Bartosiewicz v. Nelsen

• Decision Date: 29 September 2021
• Docket Number: 6:20-CV-06513 EAW
• Citation: 564 F.Supp.3d 287
• Parties: Robert J. BARTOSIEWICZ, Plaintiff, v. Greg NELSEN, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

564 F.Supp.3d 287

Robert J. BARTOSIEWICZ, Plaintiff,

v.Greg NELSEN, Defendant.

6:20-CV-06513 EAW

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed September 29, 2021

Edward P. Hourihan, Jr., Curtis Alan Johnson, Bond Schoeneck & King PLLC, Rochester, NY, for Plaintiff.

Mallory K. Smith, Law Offices of Pullano & Farrow, PLLC, Rochester, NY, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, Chief Judge

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Robert Bartosiewicz ("Plaintiff") commenced this action on July 16, 2020, against defendant Greg Nelsen ("Defendant") alleging breach of contract, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, unjust enrichment, and fraud arising out of a transaction in which Plaintiff contracted to purchase a black 1971 Plymouth Barracuda from Defendant in exchange for three vehicles. (See Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 14-79). Presently before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. (Dkt. 5).

For the following reasons, the Court finds that the Court lacks statutory and constitutional personal jurisdiction over Defendant. The Court further grants the parties’ requests for transfer of venue in the interest of justice.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from the complaint, the exhibits, and Defendant's submission in support of his motion to dismiss. As is required at this stage of the proceedings, the Court treats Plaintiff's factual allegations as true.

Plaintiff is a resident of Rochester, New York, and maintains the Rochester Auto Museum, a museum of antique muscle cars. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 6). Defendant, a resident of Prior Lake, Minnesota, owns Mopar Ponderosa, a seller of antique Chrysler, Dodge, and Plymouth cars. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 2, 7; Dkt. 5-2 at ¶¶ 2, 4). The parties entered a sales agreement (Dkt. 1-1) dated February 19, 2019, detailing the sale from Defendant to Plaintiff of a 1971 black Plymouth Barracuda, valued at $1,025,000 ("the black 1971 Barracuda"), in exchange for three vehicles: a 1971 brown Plymouth Barracuda, a 1970 Chevrolet Chevelle, and a 1971 "Plum Crazy" Dodge Challenger, valued in aggregate at $1,025,000. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 19; Dkt. 1-1).

The sales agreement stipulated that both Plymouth Barracudas and the Chevrolet Chevelle were "numbers matching" vehicles. (Dkt. 1-1). Plaintiff contends that "numbers matching" is a term of art among car collectors, which refers to matching Vehicle Identification Numbers ("VINs") and corresponding matching die lot numbers stamped on various parts throughout the car, indicating the period of manufacture. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 16-18).

To effect the trade, Plaintiff's employee travelled to Minnesota to deliver the three vehicles, and Plaintiff traveled to Minnesota to retrieve the black 1971 Barracuda and return it to Rochester. (Dkt. 5-2 at ¶¶ 16-19). After the black 1971 Barracuda arrived in Rochester, Plaintiff hired a specialist, Dave Wise, managing partner of MMC Detroit, LLC, to inspect the black 1971 Barracuda and assess its condition. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 25-31). Wise inspected the vehicle and determined that the VINs on the upper radiator core support, left hand side of the cowl, engine, and transmission matched. (Dkt. 1-2 at 12). However, the die lot numbers on several parts of the vehicle did not correspond to the period that it was produced, indicating that the parts were not original, which decreased its value. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 26-31).

On April 12, 2019, Plaintiff informed Defendant that he would not accept the black 1971 Barracuda. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 32; Dkt. 5-1 at ¶ 33; Dkt. 7-1 at ¶ 4). Defendant offered to reduce the purchase price by $45,000, noting that Plaintiff specified a "numbers matching" car and not a "die lot numbers matching" car. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 33; Dkt. 5-1 at ¶ 33). Defendant informed Plaintiff that he had sold the three vehicles and did not intend to refund the purchase price. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 34; Dkt. 7-1 at ¶ 18). Plaintiff then stored the black 1971 Barracuda and ultimately resold it for $700,000. (Dkt 1 at ¶ 37; Dkt. 7-1 at ¶ 20).

II. Procedural Background

Plaintiff commenced this action on July 16, 2020, alleging breach of contract, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, unjust enrichment, and fraud. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 45-79). Defendant was served with the summons and complaint on August 19, 2020, in Minnesota. (Dkt. 1-2; Dkt. 4; Dkt. 5-2 at ¶ 7). On September 9, 2020, Defendant timely moved for the Court to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and for improper venue pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3). (Dkt. 5). Alternatively, Defendant seeks transfer of venue. (Dkt. 8 at 6). Defendant's declaration accompanying his motion to dismiss asserts that Defendant is a Minnesota resident, he has never traveled to New York, he has not conducted business in the state, and that a substantial portion of the acts giving rise to this action occurred in Minnesota. (Dkt. 5-2 at ¶¶ 2-6, 12-16, 19).

Plaintiff opposed Defendant's motion arguing, inter alia , that New York's long-arm statute grants personal jurisdiction over Defendant, Defendant knew his acts would have consequences in New York, Defendant derives substantial revenue from interstate commerce, Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction pursuant to the United States Constitution, and venue is proper in this Court. (Dkt. 7 at 4). Plaintiff additionally requests that the Court transfer venue to the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota if it determines that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Defendant or if venue in the Western District of New York is improper. (Dkt. 7 at 16).

DISCUSSION

I. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

A. Standard

Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), arguing that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant. (Dkt. 5). "On a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, [the] plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant." In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Lit., 334 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2003). "Prior to discovery, a plaintiff may survive a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss by pleading in good faith legally sufficient allegations of jurisdiction." DiFillippo v. Special Metals Corp., 299 F.R.D. 348, 352 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp. , 84 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 1996) ). "That is, where a court relies only upon the pleadings and supporting affidavits, a plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over a defendant." Id. (citing CutCo Indus., Inc. v. Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 364 (2d Cir. 1986) ). When considering a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the Court must "construe the pleadings and affidavits in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, resolving all doubts in [his] favor." Porina v. Marward Shipping Co. , 521 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2008). The Court "must accept the allegations in the Complaint as true ‘to the extent they are uncontroverted’ by defendant[’s] affidavits ‘which the district court may also consider.’ " NuMSP, LLC v. St. Etienne , 462 F. Supp. 3d 330, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Laclede, Inc. , No. 18-CV-4945 (JMF), 2019 WL 293329, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2019) ). "The Court need not, however, draw argumentative inferences in the plaintiff's favor or accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

"A prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction requires: (1) procedurally proper service of process, (2) ‘a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction that renders such service of process effective’ and (3) that ‘the exercise of personal jurisdiction ... comport[s] with constitutional due process principles.’ " Fire and Police Ass'n of Colo. v. Bank of Montreal , 368 F. Supp. 3d 681, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff properly served the summons upon Defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(2)(A). (Dkt. 4).

As to whether there is a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction, federal courts exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who is served with a summons and "who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). "In general, a ‘district court's personal jurisdiction is determined by the law of the state in which the court is located.’ " Mrs. U.S. Nat'l Pageant, Inc. v. Miss U.S. Org., LLC , 875 F. Supp. 2d 211, 219 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Spiegel v. Schulmann , 604 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2010) ). "There are two ways that New York exercises personal jurisdiction over non-residents: general jurisdiction pursuant to [ New York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR") 301 ] ... or specific jurisdiction pursuant to [ CPLR 302 ]." Thackurdeen v. Duke Univ. , 130 F. Supp. 3d 792, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted), aff'd , 660 F. App'x 43 (2d Cir. 2016). "General jurisdiction ... permits a court to adjudicate any cause of action against the ... defendant, wherever arising, and whoever the plaintiff." Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp. , 814 F.3d 619, 624 (2d Cir. 2016). "Specific jurisdiction is available when the cause of action sued upon arises out of the defendant's activities in a state." Id.

"If personal jurisdiction exists under the forum state's laws, the district court must then determine if the exercise of such jurisdiction complies with federal due process requirements." Gaymar Indus. Inc. v. FirstMerit Bank, N.A. , No. 06-CV-70S, 2007 WL 894217, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2007) (citing Metro. Life Ins. , 84 F.3d at 567 ). The Court will first address personal jurisdiction under CPLR 301 and 302 and then analyze whether personal...