Barstad v. Barstad, 920278

• Decision Date: 27 April 1993
• Docket Number: No. 920278,920278
• Citation: 499 N.W.2d 584
• Parties: Catherine M. BARSTAD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. James R. BARSTAD, Defendant and Appellee. Civ.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 584

499 N.W.2d 584

Catherine M. BARSTAD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.James R. BARSTAD, Defendant and Appellee.

Civ. No. 920278.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

April 27, 1993.

Charles A. Stock of Vogel, Brantner, Kelly, Knutson, Weir & Bye, Ltd., Fargo, for plaintiff and appellant.

Maureen Holman of Serkland, Lundberg, Erickson, Marcil & McLean, Ltd., Fargo, for defendant and appellee.

LEVINE, Justice.

Catherine Barstad(Cathy) appeals from an amended judgment changing custody of her son, Ryan, to Ryan's father, James Barstad(Jim).We reverse and remand.

At the time of Jim and Cathy's marriage in October 1982, Cathy's son, Ryan, was three years old.Jim adopted Ryan soon after their marriage.The couple's second son, Bradley, was born in March 1983.Jim and Cathy were divorced in November 1988.Cathy received custody of the two boys and Jim received supervised visitation because of the manifestations of his behavioral disorder of exhibitionism, a condition which was deemed treatable but not curable.At the time of the divorce, Jim had a record of four convictions for indecent exposure between 1981 and 1987, and for the years 1973 to 1985, three convictions of disorderly conduct, one conviction of lying-in-wait and one conviction of making an obscene or harassing telephone call.After the divorce, an additional incident occurred in 1988.

After receiving treatment, Jim petitioned for unsupervised visitation in February 1990, which the court ultimately granted.Jim has fully exercised his unsupervised, alternate weekend and extended summer visitation rights since then and has also visited with the boys, by agreement with Cathy, one evening a week.Apparently, Jim stopped receiving treatment in 1990.

In February 1992, Cathy told Jim of her engagement to Charles Koval and asked for Jim's consent to her moving with the children to Charles' residence in Crookston, Minnesota.At first, Jim consented to the move, but he later withdrew that consent and moved to gain the boys' custody.According to Jim, he sought custody for a variety of reasons, the foremost of which were the boys' statements, obtained in response to Jim's interrogation, that they preferred to live with him in Fargo.He also believed they would benefit from their continued involvement in the Fargo sports community and that he could help improve Ryan's poor academic performance.Jim was uneasy, as well, about how the boys would adapt to living with Charles' three children.¹

Cathy subsequently filed a motion to change the boys' residence to Crookston, Minnesota.She claimed the move was in the boys' best interests, that her fiance, Charles, would have a positive influence on them, and that the short distance between Crookston and Fargo would not affect Jim's visitation rights.After a change in Cathy and Charles' plans, Cathy amended her motion to state her proposed residence as Shelly, Minnesota, a small community approximately 38 miles from Fargo.

With both motions filed and a hearing scheduled, Jim, Cathy, Ryan and Bradley, at Jim's request, underwent custody evaluations from psychologist Neil Clark.Dr. Clark prefaced his "Custody Evaluation Summary" with the following remarks:

"With regards to background (psychosocial history) Ms. Barstad presents a normal background, and Mr. Barstad has had several relevant problems: physical abuse as a child, inpatient and outpatient psychiatric treatments, and nine law enforcement convictions.None of his historical problems showed a direct impact on either of the children.They have not been victimized nor abused.Generally, in custody related issues a period of two-three years since the last occurrence is considered a remission of the situation.That period of time has been established for Mr. Barstad.This examiner would point out, however, that there have been previous periods of remission, followed by reoccurrence."

Apparently treating his custody evaluations for this modification proceeding no differently than he would for an original divorce proceeding, Dr. Clark concluded that Cathy and Jim were "suitable and competent parents" and that neither posed "any dangers to the children."In recommending Ryan's placement with Jim, Dr. Clark explained:

"Ryan's current personality adjustment is superior.He currently feels more closely attached to his father.He states a clear preference for living with his father.He wants to maintain his involvements in the Fargo community (friends, sports, schools).When asked if Ms. Barstad were to remain in Fargo, would his preference for living with his father change, he replied, 'no'.Ryan reported more mutual activities with his father."

Dr. Clark thus recommended, based on "the preference of the child, the extent of community roots, continuity of schools/sports/friends, the developmental age of the child, the mixed affect (conflicts) of the siblings, and the prospects of readjusting to a new blended family, new school, [and] new friends," that Jim receive custody of Ryan and Cathy retain custody of Bradley.

Cathy had the boys examined by another psychologist, Dr. Berch R. Offutt.Dr. Offutt made no recommendation regarding custodial placement and did not comment on Dr. Clark's custody evaluation.However, Dr. Offutt observed that Ryan, who was twelve years old at the time, was "under significant stress regarding his present family situation" and was "attempting to hang on to as much of the past as he can in order to provide himself with some stability, e.g., not wanting to move from Fargo and keeping his relationship with his friend[s]."Dr. Offutt recommended that little weight be given to Ryan's stated preferences, cautioning that Ryan's stated preference should be "questioned thoroughly given his cognitive weaknesses and his emotional vulnerability."

A hearing on the parties' motions was conducted in June 1992.At the close of the proceeding, the court orally granted Cathy's motion to move, suggested that she would receive custody of Bradley, but retained the issue of Ryan's custody under advisement.Cathy married Charles on July 11, 1992.On August 10, 1992, the court issued its memorandum opinion, finding that there had been a significant change of circumstances and that it was "in the interests of the minor children" that Jim take custody of Ryan, that Cathy retain custody of Bradley, and that visitation be modified.The court's findings and conclusions of law were incorporated into its third amended judgment.Cathy has appealed from that judgment, challenging the change of Ryan's custody.

A trial court's decision to modify custody is a finding of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.Blotske v. Leidholm, 487 N.W.2d 607(N.D.1992).A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if there is no evidence to support it, or if, although there is some evidence to support it, the reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.Id.;seeN.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a).

A request to modify custody requires the determination of two issues in chronological order: (a) whether there has been a significant change of circumstances since the original divorce decree and custody award; and, if so, (b) whether those changes compel or require, in the best interests of the child, a change of custody.Delzer v. Winn, 491 N.W.2d 741(N.D.1992).

The court's memorandum opinion was issued on August 10, 1992, only shortly after this court's opinion in Blotske v. Leidholm, on July 28, 1992, and several months before we decided Delzer v. Winn on November 5, 1992.Blotske and Delzer capsulize the proposition that in a change of custody proceeding, the child's stability with the custodial parent is a primary consideration, and the statutory factors of NDCC Sec. 14-09-06.2 must be weighed with that primacy in mind.The Blotske-Delzer duo also cautions that a trial court should change custody only if a change in custody is necessary or required for the best interests of the child.While those best interests are to be determined from considering the statutory factors in NDCC Sec. 14-09-06.2, the process of weighing those factors must be "gauged against the backdrop of the stability of the child's relationship with the custodial parent."Blotske, supra at 610;Delzer, supra at 744.The maintenance of custodial stability and continuity "is a very compelling consideration."Delzer, supra at 744.

So the question becomes whether the trial court's assessment in this case comports with the rule of Blotske and Delzer.We believe it does not; therefore, we reverse the order transferring Ryan's custody to Jim.

The trial court, in effect, identified three significantly changed circumstances: Cathy's marriage and move to Shelly, Minnesota; the move's effect on the present visitation scheduling; and Ryan's "reasonable and knowledgeable preference to reside with Jim."

As to the first significant change, Cathy's move and remarriage, we have said that a "move to another state does not, by itself, compel a change of custody.If the trial court approves the move, even after the fact, the move does not dictate a change of custody."Gould v. Miller, 488 N.W.2d 42, 44(N.D.1992).Nor does remarriage dictate a change of custody.Id.We thus look to the other factors the trial court found were significant and required a change of custody.

The trial court found that the move to Shelly, 38 miles away, significantly affected visitation and presumably compelled a change in custody.In Blotske, the custodial parent not only moved and in that way affected visitation, but also deliberately frustrated the noncustodial parent's visitation rights.We concluded that the remedy for that frustration was not a change in custody but, rather, a specified visitation schedule which would, in effect, serve warning upon the recalcitrant custodial parent, while protecting the rights of the...