Sec. 3-205.42."

Among the trial court's Findings of Fact¹⁰ were the following relating to implementation of the 1991 legislation by the Department of Human Services:

1. The same recertification forms (one to be executed by the recipient and one by his or her physician) were used as had been used under the pre-1991 legislation.

2. At no time prior to or during the recertification process did GPA recipients or their doctors receive...