Baruah v. Young

• Decision Date: 24 March 1982
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. M-81-1346.
• Citation: 536 F. Supp. 356
• Parties: Amrit BARUAH v. Ruth H. YOUNG, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

536 F. Supp. 356

Amrit BARUAH v. Ruth H. YOUNG, et al.

Civ. A. No. M-81-1346.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

March 24, 1982.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Glen Fallin, Upper Marlboro, Md., and Harold Buchman, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.

Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen. of Md., James J. Mingle, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Md., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JAMES R. MILLER, Jr., District Judge.

The plaintiff, Amrit Baruah, brought this action to redress alleged violations of his civil rights against the following defendants: The Board of Regents of the University of Maryland (University); John S. Toll, President of the University; and Ruth H. Young, Dean of the University's School of Social Work and Community Planning (SSW&CP). Defendants Toll and Young are sued in both their individual and official capacities.¹ The plaintiff has requested damages, and injunctive as well as declaratory relief.

The defendants have moved to dismiss² the plaintiff's amended complaint,³ and the plaintiff has filed an opposition to that motion.⁴ Having considered the parties' memoranda, the court concludes that no hearing is necessary. Local Rule 6(E).

I. Overview⁵

In August of 1972, the plaintiff was appointed to a full-time teaching position, with a rank of assistant professor, at the University's SSW&CP. This position was funded from federal and other grant monies.

During the period 1972 through 1976, Dr. Daniel Thursz, then Dean of the SSW&CP, encouraged the plaintiff to obtain a doctoral degree. According to the plaintiff, it was the University's policy to transfer full-time teachers whose positions were funded by grants to tenure-track state funded positions upon their receipt of a doctoral degree.

The plaintiff received his doctoral degree in July of 1976. He alleges that Dr. Thursz assured him that he would receive a state funded, tenure track position within a "reasonable period of time subsequent thereto."⁶ When Dr. Thursz left the SSW&CP in January of 1977, the plaintiff had not been appointed to a tenure track position.

Defendant Young succeeded Dr. Thursz as Dean of the SSW&CP in January of 1977. According to the plaintiff, Young had been a faculty member of the SSW&CP prior to becoming Dean and had exercised administrative functions within the SSW&CP. In addition, the plaintiff alleges that Young "knew that the practice of the SSW&CP ... was that whenever full-time teachers at the SSW&CP earned doctoral degrees while assigned to a grant-funded position, they were rewarded by transfer to more secure, State-funded positions."⁷

Young notified the plaintiff on June 22, 1978 that his employment with the SSW&CP would be terminated as of December 31, 1978. According to the plaintiff, the sole reason given by Young for this decision was the school's declining enrollment.

On October 25, 1978, Young notified the plaintiff that his employment with the SSW&CP would be extended until June 30, 1979. Young stated in the notification that the plaintiff would be paid during the period January 1 through June 30, 1979, from funds other than those provided under the "Title XX grant," which had been the source of funding for the plaintiff's position until December 31, 1978. According to the plaintiff, he believed, and was aware of no objective facts to support a contrary belief, that his employment was being terminated solely due to an expected decline in enrollment.

On May 14, 1979, the plaintiff, a citizen of India, requested that Young reconsider the decision to terminate his employment. The plaintiff made this request because he had learned that Young was interviewing candidates, including white American natives, for a faculty position at the SSW&CP and that the new appointee would teach the courses that were taught by the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, Young's decision to interview candidates indicated to him that the reason for his termination, an expected decline in enrollment, "no longer obtained."

On May 15, 1979, Young responded, in writing, to the plaintiff's request for reconsideration. Her letter stated that the plaintiff's employment could not be extended due to the projected decline in enrollment.

A member of the SSW&CP's full-time faculty retired in June of 1979. According to the plaintiff, although he was qualified for the position another person was appointed from outside of the University. The person appointed was younger than forty and did not have a doctoral degree. This position was funded by State funds.

In the Fall of 1979, a white American national, who was younger than the plaintiff, was appointed from outside of the University to teach the course formerly taught by the plaintiff. This position was funded by state rather than grant funds.

According to the plaintiff, the funds received by the SSW&CP under "Title XX" did not decrease significantly in either 1979 or 1980. Thus, the plaintiff claims that his termination was not occasioned by economic necessity. In addition, the plaintiff alleges that the projected decline in enrollment, purportedly relied on by Young as the basis for terminating his employment, was not actually so projected but rather was used as a pretext for his termination and denial of a transfer to a position funded by the State.

The plaintiff filed an administrative charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on November 21, 1979, alleging that he had been discriminated against on account of national origin and age. The EEOC deferred this charge to the Maryland Commission on Human Rights (MCHR), which declined to investigate the plaintiff's allegations. The EEOC then assumed jurisdiction and conducted an investigation. According to the plaintiff, a representative of the University stated during an administrative proceeding that the plaintiff's competence had not been questioned and was not a factor in his termination.

The EEOC issued its decision on the plaintiff's Title VII claim on February 19, 1981, finding that there was reasonable cause to believe that the plaintiff had been discriminated against on the basis of national origin. This action was instituted on May 28, 1981, and the plaintiff filed an amended complaint on December 4, 1981.⁸

II. Discussion

The defendants have moved to dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint on grounds cognizable under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P. Both sides have advanced numerous arguments for or against the dismissal of the plaintiff's various claims. As will be seen below, the court is presently unable to resolve definitively all of the issues raised by the parties due to the state of the record and the procedural posture of the case.

A. Title VII and the ADEA

The defendants' first contention, that the plaintiff's claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. are time-barred, is predicated on two assumptions. The first assumption is that the plaintiff's claims accrued on October 25, 1978, the date on which Young last extended the plaintiff's employment. The second assumption is that the plaintiff was required to file an administrative charge within 180 days of that date in order to preserve his right to sue in federal court.

The defendants correctly note that under Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256-62, 101 S.Ct. 498, 503-06, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1981), the plaintiff's discriminatory termination claims accrued initially on October 25, 1978, the date on which Young last extended the term of his employment with the SSW&CP. Accord, Chardon v. Fernandez, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981). Thus, without more, the period in which the plaintiff was required to file his administrative charge began to run on that date.

Nevertheless, as this court noted in Algea v. Schweiker, 529 F.Supp. 163, 165-66, (D.Md.1981), the time-to-file and other procedural requirements of Title VII and the ADEA do not implicate the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, they are in the nature of statutes of limitations and are subject to tolling on equitable grounds. See, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982); Citicorp Person-to-Person Financial Corp. v. Brazell, 658 F.2d 232, 234 (4th Cir. 1981); Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 640 F.2d 584, 587-94 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

The plaintiff has alleged in his amended complaint facts which, if proven, might entitle him to the benefit of equitable tolling. According to the plaintiff, the only reason ever advanced directly by Young for his termination was the University's projected decline in enrollment. It was not until May or June of 1979, that the plaintiff claims he had at least some reason to believe that his termination was for reasons other than economic ones. During this time Young was interviewing persons for positions the plaintiff alleges he was qualified to fill. Moreover, it was not until the Fall of 1979 that someone was hired from outside of the University to teach the courses formerly taught by the plaintiff. Consequently, when the complaint is viewed under the standards applicable to a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), it sufficiently alleges that the plaintiff may have been misled purposely by Young as to the reasons for his termination. Wilkerson v. Seigfried Insurance Agency, Inc., 621 F.2d 1042, 1045 (10th Cir. 1980). See Tucker v. United Parcel Service, 657 F.2d 724, 726-27 (5th Cir. 1981). Whether the application of equitable tolling is warranted in this case cannot be resolved at this juncture. In most cases such a determination cannot be made until a trial on the merits or at least the establishment of the non-existence of material fact issues. Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 640 F.2d at 595. Accordingly, the court cannot now say that the period in which the plaintiff was required to file an administrative charge, in order to preserve his rights under Title VII and...