Barton v. Barton

• Decision Date: 07 December 2015
• Docket Number: No. 32A04–1412–DR–550.,32A04–1412–DR–550.
• Citation: 47 N.E.3d 368
• Parties: Brad BARTON, Appellant–Petitioner, v. Alexandra BARTON, Appellee–Respondent.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

47 N.E.3d 368

Brad BARTON, Appellant–Petitioner

v.Alexandra BARTON, Appellee–Respondent.

No. 32A04–1412–DR–550.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Dec. 7, 2015.

Bryan L. Ciyou, Ciyou and Dixon, P.C., Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

CRONE

, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] In a consolidated appeal, Brad Barton (“Husband”) appeals the trial court's decree dissolving his marriage to Alexandra Barton (“Wife”) and the trial court's subsequent order denying his motion for relief from judgment on the basis of fraud or misrepresentation.¹ On appeal, Husband contends that each of the appealed orders constitutes an abuse of discretion. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Husband's motion for relief from judgment and we affirm that order in its entirety. Regarding the dissolution decree, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding incapacity spousal maintenance and attorney's fees to Wife. However, we conclude that the trial court erred in dividing the marital estate, namely in valuing and dividing Husband's pension and deferred tax savings plan. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Husband and Wife were married on April 12, 2005. No children were born of the marriage. Husband filed his petition for dissolution of marriage on September 1, 2011, and Wife filed her counter-petition for dissolution on October 20, 2011. Following numerous continuances and extensions of time, a final dissolution hearing was held on October 2, 2014. The dissolution court entered its decree on October 31, 2014. In addition to dividing the marital property, which primarily included Husband's pension and deferred tax savings plan, the dissolution court found Wife to be physically incapacitated to the extent that her ability to support herself is materially affected. Accordingly, the court ordered Husband to pay spousal maintenance in the amount of $1500 per month and to secure COBRA coverage for Wife until she becomes eligible for Medicare.² The dissolution court also found that Husband caused Wife to incur extraordinary attorney's fees by his failures to comply with discovery, switching attorneys, and delaying the case. Thus, the court ordered Husband to pay Wife's attorney's fees in the amount of $24,364.18.

[3] Husband filed his notice of appeal on December 1, 2014. Shortly thereafter, Husband filed a “Motion to Stay Order on Dissolution Decree” pending appeal. Specifically, Husband requested that the dissolution court stay its order regarding the award of spousal maintenance and attorney's fees, as well as the division of Husband's pension and deferred tax savings plan. The dissolution court granted the motion to stay regarding the division of Husband's retirement benefits, but denied the motion regarding the award of spousal maintenance and attorney's fees.

[4] Wife remarried on December 12, 2014. On April 21, 2015, Husband filed his petition for leave to file an Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)

motion for relief from judgment in the dissolution court and requested that we remand his appeal pending that ruling. Our motions panel granted Husband's petition and remanded the matter to the dissolution court. Husband subsequently filed his Trial Rule 60(B) motion challenging the dissolution court's award of spousal maintenance and attorney's fees to Wife. Following a hearing, the trial court issued its findings of fact, conclusions thereon, and order denying Husband's motion for relief from judgment. Husband then filed his amended notice of appeal, and this Court assumed jurisdiction over a consolidated appeal of both the dissolution decree and the trial court's order on the motion for relief from judgment.³

Discussion and Decision

[5] We begin by noting that Wife did not file an appellee's brief. When an appellee fails to submit a brief, we do not undertake the burden of developing appellee's arguments. K.L. v. E.H., 6 N.E.3d 1021, 1029 (Ind.Ct.App.2014)

. Instead, we apply a less stringent standard of review and may reverse if the appellant establishes prima facie error. Id. “Prima facie error in this context is defined as, at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Falatovics v. Falatovics, 15 N.E.3d 108, 110 (Ind.Ct.App.2014) (citation omitted). With this in mind, we will address Husband's appeal from each order in turn.

Section 1—The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Husband's motion for relief from judgment regarding the dissolution court's incapacity spousal maintenance award.

[6] We first address Husband's appeal from the trial court's denial of his motion for relief from judgment. Specifically, Husband asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for relief from the dissolution court's award to Wife of incapacity spousal maintenance on the basis of fraud or misrepresentation.⁴ Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)

provides in relevant part, “On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party ... from a judgment ... for the following reasons: ... (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated as intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party.” The burden is on the moving party to establish the ground for relief under Trial Rule 60(B). In re Paternity of P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d 737, 740 (Ind.2010). While we will discuss the actual merits of the incapacity maintenance award later in our opinion, Trial Rule 60(B) motions address only the procedural, equitable grounds for justifying relief from the legal finality of a final judgment, not the legal merits of the judgment. Id.

[7] We review the trial court's ruling on a motion for relief from judgment using an abuse of discretion standard. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC v. Holmes, 885 N.E.2d 1265, 1270 (Ind.2008)

. An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court's action is clearly erroneous, that is, against the logic and effect of the facts before it and inferences drawn therefrom. P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d at 741. Moreover, where as here, the trial court enters special findings and conclusions pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Stonger v. Sorrell, 776 N.E.2d 353, 358 (Ind.2002). First we determine if the evidence supports the findings, and second whether the findings support the judgment. Id. The trial court's findings and conclusions will be set aside only if clearly erroneous. Id. We neither reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility. Id. Instead, we must accept the ultimate facts as stated by the trial court if there is evidence to sustain them. Id. [8] “A party making a claim under Trial Rule 60(B)(3)

and alleging fraud or misrepresentation must demonstrate that: (1) the opposing party knew or should have known from the available information that the representation is false, and (2) the misrepresentation was made with respect to a material fact which would change the trial court's judgment.” Seleme v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 982 N.E.2d 299, 310–11 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted), trans. denied (2012). In his motion for relief, Husband asserted that he had discovered “new material evidence” that during the final dissolution hearing, Wife misrepresented her “financial needs,” and that such misrepresentation of material fact affected the dissolution court's judgment awarding incapacity spousal maintenance to Wife. Appellant's App. at 161, 166.⁵ Specifically, Husband claimed that Wife was residing with and being financially supported by her then-boyfriend (now husband), that she misled the dissolution court in stating that she did not intend to marry or continue residing with her boyfriend, and that Social Security Disability (“SSDI”) was her only source of income. Husband points to Wife's post-dissolution remarriage to support his claim that Wife misled the court.

[9] During the hearing on the motion for relief from judgment, Wife confirmed her earlier testimony that, at the time of the final dissolution hearing, she did not intend to marry her boyfriend, that she intended to move out of his residence and obtain her own housing, and that SSDI was her only source of income. In denying Husband's motion for relief, the trial court found in relevant part,

7. While it might be true that [Wife's] testimony was “artful[,]” Court cannot find in the record that [Wife] misrepresented that she received any other “income” than that from the Social Security Administration.

Appellant's App. at 25. It is the trial court's prerogative to weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility, and we will not second-guess that determination on appeal. Stonger, 776 N.E.2d at 358

. We agree with the trial court that Husband failed to carry his burden of proving that, during the dissolution proceedings, Wife misrepresented any material fact to the dissolution court regarding her financial resources which would have changed the court's judgment. Indeed, the evidence supports the trial court's finding that SSDI was Wife's only source of income at the time of dissolution and, in turn, this finding supports the trial court's denial of relief on the basis of fraud or misrepresentation.

[10] While we acknowledge Husband's frustration with Wife's remarriage approximately six weeks after dissolution, that does not alter what Wife's (not her then-boyfriend's) financial resources were at the time of dissolution. The crux of Husband's claim can be summarized essentially as this: Wife lied about her future intent to remarry, and the dissolution court would not have awarded her incapacity spousal maintenance if she had not misrepresented that intent. First, the entirety of Husband's argument is an invitation for this Court to reassess Wife's credibility, which we will not do. Moreover, we note that, as a general matter, a claim of actual fraud cannot be based on representations of future conduct, on broken promises, or on representations of...