Baskin v. Bogan
| Decision Date | 25 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 1:14–cv–00355–RLY–TAB,1:14–cv–00406–RLY–MJD.,1:14–cv–00404–RLY–TAB,s. 1:14–cv–00355–RLY–TAB |
| Citation | 12 F.Supp.3d 1144 |
| Parties | Marilyn Rae BASKIN and Esther Fuller; Bonnie Everly and Linda Judkins; Dawn Lynn Carver and Pamela Ruth Elease Eanes; Henry Greene and Glenn Funkhouser, individually and as parents and next friends of C.A.G.; Nikole Quasney, and Amy Sandler, individually and as parents and next friends of A.Q.-S. and M.Q.-S., Plaintiffs, v. Penny BOGAN, in her official capacity as Boone County Clerk; Karen M. Martin, in her official capacity as Porter County Clerk ; Michael A. Brown, in his official capacity as Lake County Clerk; Peggy Beaver, in her official capacity as Hamilton County Clerk; William C. VanNess II, M.D., in his official capacity as the Commissioner, Indiana State Department of Health; and Greg Zoeller, in his official capacity as Indiana Attorney General, Defendants. Midori Fujii; Melody Layne and Tara Betterman; Scott and Rodney Moubray–Carrico; Monica Wehrle and Harriet Miller; Gregory Hasty and Christopher Vallero; Rob MacPherson and Steven Stolen, individually and as parents and next friends of L. M.-C. and A. M.-S., Plaintiffs, v. Governor, State of Indiana, in his official capacity; Commissioner, Indiana State Department of Health, in his official capacity; Commissioner, Indiana State Department of Revenue, in his official capacity; Clerk, Allen County, Indiana, in her official capacity; Clerk, Hamilton County, Indiana, in her official capacity, Defendants. Officer Pamela Lee, Candace Batten–Lee, Officer Teresa Welborn, Elizabeth J. Piette, Batallion Chief Ruth Morrison, Martha Leverett, Sergeant Karen Vaughn–Kajmowicz, Tammy Vaughn–Kajmowicz, and J.S. V., T.S. V., T.R.V., by their parents and next friends Sergeant Karen Vaughn–Kajmowicz and Tammy Vaughn–Kajmowicz, Plaintiffs, v. Mike Pence, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Indiana; Brian Abbott, Chris Atkins, Ken Cochran, Steve Daniels, Jodi Golden, Michael Pinkham, Kyle Rosebrough, and Bret Swanson, in their official capacities as members of the Board of Trustees of the Indiana Public Retirement System ; and Steve Russo, in his official capacity as Executive Director of the Indiana Public Retirement System, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Barbara J. Baird, The Law Office of Barbara J. Baird, Indianapolis, IN, Brent Phillip Ray, Jordan Heinz, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Chicago, IL, Camilla B. Taylor, Christopher R. Clark, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Chicago, IL, Paul D. Castillo, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiffs.
Robert V. Clutter, Kirtley, Taylor, Sims, Chadd & Minnette, P.C., Lebanon, IN, Elizabeth A. Knight, Valparaiso, IN, John S. Dull, Law Office of John S. Dull, PC, Merrillville, IN, Nancy Moore Tiller, Nancy Moore Tiller & Associates, Crown Point, IN, Omas M. Fisher, Office of the Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Darren J. Murphy, Howard & Associates, Noblesville, IN, for Defendants.
ENTRY ON CROSS–MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The court has before it three cases, Baskin v. Bogan, Fujii v. Pence, and Lee v. Pence . All three allege that Indiana Code Section 31–11–1–1 (“Section 31–11–1–1 ”), which defines marriage as between one man and one woman and voids marriages between same-sex persons, is facially unconstitutional. Plaintiffs in the Baskin and Fujii cases challenge the entirety of Section 31–11–1–1, while Plaintiffs in the Lee case challenge only Section 31–11–1–1(b). Plaintiffs, in all three cases, allege that Section 31–11–1–1 violates their rights to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In each case, Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief against the respective Defendants. Also in each case, Plaintiffs and Defendants have moved for summary judgment, agreeing that there are no issues of material fact. For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that Indiana's same sex marriage ban violates the due process clause and equal protection clause and is, therefore, unconstitutional. The court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Defendants' motions.
The court considers the case of Baskin v. Bogan to be the lead case and thus will recite only those facts relevant to that dispute. In Baskin v. Bogan, Plaintiffs are comprised of five same-sex couples and three minor children of two of the couples. (Amended Complaint ¶ 1, Filing No. 30).1 Four couples, Marilyn Rae Baskin and Esther Fuller, Bonnie Everly and Linda Judkins, Dawn Carver and Pamela Eanes, Henry Greene and Glenn Funkhouser (collectively the “unmarried plaintiffs”), are not married; one couple, Nikole Quasney and Amy Sandler (collectively the “married plaintiffs”), married in Massachusetts while on their annual vacation to the Sandler family home. Each couple resides in Indiana and has been in a loving, committed relationship for over a decade. Each couple has their own set of fears and concerns should something happen to his or her significant other.
Plaintiffs challenge Section 31–11–1–1, which states:
In addition, Plaintiffs broadly challenge other Indiana statutes that have the effect of carrying out the marriage ban.(hereinafter, collectively, with Section 31–11–1–1, referred to as “Indiana's marriage laws”). On April 10, 2014, the court granted a temporary restraining order (Filing No. 51) prohibiting the Baskin Defendants from enforcing Section B against Nikole Quasney and Amy Sandler. The parties in Baskin agreed to fully brief their motions for preliminary injunction and summary judgments for a combined hearing held on May 2, 2014. The court granted a preliminary injunction extending the temporary restraining order. (Filing No. 65). The court now considers the cross motions for summary judgment in the three cases.
In order to marry in the State of Indiana, a couple must apply for and be issued a marriage license. See Ind.Code § 31–11–4–1. The couple need not be residents of the state. See Ind.Code § 31–11–4–3. However, the two individuals must be at least eighteen years of age or meet certain exceptions. See Ind.Code § 31–11–1–4 ; Ind.Code § 31–11–1–5. An application for a marriage license must include information such as full name, birthplace, residence, age, and information about each person's parents.See Ind.Code § 31–11–4–4.2 The application only has blanks for information from a male and female applicant. See Marriage License Application, available at www. in.gov/judiciary/2605.htm. It is a Class D Felony to provide inaccurate information in the marriage license or to provide inaccurate information about one's physical condition.3 See Ind.Code § 31–11–11–1 ; Ind.Code § 31–11–11–3. The clerk may not issue a license if an individual has been adjudged mentally incompetent or is under the influence of alcohol or drugs. See Ind.Code § 31–11–4–11.
The marriage license serves as the legal authority to solemnize a marriage. See Ind.Code § 31–11–4–14. The marriage may be solemnized by religious or non-religious figures. See Ind.Code § 31–11–6–1. If an individual attempts to solemnize a marriage in violation of Indiana Code Chapter 31–11–1, which includes same-sex marriages, then that person has committed a Class B Misdemeanor. See Ind.Code § 31–11–11–7.
In addition to prohibiting same-sex marriages, Indiana prohibits bigamous marriages and marriages between relatives more closely related than second cousins unless they are first cousins over the age of sixty-five. See Ind.Code § 31–11–1–2 (cousins); see Ind.Code § 31–11–1–3 (polygamy). Nevertheless, when evaluating the legality of marriages, the Indiana Supreme Court found that “the presumption in favor of matrimony is one of the strongest known to law.” Teter v. Teter, 101 Ind. 129, 131–32 (Ind.1885). In general, Indiana recognizes out-of-state marriages that were valid in the location performed. Bolkovac v. State, 229 Ind. 294, 98 N.E.2d 250, 254 (1951) ().
The purpose of summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the record “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party on the particular issue. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
On a motion for summary judgment, the burden rests with the moving party to demonstrate “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). After the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue for trial, the responsibility shifts to the non-movant to “go beyond the pleadings” and point to evidence of a genuine factual dispute precluding summary judgment. Id. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “If the non-movant does not come forward with evidence that would reasonably permit the finder of fact to find in her favor on a material question, then the court must enter summary judgment against her.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir.1994) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., ...
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