Basham v. State, No. 680S171
| Docket Nº | No. 680S171 |
| Citation | 422 N.E.2d 1206 |
| Case Date | July 08, 1981 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
Page 1206
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
Page 1207
John D. Clouse, Michael C. Keating, Laurie A. Baiden, Evansville, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Carmen L. Quintana, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
PRENTICE, Justice.
Defendant (Appellant) was convicted in a trial by jury of murder, Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1 (Burns 1979), and was sentenced to a prison term of sixty (60) years. The following issues are raised in this direct appeal:
(1) Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss.
(2) Whether the trial court erred in granting the State's motion in limine.
(3) Whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the defendant's confession.
(4) Whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence certain exhibits.
(5) Whether it is constitutionally permissible to place the burden of establishing insanity upon the defendant.
(6) Whether the trial court erred in giving a certain final instruction.
(7) Whether the trial court erred in refusing two (2) of the defendant's tendered final instructions.
(8) Whether the trial court erred in considering certain factors as aggravating circumstances.
Prior to trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the charge against him on the ground, inter alia, that the sentencing provisions of the Indiana Code allow the imposition of arbitrary penalties. The motion was denied and the defendant assigns error to that ruling. In support, he cites Furman v. Georgia, (1972) 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346, for the proposition that the sentencing authority must follow adequate guidelines. Further, he contends that Indiana's sentencing scheme permits disparate sentences because there is no indication of the exact number of years a defendant will serve if one or more aggravating circumstances are found. Defendant's reliance on Furman is misplaced, and the contention is without merit.
In Furman, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized the need for adequate guidelines in death penalty cases. The case now before us is not such a case. Second, while there are some guidelines present in the sentencing provisions of the Indiana Code, see, e. g., Ind.Code § 35-50-1A-7 (Burns 1979), a degree of flexibility is necessary so that the trial court can shape the sentence to fit both the crime and the criminal. Finally, even if the sentence enhancement statutes were deemed unconstitutional,
Page 1208
they would be severable and the presumptive sentence would obtain. Perforce, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss.Also prior to trial, the defendant sought the court's permission to examine the prospective jurors on voir dire concerning the post trial procedures and disposition to be made in the event of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court denied its permission and the State moved in limine to preclude the defendant from bringing forth such matters. The trial court granted the State's motion and the defendant contends this was error because a jury, uninformed of the post trial procedures in an insanity case, is being invited to speculate on what will ultimately happen to the defendant. We find that the trial court acted properly.
We have recently held that it is not error for a trial court to refuse a defendant's tendered instruction on the post trial procedures in an insanity case. Tyson v. State, (1979) Ind., 386 N.E.2d 1185; Malo v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 157, 361 N.E.2d 1201. The reason for this is that such matters are not for the jury's consideration, whose sole function is to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
Again prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the introduction of his confession into evidence. Following a full evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion. At trial, the State proffered the confession, the defendant objected and the trial court overruled the objection and admitted the confession into evidence. Defendant asserts that the trial court was in error for two reasons: 1) that he was under the influence of liquor and drugs when the confession was made; and 2) that the confession was a product of promises of leniency and psychiatric treatment. Neither facet of the assertion has merit.
"It is the State's burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived his rights and that the defendant's confession was voluntarily given. In considering whether the burden was satisfied we look at the totality of circumstances to determine whether there was any inducement by way of violence, threats, promises or other improper influence. However, in reviewing the trial court's ruling upon the issue, we will consider only the evidence which supports that ruling, when the evidence is in conflict, as well as any unrefuted evidence in the defendant's favor." Jackson v. State, (1980) Ind., 411 N.E.2d 609, 610-11 (citations omitted).
As to the first facet of the assertion, at the suppression hearing, Defendant testified that he had consumed both alcohol and drugs on the day he confessed. However, a police officer, who witnessed the confession, testified that the defendant did not appear to be intoxicated or under the influence of drugs when he confessed. The officer's testimony was corroborated at...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Mead, No. 5720
...or mitigation without limiting the court to those matters alone. Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-50-1A-7 (Burns 1979); see Basham v. State, Ind., 422 N.E.2d 1206 (B) Quantum of proof Defendant also contends that, although the alteration sentencing statute contemplates a finding as to the aggravating ......
-
Vaughan v. State, No. 2-782A206
...297, 280 N.E.2d 602, 603-04; Zarnik v. State, (1977) 172 Ind.App. 593, 604, 361 N.E.2d 202, 208. See also Basham v. State, (1981) Ind., 422 N.E.2d 1206, Vaughan has not challenged the language of the statute nor claimed it to be misleading. Indeed, although brief, we deem the language to pa......
-
Stader v. State, No. 2-1082A356
...this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. See Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-4-1(b) (Burns 1979 Repl.); Basham v. State, (1981) Ind., 422 N.E.2d 1206. The standard for appellate review for this defense was clearly delineated in Turner v. State, (1981) Ind., 428 N.E.2d 1244, at 1246, where the S......
-
Ramos v. State, No. 881S204
...§ 35-41-4-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.). We have consistently upheld this statute against constitutional arguments. Basham v. State, (1981) Ind., 422 N.E.2d 1206; Price v. State, (1980) Ind., 412 N.E.2d 783. Furthermore, it is axiomatic that where the party with the burden of proof suffers a negativ......
-
State v. Mead, No. 5720
...or mitigation without limiting the court to those matters alone. Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-50-1A-7 (Burns 1979); see Basham v. State, Ind., 422 N.E.2d 1206 (B) Quantum of proof Defendant also contends that, although the alteration sentencing statute contemplates a finding as to the aggravating ......
-
Vaughan v. State, No. 2-782A206
...297, 280 N.E.2d 602, 603-04; Zarnik v. State, (1977) 172 Ind.App. 593, 604, 361 N.E.2d 202, 208. See also Basham v. State, (1981) Ind., 422 N.E.2d 1206, Vaughan has not challenged the language of the statute nor claimed it to be misleading. Indeed, although brief, we deem the language to pa......
-
Stader v. State, No. 2-1082A356
...this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. See Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-4-1(b) (Burns 1979 Repl.); Basham v. State, (1981) Ind., 422 N.E.2d 1206. The standard for appellate review for this defense was clearly delineated in Turner v. State, (1981) Ind., 428 N.E.2d 1244, at 1246, where the S......
-
Ramos v. State, No. 881S204
...§ 35-41-4-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.). We have consistently upheld this statute against constitutional arguments. Basham v. State, (1981) Ind., 422 N.E.2d 1206; Price v. State, (1980) Ind., 412 N.E.2d 783. Furthermore, it is axiomatic that where the party with the burden of proof suffers a negativ......