Barton v. Sullivan

• Decision Date: 29 March 1991
• Docket Number: No. NA 89-115-C.,NA 89-115-C.
• Citation: 774 F. Supp. 1151
• Parties: Lisa K. BARTON, Plaintiff, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

774 F. Supp. 1151

Lisa K. BARTON, Plaintiff, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant.

No. NA 89-115-C.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

March 29, 1991.

Gordon D. Ingle, Winkler, Fifer & Ingle, New Albany, Ind., for plaintiff.

Sue Hendricks Bailey, Asst. U.S. Atty., U.S. Attorney's Office, Indianapolis, Ind., for defendant.

ENTRY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

NOLAND, District Judge.

This cause is before the Court on the plaintiff's Complaint, the defendant's Answer, the plaintiff's "Memorandum in Support of Ryan L. Harper's Status as a "Child" Entitled to Social Security Benefits Through his Deceased Father" and accompanying Motion for Oral Argument, the defendant's Memorandum in Support of the Secretary's Decision, the plaintiff's Reply Memorandum, the plaintiff's Notice of New Decisional Law, and the Record of Proceedings before the Social Security Administration. The Court has reviewed the parties' pleadings and concludes that the same should be construed as cross-motions for summary judgment.

Whereupon the Court, having read the memoranda in support of and in opposition to the parties' respective summary judgment motions, and having examined the administrative record, and being duly advised, hereby concludes that the plaintiff's motion for oral argument should be denied, but that the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the plaintiff's motion for oral argument is DENIED, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

MEMORANDUM ENTRY

I. Background

The facts giving rise to this cause of action are not in dispute. On August 25, 1985, wage earner James Leslie Harper died in Floyds Knobs, Indiana, as a result of injuries he sustained in a motorcycle accident. A.R. 31, 38, 76. On January 22, 1986, less than five (5) months after his fatal accident, the plaintiff's mother, Lisa Kay Barton, filed a Petition for Declaration of Paternity in the Clark County (Indiana) Superior Court. A.R. 70, 74. The plaintiff's mother sought to establish that the plaintiff, her unborn child Ryan, was the wage earner's son. A.R. 74. Less than one month later, on February 7, 1986, the plaintiff was born at the Humana Hospital in Louisville, Kentucky. A.R. 22, 28, 33, 35, 51-52¹.

Lisa Barton never married the wage earner. A.R. 32, 57. She did not reside with him, or receive financial support from him, prior to his death. A.R. 32, 57. The wage earner did not acknowledge the plaintiff's paternity in writing. A.R. 58, 68.

On February 3, 1987, the plaintiff's mother, Lisa Barton, filed an application for children's benefits on the plaintiff's behalf.² A.R. 8, 28-32. This initial application was denied on April 8, 1987, and was not appealed. A.R. 8, 34.

On December 21, 1987, the Clark Superior Court issued an Order finding that the wage earner was the plaintiff's natural father, and that he, or rather his estate, would be responsible for a reasonable amount of the plaintiff's support. A.R. 62, 75. On December 6, 1988, the Clark Superior Court issued a Nunc Pro Tunc Order stating that the plaintiff was entitled to all inheritance rights and privileges under I.C. § 29-1-1-1, et seq., as the wage earner's heir. A.R. 78.

On February 29, 1988, the plaintiff's mother filed a new application for benefits on the plaintiff's behalf. A.R. 8, 35-39. A hearing was held on the plaintiff's second application on November 29, 1988, during which the plaintiff's counsel raised the issue of plaintiff's ability to inherit through the deceased wage earner under Indiana law. A.R. 7, 20, 22. The plaintiff appeared at the hearing in person and by his counsel. A.R. 7, 22. Although the plaintiff chose not to call any witnesses, documentary evidence was submitted and the ALJ heard oral argument on the plaintiff's application. A.R. 7, 22-27. The wage earner's mother's (Leslie's mother May L. Harper) statement of February 3, 1987, which noted that the wage earner had stated to her on several occasions before he died that Lisa Barton was pregnant with his child, was admitted into evidence during the hearing. A.R. 55-56.

On December 30, 1988, the Administrative Law Judge issued his decision denying the plaintiff's application for benefits. A.R. 7-13. The ALJ declined to apply the doctrine of res judicata because the plaintiff's second application for benefits raised a number of issues which were not previously considered (including the 1987 amendment to Indiana's intestacy statute which is at issue in this case). A.R. 8. The ALJ ultimately concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to surviving children's insurance benefits under the Social Security Act because he was not the deceased wage earner's "child" as that term is defined under the Social Security Act. A.R. 7-13. Before analyzing the plaintiff's case under the 1953 and 1987 versions of I.C. § 29-1-2-7, the ALJ stated as follows:

While it is the opinion of the Administrative Law Judge that the claimant would not have the status of a child of the wage earner under the intestacy laws of the State of Indiana either at the time of the wage earners's death or under subsequent amendments to those statutes, the fact that the prior law is controlling in this case leaves no doubt as to the issue.

A.R. 9 (Emphasis added).

On May 3, 1989, two (2) days after the effective date of the 1989 amendment, the Appeals Council denied the plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision. A.R. 3-4.³ The Appeals Council stated that the record did not support the plaintiff's argument that § 3 of Indiana Public Law 50-1987 (i.e., the 1987 amendment to I.C. § 29-1-2-7) should be applied retroactively. A.R. 3. The Appeals Council did not mention the 1989 amendment in its decision despite the fact that the amendment's effective date preceded the date of its decision. A.R. 3-4.

On July 7, 1989, the plaintiff's mother filed her Complaint seeking judicial review of the Secretary's final decision that her son is not entitled to benefits under the Act.

II. Discussion

The issue in this case is whether the plaintiff, a child who has obtained a posthumous judgment of paternity in an Indiana Court, may obtain social security benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A). Resolution of this issue requires an understanding of (1) the precise relationship between the Social Security Act's provisions regarding children's benefits and the Indiana statute regarding an illegitimate child's rights with respect to intestate succession, and (2) the history of the later statute (i.e., how the statute has evolved through its the amendment process).

A. Social Security Provision

A child may obtain child's insurance benefits under the Social Security Act only if he or she meets one of the alternative "tests" of dependency which is set out in 42 U.S.C. § 416. As Judge Easterbrook explained in Trammell on Behalf of Trammell v. Bowen, 819 F.2d at 168:

The statute (42 U.S.C. § 416) offers a person a multitude of ways to become a statutory "child". The most common is for the mother to be — or be married to — the covered wage earner. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3)(A). A child adopted by the insured person is treated the same as his own child. Ibid. Methods other than legitimate birth and adoption include:

— Eligibility to inherit property under intestate succession laws, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A), see Schaefer v. Heckler, 792 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.1986)

— Common law marriage of one's parents, defined as a technically deficient marriage ceremony, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(B)

— The insured person's written acknowledgment of parentage, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I)

— A court order requiring the insured person "to contribute to the support of the applicant because the applicant was his son or daughter", 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(III)

— A determination by the Secretary that the insured person was the parent of and "was living with ... the applicant for benefits at the time such insured individual died", 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii)

— A determination by the Secretary that the insured person was the parent of and was "contributing to the support of the applicant" for benefits when the insured person died, ibid.; see also Dubinski v. Bowen, 808 F.2d 611 (7th Cir.1986)

— A decree by a court that the insured person is the "father of the applicant", provided that "such ... court decree ... was made before the death of such insured individual", 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(II)

Id. (Emphasis added).

Citing 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A), the plaintiff contends that he is entitled to child's insurance benefits under the second "test" described in Trammell, i.e., that he is eligible to inherit property under Indiana's intestate succession law.

B. Indiana's Intestate Succession Law

The law with respect to the inheritance rights of illegitimates has undergone dramatic change in Indiana since common law:

At common law, a child born out of wedlock had no inheritable blood. The statutes antedating I.C. 29-1-2-7 were designed to ameliorate this condition. Wilson v. Bass (1918), 70 Ind.App. 116, 120, 118 N.E. 379, 380, trans. denied. Illegitimate children acknowledged during their fathers' lifetime were permitted to inherit his estate. See, e.g., Acts 1901 p. 288 (Burns' Ann.Stat. § 2630a 1901).

In 1953, with enactment of the probate code, the statutory preconditions for inheritance changed. An illegitimate child could inherit "as if he were the legitimate child of the father, if but only if, (1) the paternity of such child has been established by law, during the father's lifetime, or (2) if the putative father marries the mother of the child and acknowledges the child to be his own."

Matter of Estate of Edwards, 562 N.E.2d 763, 766 (Ind.App.1990).

At the time of the wage earner's death (August 25, 1985), the 1953 version of Indiana's statute governing the inheritance rights of...