BASF Wyandotte v. LOCAL 227, INTERN. CHEM. WORKERS
| Decision Date | 02 July 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 82-CV-1431.,82-CV-1431. |
| Parties | BASF WYANDOTTE CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. LOCAL 227, INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO, Joseph LaMountain, President and in his individual capacity, and Roger Scales, Secretary and in his individual capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
Solotoff & Spivak, Great Neck, N.Y., Henry Kramer, Rensselaer, N.Y., for plaintiff; Joel Spivak, Great Neck, N.Y., of counsel.
Dominick Tocci, Albany, N.Y., for defendants; Laurence Gold, David M. Silberman, A. Richard Feldman, Bredhoff & Kaiser, Washington, D.C., of counsel.
This action involves an alleged violation of the provisions of section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 186. Jurisdiction in this Court is invoked pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1337. Plaintiff BASF Wyandotte Corporation ("BASF"), an employer within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 186, seeks a declaration that certain payments it has contracted to make to representatives of defendant Local 227, International Chemical Workers Union, AFL-CIO ("Union") are prohibited by the proscription found in § 302(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(2).1 Defendants LaMountain and Scales are the past president and secretary, respectively, of defendant Union. Before the Court is plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
BASF maintains a chemical manufacturing facility in the City of Rensselaer, New York. It has operated that plant since April 1, 1978. Defendant Union has been the exclusive bargaining representative of the production and maintenance workers at the plant since the 1940s and has continued in that capacity since the purchase of the plant by BASF. All of the Union's approximately 200 members are employed by BASF at the Rensselaer facility.
The dispute herein concerns a "no-docking" provision in the collective bargaining agreement between these parties. Stated simply, a no-docking provision allows an employee to take time off from work without any loss of pay.
According to the Union, its two primary officers are its president and its secretary. At the time this action was commenced, those positions were held by defendants LaMountain and Scales, respectively. Prior to BASF's acquisition of the Rensselaer facility, these officers were permitted an aggregate of six hours a day, without loss of pay, to attend to union business. In 1978, however, the parties re-negotiated this no-docking term to provide for a maximum aggregate of only four hours a day, and in 1981, this no-docking provision was continued in a subsequent collective bargaining agreement. The no-docking provision is contained in Article II, § 4 of the collective bargaining agreement and provides in part:
Pursuant to this agreement, both the president and secretary of the Union were paid for an eight-hour day, notwithstanding that some of these employees' time presumably was spent on other than "company" business. The officers were not paid for time spent in excess of an eight-hour day, nor were they compensated for time spent away from company premises.
In September of 1982, BASF informed LaMountain and Scales that, notwithstanding the bargained for no-docking provision, BASF no longer would make payments to union officers for time spent on union business, with the limited exception of payments made for actual time spent meeting with management. The notice was given pursuant to BASF's conclusion that payments to union officials for time spent on union business, other than at actual meetings with management, are proscribed by the provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 186(a).
Based on this refusal by BASF to honor the no-docking provision, as well as certain other antagonistic actions taken by BASF, the Union filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"). On February 15, 1984, an administrative law judge ("ALJ") found that BASF's repudiation of the no-docking agreement constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5).3 The ALJ found specifically that he was without jurisdiction to determine whether BASF's repudiation of the agreement was in violation of § 302. See ALJ decision, Appendix A to Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Opposition.
Section 302(a) contains a broad prohibition against payments by an employer or its agents to, among others, a representative of its employees. Indeed, § 302(d)4 makes a willful violation of the proscriptive provisions of § 302(a) a criminal violation. There is no question concerning the laudable purpose underlying § 302 of preventing even subtle forms of assistance to union representatives which present a risk of improperly influencing the representatives or of compromising their independent judgment. Clearly, then, § 302 is designed to prevent improper interference by an employer with the representatives of its employees, and is not designed to prevent the necessary cooperation between management and labor essential to the furtherance of their joint interests. It is apparent to this Court that the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between these parties allowing for the Union's officials to be paid for time spent on union business during working hours is a cooperative effort representing the product of armslength bargaining and does not present the type of opportunity for employer interference in union affairs which § 302 is designed to prevent. More specifically, this Court finds that the payments in question fall within the exception found in § 302(c)(1),5 allowing for payments made "by reason of" one's service as an employee.
Two cases addressing the legality of similar no-docking provisions have been discussed at length by the parties herein. The first of these cases, United States v. Motzell, 199 F.Supp. 192 (D.N.J.1961), involved a criminal prosecution under § 302. The defendant in Motzell, while a union representative, accepted employment with two employers as a master mechanic. His services to each employer essentially involved assuring that a sufficient number of union employees would be available when needed by the two employers. Motzell's employment with each employer constituted a separate count of the indictment. With respect to count one of the indictment, the Motzell court concluded that payments made to defendant by employer number one fell within the exceptions in § 302(c) to the prohibitions of § 302(a). In dealing with count two of the indictment, with which we need not be concerned here, the court concluded that Motzell's actions had not been willful and, therefore, could not give rise to criminal responsibility.6
Arguably, Motzell can be distinguished from the case at bar. There, the conduct for which defendant was compensated fell more comfortably within the "by reason of his services as an employee" exception found in § 302(c), since Motzell was paid to ensure an adequate labor supply at each jobsite. By contrast, in the present case, union officials have been compensated for time spent attending to purely intra-union affairs. This Court concludes, however, that any such distinction is insufficient to reject the broader policy considerations enunciated in Motzell.
In distinguishing the cases relied upon by the Government, the Motzell court noted that "none of the cases have a feature of employment, but only occasional payments or loans or doing of other things of value usually in a surreptitious fashion in an attempt to hide or put under a different cloak or label the true nature of the payment made." United States v. Motzell, 199 F.Supp. at 196 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted). The court also relied upon the following language in United States v. Ryan, 232 F.2d 481, 483 (2d Cir.1956), quoted in United States v. Alaimo, 191 F.Supp. 625 (M.D.Pa.1961):
The chief, if not only, purpose of the section was to put a stop to practices that, if unchecked, might impair the impartiality of union "representatives," to prevent employers from tampering with the loyality of union officials, and disloyal union officials from levying tribute upon employers.
United States v. Alaimo, 191 F.Supp. at 627 (citations omitted). This Court agrees with Motzell's assessment of the purposes underlying § 302 and finds inescapable the conclusion that those purposes would not be served by finding unlawful the instant no-docking provisions. As in Motzell, defendant's actions here are "legitimate labor practices, as a result of open dealings between management and labor, and were not designed by the Union as an intimidation or extortion of the company nor an attempt on the part of the company to bribe the union officials here involved ... or to gain control over the Union." United States v. Motzell, 199 F.Supp. at 198.
Also relied upon by defendant Union is the closely analogous case of Employee's Independent Union v. Wyman Gordon Co., 314 F.Supp. 458 (N.D.Ill.1970). The facts in Wyman Gordon were set out as follows:
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