Bartletta v. McFeeley

• Decision Date: 30 October 1930
• Citation: 152 A. 17
• Parties: BARTLETTA v. McFEELEY, Commissioner of Public Safety, et al.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

152 A. 17

BARTLETTA

v. McFEELEY, Commissioner of Public Safety, et al.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Oct. 30, 1930.

Syllabus by the Court.

A person under arrest charged with crime may lawfully be fingerprinted, measured, and photographed by the police without his consent.

Syllabus by the Court.

Whether any certain prisoner should be fingerprinted, measured, and photographed is an administrative question to be determined by the police.

Suit by Frank J. Bartletta against Bernard N. McFeeley, as Commissioner of Public Safety of the City of Hoboken, and others.

Bill of complaint dismissed.

Anthony P. La Porta, of Hoboken, for complainant.

Horace L. Allen, of Hoboken, for defendants.

BIGELOW, Vice Chancellor.

This bill was filed against the commissioner of public safety, the chief of police, and the board of commissioners of the city of Hoboken, to compel them to surrender to the complainant the photographs, Bertillon measurements, and fingerprints of the complainant which had been made by the police of Hoboken.

Complainant has been a resident of Hoboken for many years, prominent in business and political affairs of that municipality. Among other activities, he was the president and principal stockholder of the Terminal Printing & Publishing Company. On February 10, 1928, police officers of Hoboken, armed with a search warrant, went to the plant of the printing company and there found and seized several thousand lottery tickets and other printed matter relating to lotteries, as well as the plates with which the printing was done. Immediately after the seizure, Lieutenant Scott of the police department swore to a complaint charging Mr. Bartletta and three others with possessing papers, documents, etc., pertaining to a lottery in violation of section 58 of the Crimes Act of 1898 (2 Comp. St. 1910, p. 1764, § 58). A warrant was issued upon this complaint by the recordier of the city. That same evening, Mr. Bartletta, hearing of the raid and of the issuance of the warrant, went to police headquarters, accompanied by his lawyer. There he was arrested, and was immediately taken to the room in which prisoners were customarily fingerprinted. He thrust his hands into his pockets and declared that the prints of his fingers should not be taken. After some discussion, he submitted, under protest and upon the advice of his counsel, and the officer in charge made the fingerprints. He was next photographed over his protest. Mr. Bartletta was then taken before the recorder and released in bail to await the action of the grand jury. Four days after his arrest, he filed his bill of complaint in this suit.

One other factor in the case should be mentioned, although it is not alleged in the bill. The complainant and the defendant Bernard M. McFeeley had been political allies in Hoboken, but they had quarreled and had been opposing each other with great bitterness for some months before the arrest of Mr. Bartletta. Mr. McFeeley at the time of the arrest was commissioner or public safety, and had charge of the police department. He was present at police headquarters, part of the time at least, while Mr. Bartletta was being fingerprinted and photographed, and seemed well satisfied with the plight of his enemy. It does not appear, however, that he caused the complaint to be made against Mr. Bartletta or caused him to be photographed and fingerprinted. The officers who took the photographs and made the prints testified that they acted pursuant to the instructions of an inspector of the department from whom they usually received orders in such matters.

Counsel for the complainant contends that it is unlawful for the police in any case to photograph or fingerprint an accused person before trial and conviction except with the consent of the prisoner. I am convinced that this is not the law. The police are charged with the duty of preventing crime, apprehending criminals, and gathering evidence upon which they may be brought to trial. In the performance of this duty, they may use any apt and reasonable means which do not invade the rights of the accused or of other persons. Fanciful rights of accused persons cannot be allowed to prevent the functioning of the police and so to jeopardize the safety of the public. Let me assume a not infrequent case: Fingerprints are found at the scene of a burglary; a suspect is captured and placed on trial. If the police are prohibited from taking his fingerprints, they will be unable to present to the jury evidence as to whether or not he is the person who made the prints in the house where the burglary was committed. Again, let me suppose the trial of a defendant charged with receiving stolen goods; prior convictions of similar offenses are admissible in evidence. Unless the police are allowed to fingerprint the accused before trial, they may be unable to show that he is the same person who was convicted on former occasions and whose fingerprints are already in the possession of the public authorities. Again, a prisoner escapes from jail before trial, or, having been released on recognizance, fails to appear when called. His recapture will be much facilitated if the police have taken the precaution to fingerprint and photograph him. Such police measures are a strong protection for the innocent defendant; they may prove that he was not the person present at the time of the burglary, and that he is not the person who has been previously convicted under the same name.

The right of the police to fingerprint and photograph is powerfully supported by the argument from convenience and from the public interest in permitting the courts to learn the truth of the questions at issue. This right is also upheld by custom. The police in the large cities of this state and throughout the country for half a century have measured, photographed, or fingerprinted prisoners before trial; and their authority to do so...