Baruch v. Giblin

• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: TERRELL, Justice.
• Citation: Baruch v. Giblin, 122 Fla. 59, 164 So. 831 (Fla. 1935)
• Decision Date: 19 December 1935
• Parties: BARUCH v. GIBLIN.

164 So. 831

122 Fla. 59

BARUCH v. GIBLIN.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

December 19, 1935

Rehearing Denied Jan. 14, 1936.

Error to Circuit Court, Dade County; Paul D. Barns, Judge.

Action by Vincent C. Giblin against Sailing W. Baruch. Judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant brings error.

Affirmed.

COUNSEL

Gautier, Worley & Bouvier, of Miami, for plaintiff in error.

Marion E. Sibley, of Miami, for defendant in error.

OPINION

TERRELL Justice.

Counsel in this case are wide at variance both as to what the record discloses and as to what questions are properly here for our solution. An examination of the record reveals a controversy between plaintiff in error and defendant in error over the payment of an attorney's fee. Nothing more.

It appears that in February, 1932, one Dorothy Firman brought a common-law action against Sailing W. Baruch, plaintiff in error, claiming damages in the sum of $100,000 for breach of promise and other alleged grounds. Defendant in error Vincent C. Giblin, was employed by plaintiff in error to represent him in said common-law action, which was later transferred to the federal court for the Southern District of Florida on the ground of diverse citizenship, and about a year after such transfer it was compromised and settled by payment of $400 to the plaintiff.

After dismissal of the action Giblin demanded his fee for services rendered which, after some controversy, was refused. Giblin then brought this action claiming damages in the sum of $25,000. A trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for $6,250. A new trial was refused, and the present writ of error was prosecuted to the judgment.

Baruch contends, in substance, that he contracted with a lawyer named Fritz Gordon to represent him in the former action, and that Gordon associated Giblin with him in the litigation that Gordon and Giblin agreed between themselves as to the compensation they would charge, that Baruch had no contract with Giblin except through Gordon, that he (Baruch) has paid Gordon the full amount agreed to be paid him, that Gordon has receipted him in full therefor, that Gordon and Giblin were for the purposes of this suit partners, and that Giblin cannot now repudiate his contract with Gordon and bring an action in general assumpsit for services rendered and recover a fee more than the contract price.

As against the contention of Baruch, Giblin contends that he was never the partner of Gordon for the purpose of this or any other litigation, that his contract for services and compensation was direct with Baruch, that he personally performed the services for which he seeks compensation with the full knowledge of Baruch, that said services extended over a period of fifteen months and were all the services that were performed on the case, that Baruch was advised that he (Giblin) was looking solely to him (Baruch) for his compensation, and that on his refusal to pay he brought this action in quantum meruit to recover the value of the services rendered.

On the issue thus raised by the contention of the litigants, the evidence is plenary and in hopeless conflict. The jury and the trial court resolved the issues in favor of the plaintiff. The nature of the contract between Gordon and Giblin and whether or not Baruch had an independent contract with Giblin were questions of fact well within the province of the jury to determine, and since their finding is amply supported by the record, we do not feel authorized to disturb it.

The sole question remaining for our consideration is whether or not the jury was prejudiced, and, in being so, returned a verdict that was unreasonable and out of proportion to the value of the services rendered.

The matter of fixing attorney's fees often involves the most delicate technique of the lawyer's art. The primary, though not the exclusive, elements that enter into the determination of such a fee are the amount and value of the services rendered, the responsibility undertaken, the importance and results of the litigation, and the time required in the conduct of it. In estimating the value of an attorney's services his skill, experience, professional reputation, and the amount of his business may be taken into consideration. The prices usually charged for similar services in the same court and community may also be shown, but that rule has no application in this case. 2 R.C.L., par. 145, page 1059; Naef v. Miller-Goll Mfg. Co., 176 La. 979, 147 So. 52; Munroe v. Birdsey, 102 Fla. 544, 136 So. 886.

There is but little analogy between the elements that control the determination of a lawyer's fee and those which determine the compensation of skilled craftsmen in other fields. Lawyers are officers of the court. The court is an instrument of society for the administration of justice. Justice should be administered economically, efficiently, and expeditiously. The attorney's fee is, therefore, a very important factor in the administration of justice, and if it is not determined with proper relation to that fact it results in a species of social malpractice that undermines the confidence of the public in the bench and bar. It does more than that; it brings the court into disrepute and destroys its power to perform adequately the function of its creation.

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