Barth v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts U.S., Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 August 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION No. 16-2140
• Citation: 206 F.Supp.3d 1026
• Parties: Michael BARTH and Maureen Barth, individually and as husband and wife, Plaintiffs, v. WALT DISNEY PARKS AND RESORTS U.S., INC. and the Walt Disney Company, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

206 F.Supp.3d 1026

Michael BARTH and Maureen Barth, individually and as husband and wife, Plaintiffs,

v.WALT DISNEY PARKS AND RESORTS U.S., INC. and the Walt Disney Company, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION No. 16-2140

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed August 29, 2016

James R. Radmore, Law Office of James R. Radmore PC, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Frederick P. Marczyk, Ginene A. Lewis, Drinker Biddle & Reath, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

ROBERT F. KELLY, Senior Judge.

Presently before this Court is the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction filed by Defendants, Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc. ("WDPR") and The Walt Disney Company ("TWDC") (collectively, "Defendants"), the Response in Opposition filed by Plaintiffs, Michael and Maureen Barth (collectively, "Plaintiffs'), and Defendants' Reply Brief. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion is granted.

I. FACTS

Plaintiffs allege that Michael Barth sustained injuries when he was attacked by a venomous snake at Walt Disney World Resort in Florida. (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 10.) WDPR owns and operates Walt Disney World Resort.¹ (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 2) (citing Certification of Scott Justice, officer at WDPR serving as Assistant Secretary, hereinafter "Justice Cert.," ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs assert claims against Defendants for negligence and loss of consortium. (See Compl.)

Plaintiffs initiated this action by writ of summons in the Court of Common Pleas for the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia County). (Not. of Removal.) Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on October 13, 2015. (Id. ) Defendants removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and § 1446 based on diversity jurisdiction. (Id. ) Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint based on lack of personal jurisdiction.²

II. DISCUSSION

"Federal courts sitting in diversity may exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent provided by the law of the state in which the federal court sits." Penco Prods., Inc. v. WEC Mfg., LLC , 974 F.Supp.2d 740, 746 (E.D.Pa.2013) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) ). "Pennsylvania's Long–Arm Statute allows personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the constitutional limits of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5322(b) ; Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat'l Ass'n v. Farino , 960 F.2d 1217, 1221 (3d Cir.1992) ). "Under this standard, nonresident defendants are required to have minimum contacts with Pennsylvania so as not to offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. (citing Marten v. Godwin , 499 F.3d 290, 296 (3d Cir.2007) ; Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) ). "There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general and specific."³ Id. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall , 466 U.S. 408, 414–15 & n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984) ).

General jurisdiction "permits a court to assert jurisdiction over a defendant based on a forum connection unrelated to the underlying suit (e.g., domicile)" Walden v. Fiore , ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 1121 n. 6, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014) (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown , 564 U.S. 915, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011) ). "A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State." Goodyear , 564 U.S. at 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846 (citing Int'l Shoe , 326 U.S. at 317, 66 S.Ct. 154 ); see also Daimler AG v. Bauman , 571 U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 746, 761, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014) ("Accordingly, the inquiry under Goodyear is not whether a foreign corporation's in-forum contacts can be said to be in some sense ‘continuous and systematic,’ it is whether that corporation's ‘affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.’ "). Regarding a corporate defendant, the paradigm bases for general jurisdiction are the place of incorporation and the principal place of business. Daimler , 134 S.Ct. at 760–62 n. 20 ("General jurisdiction...calls for an appraisal of a corporation's activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them."). In addition to the two paradigm bases, general jurisdiction may arise in the "exceptional case" where "a corporation's operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State."⁴ Id. at 761 n. 19 ; see alsoBrown v. Lockheed Martin Corp. , 814 F.3d 619, 627 (2d Cir.2016) ("[I]n our view Daimler established that, except in a truly ‘exceptional’ case, a corporate defendant may be treated as ‘essentially at home’ only where it is incorporated or maintains its principal place of business—the ‘paradigm’ cases."); Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc. , 789 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th Cir.2015) ("A foreign corporation cannot be subject to general jurisdiction in a forum unless the corporation's activities in the forum closely approximate the activities that ordinarily characterize a corporation's place of incorporation or principal place of business."); Kipp v. Ski Enter. Corp. of Wis. , 783 F.3d 695, 698 (7th Cir.2015) (noting the "stringent criteria" of Goodyear and Daimler ); Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter , 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir.2014) (analyzing Goodyear and Daimler finding that "[i]t is...incredibly difficult to establish general jurisdiction in a forum other than the place of incorporation or principal place of business"); Martinez v. Aero Caribbean , 764 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir.2014) ("Daimler makes clear the demanding nature of the standard for general personal jurisdiction over a corporation.").

In this case, Plaintiffs have failed to establish general jurisdiction over Defendants. Here, the paradigm bases do not apply because Defendants are neither incorporated nor have their principal places of business in Pennsylvania. WDPR is a Florida corporation that has its principal place of business in Florida. (Justice Cert. ¶ 2.) WDPR's business activities consist of the ownership, operation, and management of themed entertainment parks, resorts, and related facilities located in Florida and California, including Walt Disney World Resort in Florida. (Id. ¶ 3.) TWDC is a Delaware corporation that has its principal place of business in California. (Certification of Marsha L. Reed, TWDC's Vice-President of Governance Administration and Assistant Secretary, hereinafter "Reed Cert.," ¶ 2.) TWDC is a holding company that owns stock in a variety of corporations operating in the fields of entertainment, recreation, and consumer products, among others. (Id. ¶ 3.)

Since Plaintiffs cannot show general jurisdiction under the two paradigmatic bases, Plaintiffs must show that this is an exceptional case where Defendants' "affiliation with the state are so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home" in Pennsylvania. See Goodyear , 564 U.S. at 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846 ; Daimler , 134 S.Ct. at 761. Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts suggesting that Defendants are essentially "at home" in Pennsylvania. Through affidavits, Defendants have shown the following: they are not qualified or licensed to do business in Pennsylvania; have never conducted business in Pennsylvania; have neither incurred nor paid taxes in Pennsylvania; have not appointed agents for the service of process in Pennsylvania; have no offices or places of business in Pennsylvania; own no real estate, bank accounts, or other assets in Pennsylvania; and should not be listed in any Pennsylvania telephone directories. (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 3) (citing Justice Cert. ¶ 4; Reed Cert. ¶ 4.)

Plaintiffs fail to premise their argument on the "at home" inquiry. (Pls.' Response Opp'n Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 3-6.) Instead, they concentrate on Defendants' alleged "substantial business activities" in Pennsylvania. (Id. ) Plaintiffs argue that "the record reveals defendants have more than the minimal contacts with Pennsylvania" and they are "substantial."⁵ (Id. at 3); see Daimler , 134 S.Ct. at 761 (criticizing plaintiffs' request that the Court "approve the exercise of general jurisdiction in every State in which a corporation engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business" as "unacceptably grasping"). In support of their argument, Plaintiffs rely upon the following: they assert that Disney Stores have several locations in Pennsylvania, which sell a variety of Disney World merchandise; WPVI-TV, Channel 6, a major Philadelphia television station is owned by ABC Owned Television Stations subsidiary of TWDC; and the Walt Disney World College Program⁶ has an office in Philadelphia.⁷ (Id. at 3–5.)

Defendants respond by arguing that Plaintiffs' reliance on the alleged activities in Pennsylvania by affiliates of Defendants, namely the Disney Store, USA, LLC, ABC, Inc. d/b/a/ WPVI-TV, and Disney Destinations, LLC (an entity listed in Plaintiffs' Exhibit B) (collectively, "Affiliated Companies"), is misplaced because those "Affiliated Companies" are entities that are separate and distinct from Defendants. (Defs.' Reply Br. at 4) (citing Second Justice Cert. ¶ 2; Second Reed Cert. ¶ 2.) Defendants also state that "Plaintiffs do not and cannot cite any evidence to the contrary." (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiffs have neither shown how the activities and contacts of the Affiliated Companies may be properly imputed to Defendants in this action nor how those alleged contacts with Pennsylvania render Defendants subject to general jurisdiction here. Plaintiffs do not assert that any of the Affiliated...