Barto v. Miyashiro
| Decision Date | 06 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 19-cv-2261-WQH-KSC |
| Parties | JILANNE D. BARTO, an individual, Plaintiff, v. DAVID MIYASHIRO, in his official capacity as Superintendent Cajon Valley Union School District; JAMES MILLER, JO ALEGRIA, TAMARA OTERO, and KAREN CLARK-MEJIA, each in their official capacity as Trustee of Cajon Valley Union School District Board of Trustees; and DOES 1 to 50, inclusive, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
The matter before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction filed by Defendants David Miyashiro, James Miller, Jo Alegria, Tamara Otero, and Karen Clark-Mejia. (ECF No. 4).
On November 26, 2019, Plaintiff Jilanne D. Barto filed a Complaint against Defendants David Miyashiro in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Cajon Valley Union School District; James Miller, Jo Alegria, Tamara Otero, and Karen Clark-Mejia in their official capacities as Trustees of the Cajon Valley Union School District Board of Trustees; and Does 1-50. (ECF No. 1). In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she has been a Trustee of the Cajon Valley Union School District Board of Trustees for twenty-five years. Plaintiff alleges that she took an oath to uphold the Cajon Valley Union School District Board Bylaws, which require Trustees to "provide leadership and citizen oversight of the district," to "participate in decisions pertaining to education in the district," and to not "use [the position] for private advantage or personal gain." (Id. ¶¶ 21-23). Plaintiff alleges that since her reelection to the Board in November 2018, Plaintiff "spoke unfavorably about Defendants' actions" and "question[ed] [ ] the way in which Defendants spend District funds." (Id. ¶¶ 27, 29). Plaintiff alleges that she questioned "how much money District Superintendent Miyashiro has spent on his travel and conference costs" and the "size and nature of expenditures from his discretionary funds." (Id. ¶ 30). Plaintiff alleges that in December 2018, Plaintiff "questioned Defendant Trustee Jo Alegria's request for payment for a missed Cajon Valley Board meeting . . . ." (Id. ¶ 31). Plaintiff alleges that in May 2019, Plaintiff "raised questions about contracts with the District, particularly in connection with a $600,000 contract that . . . was awarded to Dryw Otero, son of Board President Defendant Tamara Otero." (Id. ¶ 32).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants attempted to silence Plaintiff and retaliated against Plaintiff for her "efforts to bring to the public's attention the financial irregularities of the Defendants." (Id. ¶ 33). Plaintiff alleges that in August 2018, Defendant Miyashiro prohibited Plaintiff from contacting District employees, and Defendants refused to share information exchanged during a closed session Board meeting that Plaintiff was unable to attend. Plaintiff alleges that in December 2018, Defendants took Plaintiff off the rotation to set the Board meeting agenda, even though it was Plaintiff's turn. Plaintiff alleges that in March 2019, Defendants refused to allow Plaintiff to use her expense card to pay for her ticket to the Mayor's lunch and refused to update Plaintiff's phone number and photograph on the District website. Plaintiff alleges that in April 2019, Defendants denied Plaintiff a position on a Board committee. Plaintiff alleges that beginning in June 2019, Defendantsdenied Plaintiff access to public comment cards and video of recorded Board meetings. Plaintiff alleges that in September 2019, Defendants refused to allow Plaintiff to collect reward coins that she earned. Plaintiff alleges that in October 2019, Defendants cancelled Plaintiff's expense card. Plaintiff alleges that in November 2019, Defendant Miyashiro denied Plaintiff's request to attend a conference. Plaintiff alleges that "Defendants have prohibited Plaintiff from attending Board meetings and restricted her from being on District property." (Id. ¶ 46). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants "tried to coerce [Plaintiff] to sign a resignation letter when she complained of their retaliation." (Id. ¶ 47).
Plaintiff brings claims against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Plaintiff's First Amendment rights and retaliation. Plaintiff further brings claims against Defendants for injunctive and declaratory relief. Plaintiff seeks "a permanent injunction" against Defendants and expenses, attorneys' fees, and costs. (Id. at 12).
On December 20, 2019, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. (ECF No. 4). Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "on the grounds that Defendants are immune from suit in federal court pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution." (ECF No. 4 at 2). On January 13, 2020, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 10). On January 17, 2020, Defendants filed a Reply. (ECF No. 11). On February 18, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Sur-Reply with leave of Court. (ECF No. 14).
On February 27, 2020, the Court heard oral argument on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to move for dismissal on grounds that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). "A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual." Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000)). Id. at 1039.
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits dismissal for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In order to state a claim for relief, a pleading "must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) "is proper only where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory." Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)).
An Eleventh Amendment immunity defense is "quasi-jurisdictional" in nature and "may be raised in either a Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) motion." Sato v. Orange Cty. Dep't of Educ., 861 F.3d 923, 927 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2017); compare Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch. Dist. No. 205, Maricopa Cty., 343 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) (), with Elwood v. Drescher, 456 F.3d 943, 949 (9th Cir. 2006) ("'[D]ismissal based on Eleventh Amendment immunity is not a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,' but instead rests on an affirmative defense." (quoting Miles v. California, 320 F.3d 986, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2003)). Where a defendant raises an Eleventh Amendment challenge based on the face of the complaint, it makes no difference whether the court examines immunity under Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6) because the standards are materially the same. The court assumes that all factual allegations in the complaint are true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, 499 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing Rule 12(b)(6) standard); Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing Rule12(b)(1) standard); Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that "[w]here jurisdiction is intertwined with the merits, we must 'assume[ ] the truth of the allegations . . .'" (quoting Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987)).
Defendants contend that they are immune from Plaintiff's suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution because they are school officials sued in their official capacities. Defendants contend that the exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity do not apply. Defendants further contend that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff contends that Defendants are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because the Ex parte Young exception applies. Plaintiff further contends that she sufficiently alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." The Eleventh Amendment presupposes that "each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system" and that "'[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without [the sovereign's] consent.'" Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) () (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890)). The Eleventh Amendment "enacts a sovereign immunity from suit," and it shields a state except "where there has been 'a surrender of this immunity . . . .'" Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997) (quoting Principality of Monaco v. Mississ...
To continue reading
Request your trial