Bartlett v. Duncan, CV 02-4897-TJH.
| Decision Date | 15 April 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 02-4897-TJH.,CV 02-4897-TJH. |
| Citation | 262 F.Supp.2d 1053 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | William Louis BARTLETT, Petitioner, v. W.A. DUNCAN, Warden,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> Respondent. |
Karen Bissonnette, Deputy Attorney General, Los Angeles.
ORDER ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the court has reviewed the entire file de novo, including the magistrate judge's report and recommendation.
IT IS ORDERED:
1. The report and recommendation is accepted.
2. Judgment shall be entered consistent with this order.
3. The clerk shall serve this order and the judgment on all counsel or parties of record.
This report and recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Terry J. Hatter, United States District Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 194 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California. For the reasons discussed below, it is recommended that the petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice.
On June 20, 2002, petitioner, a prisoner in state custody and represented by counsel, filed the underlying petition for writ of habeas corpus in this matter. On July 8, 2002, petitioner filed a first amended petition. On August 22, 2002, petitioner filed a second amended petition ("petition"). On January 17, 2003, respondent filed a return ("return"). On March 11, 2003, petitioner filed a traverse ("traverse").
On August 12, 1983, petitioner was convicted of forcible rape. (CT 6).2 This conviction required petitioner to register with local authorities for the rest of his life as a sex offender. See Cal.Penal Code § 290. On September 28, 1999, a jury convicted petitioner of failure to register as a sex offender in violation of California law. (CT 158). Petitioner was sentenced to a term of twenty-five years to life under California's "Three Strikes" law. (CT 182).
Petitioner filed an appeal of his conviction in the California Court of Appeal. (Lodged Doc. 3).3 On December 19, 2000, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. (Ret., Ex. A).
Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. (Ret., Ex. B). On March 14, 2001, the California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment or citation to authority. (Ret., Ex. C).
This federal petition followed.
In this petition, petitioner raises the following grounds:
1. Due process requires that a defendant know of the duty to register before that defendant may be convicted of failing to do so, but the prosecution did not prove knowledge, and the jury was instructed that knowledge was not necessary;
2. 25 years to life is grossly disproportionate to the offense and offends the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment; and,
3. One of petitioner's jury instructions violated his right to a fair trial. (Pet, Attached Pages 1-5). Respondent contends that ground three is procedurally barred and that the petpon fails on the merits.
The facts set forth in California Court of Appeal's opinion are reasonably supported by the record, and that opinion is attached as an exhibit to this report and recommendation. (Ret., Ex.A)*. Essentially, California law mandates that petitioner register with the local authorities as a sex offender because of his 1983 conviction for rape. Before his release from prison in May of 1998, petitioner was reuuired to sign a form notice that ackknowledged his duty to register with local authorities as a sexual offender ("duty to register notice"). After his release," petitioner did not register with local authorities or report to his parole officer.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to a state court judgment "shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim either: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or, (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)( theCAntiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEPA")); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) ().
A state court decision is "contrary to" the Supreme Court's clearly established precedents if it "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth" in the Supreme Court's cases or if it "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Supreme Court's] precedent." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495. State court decisions that are not contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent warrant federal habeas corpus relief "only if they are not merely erroneous, but `an unreasonable application' of clearly established federal law, or based on `an unreasonable determination of the facts.'" Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.Ct. 362, 366, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002); see also Woodford v. Visciotti 537 U.S. 19, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (per curiam) (). A state court decision is an "unreasonable application of the Supreme Court's precedent if the court "correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts" of the case. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 407-08, 120 S.Ct. 1495).
The United States Supreme Court has held that "[w]here there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding the judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground." Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991). In this case, the last reasoned state judgment is the California Court of Appeal's opinion. On habeas review, when there is no reasoned state court decision to review, the court conducts "an independent review of the record ... to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application of controlling federal law." Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir.2000).
Petitioner contends that his conviction for failure to register violates his due process rights. Petitioner argues that California Penal Code section 290(a)(1)(A) ("section 290") requires that the prosecution prove that the accused have actual knowledge of the registration requirement, but that in his case, the prosecution was only required to prove that petitioner had been given notice of the duty to register and the jury was instructed that actual knowledge was not necessary.
To the extent petitioner claims a jury instruction was incorrect under state law, his claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 n. 2, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). To merit relief, petitioner must show the instructional error so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violated due process. Id.; see also Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146-47, 119 S.Ct. 500, 142 L.Ed.2d 521 (1998) (). The allegedly erroneous instruction must be considered in the context of the trial record and the instructions as a whole. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72, 112 S.Ct. 475.
On December 19, 2000, the court of appeal rejected petitioner's contention. (Ret., Ex. A at 27). Acknowledging that the issue was currently before the California Supreme Court, the court of appeal concluded that petitioner's argument was without merit because "actual knowledge is not an element of the offense of failing to register as a sexual offender" and:
[T]here is substantial evidence that [petitioner] willfully failed to register. On five separate occasions over a 10-year period, [petitioner] personally acknowledged receiving actual notice that his "responsibility to register as a sexual offender is a lifetime requirement." Although [petitioner] registered in 1987 and again in 1990, he failed to re-register after his May 1998 release and did not thereafter report to his parole officer. After his 1998 release, [petitioner] further demonstrated both notice and knowledge of his continuing duty to register by living under an assumed name and using a false birth date. The jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that [petitioner] willfully failed to comply with the registration requirement despite his actual notice of it.
However, five months later on May 31, 2001, the California Supreme Court held that in order to satisfy the due process requirements set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S.Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957), section 290 requires proof that ...
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