Barton v. King County

• Decision Date: 22 July 1943
• Docket Number: 28964.
• Citation: 139 P.2d 1019,18 Wn.2d 573
• Parties: BARTON et al. v. KING COUNTY.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

139 P.2d 1019

18 Wn.2d 573

BARTON et al. v. KING COUNTY.

No. 28964.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 22, 1943

Department 2.

Actions by J. C. Barton and another, and by Harold Barton, by J. C Barton and another, his guardians ad litem, against King County, for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.

Reversed and remanded with direction to dismiss.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Howard M. Findley, judge.

Lloyd W. Shorett and L. C. Brodbeck, both of Seattle, for appellant.

George F. Hannan, of Seattle, for respondents.

BLAKE Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered upon a verdict in favor of plaintiffs on account of injuries sustained by plaintiff Harold Barton in a collision between a motor power bicycle which he was riding, and a truck owned and driven by Howard Wilcox. The collision occurred at the intersection of two county roads--Normandy Terrace and Brittany Drive Circle. The former extends in an easterly-westerly direction; the latter in a northerly-southerly. It is a 'T' intersection, Brittany Drive Circle intersecting on the south side of Normandy Terrace.

The accident occurred mid-day of July 21, 1941. Plaintiff Harold Barton was riding his bicycle northerly on Brittany Drive Circle. Wilcox was driving his truck westerly on Normandy Terrace. Coming to Normandy Terrace, Barton turned east. Just as he made the turn he collided headon with the Wilcox truck. Harold and his parents brought this action to recover damages for injuries sustained by Harold and damage to his bicycle as a result of the collision. From judgment entered in their favor, defendant county appeals.

It appears from the evidence that both Normandy Terrace and Brittany Drive Circle are dedicated to a width of sixty feet. At the time of the accident, however, each had been opened and improved only to the extent of graveled roadways, about fourteen feet wide, extending along the middle of the dedicated portions. Outside the graveled roadways, the rights of way were left in a state of nature. At the southeast corner of the intersection there was a heavy growth of weeds and vegetation so high as to obscure the vision of persons traveling on each highway. It is alleged in the complaint: '* * * that on account of said weeds and vegetation growing at said point, it was impossible for plaintiff, Harold Barton, or the said truck driver to observe any traffic that was approaching or about to cross the intersection of said two roads, and the said collision between the said truck and the bicycle of the minor plaintiff was caused solely by the negligence of the defendant in failing to remove said vegetation; * * *' (Italics ours.)

This is the only claim of any delict in duty on the part of King county. No claim is made that the surfaces of the graveled roadways were not in a reasonably safe condition for ordinary public travel. So, the only question for determination is whether the county was negligent in failing to keep the natural growth on the unimproved portions of the highways cut down so that it would not obscure the vision of travelers approaching the intersection.

The question is a novel one--at least in this jurisdiction. It is a general rule, which respondents recognize, that a municipal corporation is under no obligation to open a street or highway to its full width. The extent to which the improvement shall extend is a matter resting in the sound discretion of municipal authorities. As a corollary, it is established that a municipality is not liable for injuries sustained outside the improved portion of the street or highway. 7 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2nd Ed., p. 71,§ 2931; 29 C.J. 683, § 445; Blankenship v. King County, 68 Wash. 84, 122 P. 616, 40 L.R.A.,N.S., 182; Matson v. Pierce County, 94 Wash. 38, 161 P. 846. McQuillin states the principles as follows, p. 74: 'If the injury occurs on a part of a street which the city had not invited pedestrians to use, but which had been left in state of nature, and which had not been thrown open to the use of the public, frequently municipal liability is denied. In such case it is argued that the city's obligation towards persons using its public streets springs from invitation, express or implied, and unless the city does something or omits to do something, from which such invitation reasonably may be inferred or implied, it cannot be said to have assumed any obligation towards the public with respect to merely platted or dedicated streets or publicways on paper. The city has a right, therefore, to prepare a way of a width which in its discretion will accommodate the public in the middle of a dedicated or platted street, without assuming any duty or liability with respect to the portion of the street allowed to remain in a state of nature.'

Respondents urge, however, that the situation presented there brings this case within an exception to this general rule. This exception has been recognized in cases where it has been contended that a municipality was negligent in failing to maintain warning signs or barriers along a street or highway. Neel v. King County, 53 Wash. 490, 102 P. 396; Leber v. King County,

69 Wash. 134, 124 P. 397, 42 L.R.A.,N.S., 267; Wessels v. Stevens County, 110 Wash 196, 188 P. 490; Tyler v. Pierce County, ...