Bartlett v. State
| Decision Date | 20 May 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 49S00-9705-CR-349.,49S00-9705-CR-349. |
| Citation | 711 N.E.2d 497 |
| Parties | Lee BARTLETT, Appellant (Defendant), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
S. Sargent Visher, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.
Jeffrey Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, John B. Herriman, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Lee Bartlett was convicted of attempted murder, attempted rape, robbery, and two counts of kidnapping. His sentence was enhanced after he was found to be a habitual offender. In this direct appeal, Bartlett argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of attempted murder. He further argues that one kidnapping conviction cannot be sustained because the state failed to show that the victim was used as a hostage or shield as required by the kidnapping statute. Finally, Bartlett challenges the habitual offender enhancement. We reject all claims and affirm the original convictions and sentence.
The facts viewed most favorable to the State are as follows. Defendant, Lee Bartlett, first approached Peter Michael outside of Michael's house in 1994 and asked for a job. Michael employed Bartlett to paint the exterior of his house. In the early evening on June 10, 1994, Bartlett knocked on Michael's door and insisted upon using the bathroom. Bartlett came out of the bathroom pointing a gun at Michael, told him to put his hands in the air, and fiddled with the gun until Michael heard a click. Bartlett demanded that Michael get his billfold, became angry when Michael produced only twenty dollars, and insisted that Michael write a check for $300.00 to cash at the bank. Before they could leave, Michael's fiancee, Donna Barr, drove up to the house, used her own key to enter the house, and went upstairs calling Michael's name. Bartlett, who had moved Michael out of Barr's view, instructed Michael to call to Barr to come downstairs, where she saw Bartlett holding something to Michael's side under a towel. Bartlett showed Barr his gun and told Barr not to do anything stupid.
Bartlett ordered Barr and Michael into the truck. Barr got into the truck. Bartlett then ordered Michael to drive, removed the gun from Michael's side, and got in the truck next to Barr in the passenger seat. Bartlett placed the gun against Barr, and threatened to kill them both if they did anything stupid. Michael drove to the bank where he procured the cash. At Bartlett's insistence, Michael next drove to a liquor store to purchase beer and cigarettes. Michael entered the liquor store first, followed a few minutes later by Barr and Bartlett. Bartlett stood next to Barr throughout the time at the liquor store, the gun at her side covered by a towel. Bartlett continuously threatened to kill both Barr and Michael if they said or did anything stupid.
After returning to the house, Barr fixed dinner. Bartlett kept the gun trained on Michael or Barr throughout this episode, at one point even brandishing a butcher knife at Barr. After dinner, Bartlett told Michael and Barr that he was going to have to kill them and dump their bodies in the country. He restrained both Michael and Barr with duct tape, and used a hanger to attach Michael's wrists to his feet. He eventually released Barr and Michael by cutting the duct tape with the butcher knife, tearing Barr's clothes and inflicting a skin wound on Barr in the process. He then demanded to be taken to the bank again where he attempted to use Michael's credit or debit cards to procure more money.
Bartlett ordered Barr to drive her car to the liquor store. He held the gun to Barr's side, got into the front passenger seat next to Barr, and demanded that Michael get into the back seat. Michael was able to obtain sixty dollars from the bank machine. Bartlett insisted that Barr drive to the liquor store, where Michael purchased more liquor.
After purchasing more liquor, Michael, Bartlett, and Barr returned to the house, at which point Bartlett ordered Michael to tie Barr up. He then tied Michael up and told him that things had gone too far, and he had no choice but to kill them. He raised his arm, pointed the gun, and shot a bullet that struck the wall approximately one to two feet from Michael's head. Bartlett attempted to fire again, becoming frustrated when the gun would not discharge. He again threatened to kill Barr and Michael by pouring kerosene on them and burning the house down. He then poured a liquid over the bodies of Barr and Michael; a liquid they could not see.
At this point in the evening, Bartlett began making sexually explicit comments about Barr. He cut her sweater and bra off of her body, untied her and brought her into the bedroom, where he attempted to penetrate her vagina with his penis. Barr attempted to delay Bartlett by telling him that she was not ready. She took his penis in her hand and jerked it. She hit Bartlett over the head with a bottle and fled, running through the hall and breaking windows along the way. She spotted a police car outside of the house and broke a window to yell for help. The police broke down the door and Barr was able to flee.
In the meantime, Michael had managed to scoot over to a knife and use it to free himself. He opened a third story window and saw the police cars. Michael jumped from this window, to a ledge, then down to the ground.
Bartlett argues that two of his convictions and the habitual offender enhancement cannot be sustained because they are not supported by sufficient evidence of probative value. When this Court reviews a conviction for sufficiency of the evidence, we look to the evidence most favorable to the State and all of the reasonable inferences to be drawn from such evidence. Blanche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ind.1998) (citing Deckard v. State, 670 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind.1996)). We will affirm the original sentence unless there is no way a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty. We do not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses, but merely look to the evidence and determine whether there was substantive probative evidence to support the judgment. Id. (citing Minter v. State, 653 N.E.2d 1382, 1383 (Ind.1995)).
Bartlett challenges the conviction for attempted murder, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of this crime. To sustain an attempted murder conviction, the State must prove that the defendant took a substantial step towards the intentional or knowing killing of another. Ind.Code §§ 35-41-5-1(a), 35-42-1-1(1) (1998); Blanche, 690 N.E.2d at 709. We find the evidence sufficient to convict Bartlett of attempted murder.
At trial, both Michael and Barr testified that Bartlett repeatedly threatened to kill Michael over a span of several hours. Bartlett told them that he would kill them if they did not behave, he told them that he would have to kill them because things had gone too far, and that he would cover them with kerosene and burn them to death. Further, after these repeated threats, Bartlett pointed and shot a gun at Michael. This shooting occurred at a very close range, the bullet hitting the floor approximately one to two feet from Michael's head. A reasonable trier of fact could have found that Bartlett intended to kill based on this evidence. It is firmly established in prior cases that using a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death is evidence sufficient to show that the defendant intended to kill. Blanche, 690 N.E.2d at 712, Taylor v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1105, 1111 (Ind.1997); Nunn v. State, 601 N.E.2d 334, 339 (Ind.1992). Pointing and shooting a gun constitutes a substantial step in furtherance of this crime. Blanche, 690 N.E.2d at 711. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to convict Bartlett of attempted murder.
Bartlett also challenges the conviction for the kidnapping of Michael, arguing that while evidence established intent to use the victim as a shield or hostage as to Barr, it was not established as to Michael. Bartlett was convicted of kidnapping under Indiana Code section 35-42-3-2(b)(4) (1998), which states that a person is guilty of kidnapping if that person "knowingly or intentionally removes another person, by fraud, enticement, force, or threat of force, from one place to another: ... (4) with intent to use the person removed as a shield or hostage." Therefore, the conviction will stand as long as the evidence shows that Bartlett knowingly or intentionally removed Michael from one place to another place by the use of force or threat of force, and also that Bartlett had the intent to use Michael as a shield or hostage.1 We hold that evidence supports the verdict and affirm the kidnapping conviction.
It is indisputable that Bartlett transported Michael from Michael's residence to a bank and a liquor store on two separate occasions. It is also undisputed that Bartlett used the threat of force against both Michael and Barr to procure Michael's compliance. The question remaining is whether Bartlett intended to use Michael as a shield or hostage. We conclude that when Bartlett held the gun to Michael's side, and ordered Barr into the truck, Michael became a hostage, and that Michael remained a hostage until he escaped.
In order to reach this conclusion, it is necessary to define the temporal span of this crime. Crimes such as kidnapping and the lesser included offense of confinement are defined under the continuing crime doctrine. See Curry v. State, 643 N.E.2d 963, 980 (Ind.Ct.App.1994); Idle v. State, 587 N.E.2d 712, 717 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). Under this doctrine, the span of the kidnapping or confinement is determined by the length of time of the unlawful detention necessary to perpetrate the crime. It begins when the unlawful detention is initiated and ends only when the victim both feels, and is in fact, free from detention. See Curry, 643 N.E.2d at 981; Idle, 587 N.E.2d at 717. I...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Hines v. State
-
Collier v. State
... ... denied. In others, the defendant shot or stabbed at the victim but missed entirely. See, e.g., Bethel v. State, 730 N.E.2d 1242 (Ind.2000) (defendant shot at intended victim but missed); Evans v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1072 (Ind.2000) (defendant swung knife at victim but missed); Bartlett v. State, 711 N.E.2d 497 (Ind.1999) (defendant shot at intended victim but missed) ... Nor have the cases involving other attempt crimes presented questions as close as the instant case. See, e.g., Himes v. State, 273 Ind. 416, 403 N.E.2d 1377 (1980) (affirming attempted rape ... ...
-
State v. Casey
... ... 594, 769 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Ct.App.1989) ; People v. Gonzales, 926 P.2d 153, 155 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) ; State v. Feliciano, 62 Haw. 637, 618 P.2d 306, 308 (1980), superseded by statute as stated in State v. Rumbawa, 94 Hawai'i 513, 17 P.3d 862, 866 (Ct.App.2001) ; Bartlett v. State, 711 N.E.2d 497, 499 (Ind.1999) ; and Gentry v. State, 881 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex.Ct.App.1994) ... We do not find any of these cases cited by the State persuasive. Most of them only indirectly address the culpability required for attempt crimes. See Gentry, 881 S.W.2d at 40 (concerning ... ...
-
State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55 (Utah 12/5/2003)
... ... App. 1984); State v. Nunez , 769 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); People v. Gonzalez , 926 P.2d 153, 155 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Feliciano , 618 P.2d 306, 308 (Haw. 1980), superseded by statute as stated in State v. Rumbawa , 17 P.3d 862, 866 (Haw. Ct. App. 2001); Bartlett v. State , 711 N.E.2d 497, 499 (Ind. 1999); and Gentry v. State , 881 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994). We do not find any of these cases cited by the State persuasive. Most of them only indirectly address the culpability required for attempt crimes. See Gentry , 881 S.W.2d at 40 (concerning ... ...