Basarich v. Rodeghero

• Decision Date: 31 December 1974
• Docket Number: No. 73--253,73--253
• Parties: Robert BASARICH et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Richard J. RODEGHERO and Karen Galaske, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 739

321 N.E.2d 739

24 Ill.App.3d 889

Robert BASARICH et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Richard J. RODEGHERO and Karen Galaske, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 73--253.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Dec. 31, 1974.

Kleiman, Cornfield & Feldman, Chicago, for plaintiffs-appellants; Thomas W. Duda, Chicago, of counsel.

Sidley & Austin, Chicago, for defendants-appellees; Mark E. MacDonald, Chicago, of counsel.

ALLOY, Justice:

The appeal before us arises from an order of the Circuit Court of Will County which dismissed the complaint of Robert Basarich, Clyde Odle, William Zimmer, individuals, and Richard Manley, on behalf of the membership of the Lockport Federation of Teachers, a voluntary association. The individual plaintiffs are coaches and teachers at Lockport High School, and plaintiff Lockport Federation of Teachers is a voluntary association (hereinafter called the Federation) which apparently represents a majority of the faculty members of Lockport High School.

The complaint charged defendants Richard J. Rodeghero and Karen Galaske with publishing newsletters which libeled plaintiffs and invaded their right to privacy, and asserted that the alleged motive was to discourage membership in the Federation which the individual plaintiffs presumably support. Plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive relief prohibiting further libelous publications. The motion to dismiss the complaint filed by defendants asserted that the allegations of the complaint were simply conclusions and not well pleaded; that on their face the alleged libelous statements showed that no cause of action could be stated; and that plaintiffs as 'public officials', had not alleged actual malice in accordance with the rule in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) and the cases which followed the New York Times case.

The trial judge dismissed the complaint and gave plaintiffs leave to amend. After the amended complaint was filed, a new motion to dismiss was also allowed by the court. Plaintiffs requested further leave to amend but did not appear in court for the hearing on that request, and the motion of plaintiffs to amend was stricken. The fundamental issue presented by the parties is whether the New York Times v. Sullivan rule applies to plaintiffs so that they must allege malice in the complaint. The question also arises as to whether the complaint was sufficient under the New York Times v. Sullivan standard.

The rule in New York Times v. Sullivan concerning libel cases (376 U.S. at 279--280, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706):

'* * * prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'--that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.'

This rule, which restricts the scope of liability for defamation was made by the United States Supreme Court after assertedly careful consideration of the delicate balance between freedom of the press and the individual's right to be protected from libelous publications. It was emphasized in the New York Times case that the background of a 'profound national commitment to the principle by debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.' (376 U.S. at 270, 84 S.Ct. at 721, 11 L.Ed.2d at 701). The rule was premised on the need to allow citizens to criticize their public officials without fear of reprisal or large damage suits for inadvertent misstatements, and on this issue the court specified the rule which requires that defendant's statement of facts would be required to be shown to be 'deliberate or reckless error' before the official could recover damages for libel. In the New York Times case, the court declined to specify the scope of the terms 'public officials' and 'official conduct'. In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966), the Supreme Court found, however, that it was 'clear, therefore, that the 'public official' designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for and control over the conduct of governmental affairs' (383 U.S. at 85--86, 86 S.Ct. at 676, 15 L.Ed.2d at 605).

The United States Supreme Court subsequently extended the 'actual malice' requirement to plaintiffs who were 'public figures' (Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967--college football coach accused of fixing a game); and those private individuals involved in 'matters of public of general concern, without regard to whether persons involved are famous or anonymous', Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 43--44, 91 S.Ct. 1811, 1820, 29 L.Ed. 296, 312 (1971)). (But compare Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), which appears to restrict the Rosenbloom precedent and give more latitude to the states in defining libel standards for certain private plaintiffs. Gertz (which involved an attorney who was not a public official), is not applicable to the present case.

In the cause before us, the question, initially, is whether the plaintiffs as teachers and athletic coaches in the community high school, are 'public officials' or 'public figures', or involved in matters of general interest, so that statements made concerning their conduct in office or otherwise within the public interest fall under the conditional privilege noted in the case of New York Times v. Sullivan. We believe that the rule expressed in the Times case fully applies in the cause before us. Plaintiffs are public employees, hired by the school board and paid with public funds. As coaches and teachers in a local high school they maintain highly responsible positions in the community. As delineated in the 1970 Illinois Constitution Article X, § 1, it is clear that education is a prime governmental responsibility. Public school systems, their athletic programs, and those who run then are consistent subjects of intense public interest and substantial publicity. The Illinois courts have brought within the scope of the Times rule such people as doctors (Farnsworth v. Tribune Company, 43 Ill.2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969); police officers (Coursey v. Greater Niles Township Pub. Corp., 40 Ill.2d 257, 265, 239 N.E.2d 837 (1968); and those who care for abnormal and mentally retarded children (Doctors Convalescent Center v. East Shore Newspapers, 104 Ill.App.2d 271, 276--277, 244 N.E.2d 373 (1968). Public school teachers and coaches, and the conduct of such teachers and coaches and their policies, are of as much concern to the community as are other 'public officials' and 'public figures.'

Recent cases in other jurisdictions have applied the New York Times v. Sullivan rule to similar plaintiffs (Gallman v. Carnes, 254 Ark. 987, 497 S.W.2d 47 (assistant dean and professor at a law school); Reaves v. Foster, 200 So.2d 453 (Miss.1967) (school principal); and Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 4 Cir., 448 F.2d 378 and Grayson v. Curtis...