Bartel v. J.R. Simplot Co.

• Decision Date: 23 February 1984
• Docket Number: No. 14694,14694
• Citation: 677 P.2d 487,106 Idaho 174
• Parties: Barbara A. BARTEL, Claimant-Appellant, v. J.R. SIMPLOT COMPANY, Employer-Respondent, and Argonaut Northwest Insurance Company, Surety, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 487

677 P.2d 487

106 Idaho 174

Barbara A. BARTEL, Claimant-Appellant, v. J.R. SIMPLOT COMPANY, Employer-Respondent and Argonaut Northwest Insurance Company, Surety, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 14694.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Feb. 23, 1984.

Emil F. Pike, Jr., of Pike & Berry, Twin Falls, for claimant-appellant.

John W. Barrett, of Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett & Blanton, Boise, for employer-respondent.

SHEPARD, Justice.

This is an appeal by claimant-appellant Bartel from an order of the Industrial Commission awarding Bartel a disability rating of 15% of the whole person, but denying Bartel's claim that she is totally and permanently disabled. We affirm.

Claimant Bartel had been working at the Simplot potato processing plant in Burley, Idaho for some four years when on April 1, 1975, while hand trimming a potato, she noticed a pain in her shoulder and numbness in her arm. Shortly thereafter, her hand became discolored and she was unable to use the right arm. During the following year, claimant consulted numerous physicians, which resulted in a diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome. Surgery therefor was performed. Despite the surgery, claimant had persistent pain. For the following three years, claimant consulted numerous other doctors regarding various physical ailments, such as a hiatus hernia which was unrelated to the wrist injury, a lipoma of the breast unrelated to the wrist injury, and pain and numbness in her right hand and shoulder.

At issue here is only the pain and numbness in Bartel's right hand and shoulder. A panel of physicians found and all parties agree that the persistent pain and numbness is due to "conversion reaction hysteria," i.e., an actual physical disability is suffered, which disability is treated and repaired but the symptoms continue in the mind of the claimant because she is deriving "secondary gain," i.e., some benefit from being disabled and unable to work. In the instant case, a psychiatrist testified that the secondary gain was probably that claimant did not want to work, but preferred to stay at home with her family and was obtaining economic benefit therefrom. Although such might appear similar to malingering, the testimony here indicates that the residual pain may be, and probably is, real in the mind of the patient. The testimony is also clear that a person suffering a conversion reaction could and would use the extremity in normal circumstances in a normal fashion and be quite comfortable. However, when that same person is aware of observation by others, the person would use the extremity in a less normal fashion.

The medical testimony is clear that those physicians examining claimant did not believe her contention that she could barely move her arm. The arm gave no indication of atrophy which would result if claimant's contention of non-use was correct. One of the physicians indicated that during his examination, he noted her ability to move the arm without any indication of pain.

The panel of physicians questioned the severity of claimant's original carpal tunnel syndrome, and stated:

"The panel felt that no further treatment should be afforded her. It is only reenforcing her complaints. This case should be settled. She previously had been discharged as surgically healed with a permanent partial impairment of 8% of the whole person by Dr. Cutler. The panel agrees with this rating for the carpal tunnel syndrome. Also, in addition, they feel that there should be a 7% of the whole person impairment rating for the conversion hysteria which was precipitated and aggravated by the industrial injury."

The testimony of the psychiatrist indicated his belief that indeed claimant's condition would be improved by a return to work and that she should do so. Essentially all of the testimony was undisputed and to the same effect as that outlined above, excepting only the testimony of the claimant herself.

The commission found that claimant had a permanent physical impairment of 8% of the whole person with respect to her carpal tunnel syndrome which has been surgically repaired. In addition, the commission found that she suffers a conversion reaction, the precise cause of which is somewhat obscure because of claimant's other problems unrelated to the accident, and concluded that "giving the benefit of the doubt to the claimant" she should...