Basil N. And Ruth M. Proctor v. Vanessa Hufnail
| Decision Date | 05 December 1940 |
| Citation | 16 A.2d 518,111 Vt. 365 |
| Parties | BASIL N. AND RUTH M. PROCTOR v. VANESSA HUFNAIL ET AL |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
November Term, 1940.
Mandamus.---1 P. L. 4268 and P. L. 4269 Sec. 6 of No. 89 of Acts of 1935.---2. Officer's Discretion without Judicial Interference.---3. Discretionary Decision Final.---4. Inquiry and Judgment make Discretionary.---5. Disposition of Discretionary Duty Binding.---6. Court not Ordinarily Control Discretionary Duties.---7. Mandamus might Substitute Court's Judgment for Official's.---8. Court's Judgment Cannot Replace Official's.---9. Mandamus may be Exercised to Prevent Abuse of Power.---10. Transportation Contract under P. L. 4268 and P. L. 4269 Sec. 6 of No. 89 of Acts of 1935.
1. P L. 4268 providing that a school board shall control and regulate transportation and board of pupils and P. L. 4269 Sec. 6 of No. 89 of the Acts of 1935 allowing transportation to be furnished pupils give a discretionary control and management of transportation of school pupils to the board of school directors.
2. An officer who is intrusted with a duty which requires the exercise of his judgment and discretion is entitled to proceed therein without judicial interference.
3. An officer whose duties require the exercise of judgment and discretion may render a decision that will be final and conclusive.
4. If a duty charged upon an officer is one that necessarily involves an inquiry of fact and an exercise of judgment on the case presented the duty is not ministerial but discretionary.
5. An officer's disposition of a duty that is discretionary will be binding upon the courts.
6. Courts can not ordinarily control the performance of an official duty or act involving the exercise of judgment or discretion with respect to the particular action which should be taken in the matter.
7. The use of mandamus to compel a board or official to decide a matter involving the exercise of judgment or discretion in a certain way would substitute the judgment of the court for that of the board or official.
8. The law does not permit the judgment of a court to be substituted for the judgment and discretion of a board or officer charged with the exercise thereof.
9. Mandamus may be resorted to in the absence of other legal remedy to prevent an arbitrary abuse of power vested in a school board if it amounts to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined upon them by law.
10. P L. 4268 and P. L. 4269 Sec. 6 of No. 89 of the Acts of 1935 contemplate that some contract or understanding regarding a pupil's transportation must be arranged with the school board before it is authorized to pay for the same.
APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS brought to the Supreme Court against the defendants as the board of school directors of the town of Reading. Heard by the whole Court at November Term, 1940.
Petition dismissed with costs to the petitionees.
Lee S. Tillotson for petitioners.
Ernest E. Moore and Fred E. Gleason for the petitionees.
Present: MOULTON, C. J., SHERBURNE, BUTTLES, STURTEVANT and JEFFORDS, JJ.
The petitioners, Basil N. Proctor and Ruth M. Proctor, are here seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the defendants, the board of school directors for the town of Reading, to furnish facilities for the transportation of their son Robert between his home and the school at Felchville in said town "equal with the facilities which are furnished other students of said school resident in the same vicinity." They also ask that said school board be ordered to pay to them reasonable and equitable compensation for such transportation as they have already furnished their said son between his home and said school.
From the findings the following facts appear.
The petitioners own a farm in said town located by road one and one-half miles westerly from Bailey's Mills at the end of a dead end highway. The distance from this farm to Bailey's Mills through the fields is about one mile. Petitioners have resided on this farm since May, 1937. Their son Robert is a normal boy twelve years of age and in good health. The first two years they lived at their present home Robert attended the school at Bailey's Mills, hereinafter referred to as the "old school." He did not attend here during the school year of 1939-40 but received home instruction from his mother. The town furnished no transportation to Robert while he attended the old school. At the beginning of the current school year the old school was discontinued and pupils in this vicinity were required to attend the school at Felchville, hereinafter referred to as the "new school."
About ten years ago the school directors of the town laid out a school bus route. While the driver of this route resides at Bailey's Mills and so starts from there, the route proper begins at a highway intersection about one mile northeasterly from Bailey's Mills, thence in a general northerly direction about one and one-half miles, thence southwesterly about one-third mile, thence southerly and southeasterly about one and one-half miles to the place of beginning thence southwesterly about one mile to Bailey's Mills. This route is now and since it was laid out has been in use each school year. At the beginning of the present school year it was extended from Bailey's Mills to Felchville, a distance of about four and one-half miles. From the point of starting until the bus reaches Bailey's Mills the only pupils picked up are the Rowley children who live about two miles from where the old school was located. One of these is a six-year-old girl and the other is her brother about thirteen years of age. The bus now transports twelve children to the new school and all of these are picked up and discharged at their homes excepting the two Gibson children, two girls of the ages of six and nine years who walk about one-fourth mile from their home to get the bus connection. The petitioners have refused the offer of the school directors to furnish transportation for Robert from Bailey's Mills to the new school and return, and have been transporting him from his home to and from the new school. This has been done under no contract or agreement with the school board. The school board have refused and now refuse to furnish transportation to Robert other than that offered as above stated because they are of the opinion that the partial transportation offered is all that is reasonable and...
To continue reading
Request your trial