Barton v. Barton
| Decision Date | 21 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. DA 14–0507.,DA 14–0507. |
| Citation | 357 P.3d 335 (Table) |
| Parties | In re the Marriage of Mindy BARTON, Petitioner and Appellee, v. John BARTON, Respondent and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: John Barton (self-represented); Fort Worth, Texas.
For Appellee: Tiffany B. Lonnevik, Lonnevik Law Firm; Kalispell, Montana.
¶ 1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶ 2 John Barton appeals from the Eleventh Judicial District Court's decree of dissolution. We affirm.
¶ 3 We restate the issues on appeal as:
¶ 4 John and Mindy were married in 2000 in Texas. John was 30, and Mindy was 21. Over the course of the marriage they had four children who, at the time of trial, were ages 3, 7, 9, and 13. John and Mindy coparented the children.
¶ 5 John's total earnings from the ten years prior to the marriage were $4,567. Over the thirteen years of the marriage, John engaged in various short-term business and professional ventures, earning $85,525. While married, John obtained an associate's degree in business financing, a bachelor's degree in business science, and a master's degree in business administration, as well as certification in Rolfing (an alternative health treatment technique).
¶ 6 Mindy comes from a wealthy Texas oil family and was the beneficiary of three trust accounts at the time the couple married. At the time of trial, Mindy was the beneficiary of five trusts collectively valued between $5.2 and $6 million. On average, the trusts distributed $345,000 per year in the six years preceding the divorce. Of that amount, $167,217 per year was used for living expenses. Some portion of the distributions was used to pay for John's education, a failed small business venture, and John's brief venture into day-trading.
¶ 7 Mindy petitioned for dissolution in June 2013. Prior to filing the petition, Mindy paid down John's credit card debt to $1,200. By the time of trial, approximately ten months later, John's credit card debt was approximately $45,000. After the petition was filed, John requested and received temporary support and opened a Rolfing business with financial assistance from Mindy. Between the petition being filed and the trial, John deposited approximately $25,000 in his bank accounts—though the source of these funds is unclear.
¶ 8 At trial, John testified that he believed he should receive $7,000 a month in maintenance for as many years as the couple was married. John's expert testified that John required approximately $4,000 a month in maintenance to meet his expenses, and that six years would be an appropriate length of time for maintenance. The District Court awarded John $4,000 a month for four years to be followed by $2,000 a month for another four years.
¶ 9 At trial, when asked if his position was that he was entitled to any portion of the trusts, John testified: “Oh, I don't think I'm entitled to anything, I think that's the Court's discretion in this hearing to decide.” No evidence was presented that John made any contributions to the value of the trusts. The District Court determined that John would not receive any portion of the trusts, but would be paid maintenance from trust distributions.
¶ 10 The child support calculation worksheet showed that John should pay Mindy $1,666 a month in child support. Mindy waived that amount, though, so the District Court did not require John to pay monthly child support. The dissolution decree requires Mindy to pay for health insurance and John to pay 32% of any out-of-pocket medical, dental, optical, pharmacological, or counseling costs incurred on behalf of the children.
¶ 11 The decree of dissolution awarded John $288,000 in maintenance to be paid over eight years, his Rolfing business, one of the couple's two vehicles, half of the couple's $20,500 joint tax refund, $22,600 in attorney fees, and a cash equalization payment of $61,533, representing half the value of the equity in the marital home and personal property. The decree waived John's $l,666–per–month child support obligation. John was assigned the debt on the vehicle he purchased after the dissolution petition was filed and the debt on his credit cards. John appeals the decree of dissolution.
¶ 12 Section 40–4–202, MCA, governs the distribution of a marital estate and vests a district court with broad discretion to apportion the marital estate in a manner equitable to each party under the circumstances. In re Marriage of Bartsch, 2007 MT 136, ¶ 9, 337 Mont. 386, 162 P.3d 72. We initially review a district court's division of marital property and maintenance awards to determine whether the findings of fact upon which the division is based are clearly erroneous. In re Marriage of Swanson, 2004 MT 124, ¶ 12, 321 Mont. 250, 90 P.3d 418. Absent clearly erroneous findings, we will affirm a district court's division of property and award of maintenance unless we identify an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Rudolf 2007 MT 178, ¶ 15, 338 Mont. 226, 164 P.3d 907. In a dissolution proceeding, the test for an abuse of discretion is whether the district court acted arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason resulting in a substantial injustice. In re Rudolph, ¶ 15.
¶ 13 1. Was the District Court's division of the marital assets an abuse of discretion?
¶ 14 John argues that the District Court improperly valued the marital residence and various personal property. However, John either presented no evidence of the proper value of the disputed properties, or he presented vague evidence that the District Court rejected. In some instances, the District Court adopted John's vague testimony about the value of personal property and awarded him a cash equalization payment of half the value John testified the property was worth. John has not demonstrated that any of the District Court's findings of fact on the value of property were clearly erroneous.
¶ 15 John also speculates on appeal that the trusts are worth more or there are more trusts than Mindy disclosed. He presented no evidence to that effect at trial, however, and he neither objected to Mindy's evidence of the value of the trusts nor did he impeach it. Since John has not demonstrated that any of the District Court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous, we address whether the property division was an abuse of discretion. In re Rudolph, ¶ 15.
¶ 16 John argues that the District Court should have awarded him a portion of the trusts' value. We note, however, that Mindy acquired three of the trusts before the marriage, the remaining two were created with funds from those three trusts when they expired, and all the money in the trusts was inherited before the marriage. The trusts thus fall under the portion of § 40–4–202, MCA, which provides:
Although the court must consider the statutory factors when dividing property acquired before the marriage, the factors do not prevent the court from exercising its discretion in dividing such property. In re Funk, 2012 MT 14, ¶ 19, 363 Mont. 352, 270 P.3d 39.
¶ 17 In considering the statutory factors, the District Court found that Mindy contributed disproportionally to the marriage because her trust funds were used to buy or service debt on almost every asset acquired during the marriage—meaning that John's total income of approximately $85,000 over the course of the marriage did not contribute in any meaningful way to preservation of the trusts' assets. The District Court also found that, while John made non-monetary contributions to the family in the form of childcare and homemaking, his contributions did not exceed Mindy's. We further note that those contributions did not facilitate the maintenance of the trusts,...
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